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PREFACE
This study paper has been prepared on contract for
the Administrative Law Project of the Law Reform Commis-
sion of Canada. Work on it commenced in the Fall of 1978
on a part-time basis. During the Fall and Winter of 1978
research was conducted and interviews were held with a
variety of participants in the regulatory process, agency
and government department and ministerial officials,
their policy advisors and counsel, and representatives
and counsel of the Privy Council Office, as well as
clients of regulatory boards. Without the generous as-
sistance of these persons the paper could not have been
written.
The paper was written in March, 1979 and takes
account of the relevant events and decisions by regula-
tors and the courts up until mid-March, 1979. The final
draft was prepared in May and June, 1979. The author
alone is responsible for the opinions expressed in the
paper and, of course, for any errors or misrepresenta-
tions that it may contain.

INTRODUCTION
This introduction sets forth the structure and
objectives of the study paper. The paper consists of
three main parts:
1. A description of the legislative schemes pres-
ently in use which provide for executive review
and appeal powers and a detailed review of the
exercise of these powers in the last ten years;
2. An assessment of the performance and impact of
these powers on the administrative law process;
and
3. The proposal of new models for the generation,
interpretation, implementation, review and
enforcement of regulatory policy.
In the first part the development of independent
regulatory bodies in Canada is sketched with reference to
the Canadian Transport Commission, the Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission, the Nation-
al Energy Board, the Foreign Investment Review Agency,
and administrative and review bodies created by the Anti-
Inflation Act . The aims or goals sought to be realized
by government through the creation of independent bodies
for the purposes of regulation are also outlined. Legis-
lative schemes presently in use in Canada providing for
executive review and appeal powers in the administrative
law area are described in Chapter II. Reference to the
material in Appendix A, clarifying how the statutory
powers discussed and made the basis of the classification
proposed for the purposes of this paper were selected,
will assist the reader in understanding this Chapter.
Here, as throughout the paper, it was necessary to
take into account executive powers other than those mere-
ly of review and appeal over the decisions of statutory
decision makers. If one purpose of a study paper on
ministerial review powers and petitions to the Governor
in Council from decisions of federal boards, commissions
and tribunals is to ascertain the extent of executive
control over the substance of decisions of these bodies,
then clearly directive powers, enabling the executive to
interpret policy or define the parameters within which
the statutory decision-maker is to exercise original dis-
cretion, are as significant as review and appeal powers.
Similarly the locus of regulation-making powers is sig-
nificant. Effective control over the implementation of a
legislative policy mandate may be exercised through regu-
lation making powers. In regulations the policy aims of
the legislation are interpreted for the purpose of appli-
cation in future regulatory decisions. Regulations may
be drafted to leave a greater or lesser scope for discre-
tion to the statutory decision-maker in the course of
adjudication. At present most regulations are made by
the executive rather than by regulatory bodies or Parlia-
ment and subject only to the review as to form but not
substance provided for by the Statutory Instruments Act .
Chapter III focuses in some detail on the Canadian
Transport Commission, the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission, the National Energy Board,
the Foreign Investment Review Act
,
and the Anti-Inflation
Act . The statutory provisions for review and appeal by
the executive of decisions under these mandates are de-
scribed and the recent exercise of these powers is exam-
ined. The procedures, formal and informal, used in
ministerial review and on petitions to the Governor in
Council are then described insofar as it has been pos-
sible to obtain reliable information about them. Other
matters pertaining to the disposition of petitions by the
Governor in Council are then discussed, such as, the par-
ties, costs, nature of the issues, dispositions, reasons
or absence thereof, typical impact on the regulator and
the incidence of court actions in the same matter.
Finally, the Case Studies in Chapter VI have been provid-
ed as a conclusion to the first part of the paper because
they give concrete exemplification of issues and problems
associated with the executive review and appeal schemes
currently in use. Familiarity with recent cases will
assist the non-specialist reader in grasping and evaluat-
ing both the significance of the issues discussed in the
second part (Chapter VII) of the paper and the adequacy
of the models proposed in the third part (Chapter VIII)
to deal with these issues and with the problems I per-
ceive to exist with current executive review and appeal
powers, procedures and their impact on the administrative
law process.
The second part assesses current performance in the
exercise of statutory executive review and appeal powers
and their impact on the administrative law process.
First, however, the values with reference to which this
assessment is to be performed are explicitly identified.
The governmental function commonly ascribed to executive
review and appeal powers is then examined and the extent
to which it is desirable to have policies subject to con-
trol by the executive is itself placed in question.
Thirdly, recent judicial decisions in administrative law
concerning directives, fettering of the discretion of
statutory decision-makers, delegation of ministerial
powers, bias on the part of the administrators and ad-
ministrative boards and review tribunals, the concept of
ultra vires
,
and the duty of fairness, are examined for
the purpose of extracting an indication of current ten-
dencies in Canadian administrative law with a view to
applying emergent legal principles in the following
assessment of current powers and practices in the area of
executive review.
Only when the standards or measures to be relied on
have been clearly identified is the assessment itself
made. The use of different standards than those relied
on here might result in the identification of other
problems with executive review than those I perceive to
exist or the proposal of a distinct set of recommenda-
tions. I have merely argued that insofar as priority is
placed, as it is in this paper, on the enhancement of
specific and clearly identified values and principles in
government, current executive review and appeal powers
and practices are, on examination, revealed to be proble-
matic and in need of change. The recommendations I put
forward to resolve the problems identified are grounded
on this same set of values and principles.
The third part of the paper, proposing alternative
models for the generation, interpretation, implementa-
tion, review and enforcement of regulatory policy, bases
itself squarely on the conclusions of the second part and
attempts both to incorporate the administrative law prin-
ciples identified as emergent and to avoid the flaws
identified in current review and appeal provisions. In
addition, in the course of parts one and two of the paper
certain questions were identified, explicitly or implic-
itly, as being key to a resolution of existing problems
in the area of executive review over decisions of regula-
tory bodies. Among these were: 1. What do we mean by
"accountability"? 2. What meaning and role does "rule
of law" have in the regulatory area? 3. What is policy,
after all? 4. Who should have authority to enact policy
as "law" and by what process should secondary legislation
stating policy in the regulatory area be enacted? 5. To
what extent is it inevitable that adjudication will often
have as its by-product the generation of policy? 6. Are
the governmental mechanisms which would be required to
render policy generating adjudication impossible or
unnecessary themselves desirable? 7. What, in fact, is
the current effective distribution of legislative power
in Canada and does this arrangement serve the "public
interest"? 8. Is there any effective process for deter-
mining what constitutes the "public interest"? 9, Do
the policy preferences of the federal Cabinet necessarily
give due weight to the "public interest"? 10. How can
the "public interest", once identified, best be protected
against other competing legitimate interests in the regu-
latory process? It is clear that my responses to these
questions and my evaluation of the merits of alternative
mechanisms for the generation of secondary legislation
interpreting and implementing policy have influenced the
proposals for reform I put forward in the third part of
the paper.
In the course of the third part, two models for
dealing with policy from its generation to its enforce-
ment are proposed. The first and more comprehensive
model envisions fundamental changes in the regulatory
area and places emphasis on the importance of a conscious
choice by Parliament of a regulatory mechanism for each
regulated sector overtly designed to provide the degree,
type and combination of political control and insulation
desired in that sector, for policy generation, interpre-
tation, application, enforcement, review and appeal. The
other model is designed to improve treatment of policy in
the regulatory area by means of relatively minor but
significant adjustments to remove major flaws and the
most obvious sources of potential abuse of power. Rele-
vant portions of the Final Report of the Royal Commission
on Financial Management and Accountability (Lambert Com-
mission), March 1979, are referred to insofar as their
approach, conclusions and recommendations are in conflict
with my own. I hope this will serve to enrich debate 1
surrounding reform of government in the regulatory area
by highlighting some of the fundamental political choices
to be made with regard to allocation of power over the
generation and implementation of policy. Only when these
choices are consciously made is it possible to evaluate
the merits of one regulatory mechanism over another as a
means both to achieve the desired locus or distribution
of power and perform the regulatory task.
Chapter IX, not an integral part of the study
paper, briefly reviews outstanding problems in the regu-
lation of energy, transport and communication which
require for their adequate resolution a large measure of
federal and provincial cooperation and indicate the need
for an on-going examination of how federal and provincial
priorities and jurisdictions can be most workably coordi-
nated in the regulatory area. It is argued that while a
directive power in the Minister or Governor in Council
would appear to provide a mechanism for ensuring that
federal regulatory bodies adhered to policy contained in
federal-provincial agreements (as interpreted by the
Minister or federal cabinet) or regarded by the federal
cabinet as necessary for the implementation of such
agreements, a directive power is by no means the only nor
necessarily the most effective mechanism that can be used
to achieve this effect. In addition, directive powers
for use in co-ordinating federal and provincial regula-
tion are subject to the same general criticisms made in
the earlier chapters of directive powers and of the pro-
posals made by the Lambert Commission with regard to
directive powers. In and of itself, moreover, the exist-
ence of a directive power obviously does nothing to
ensure that federal-provincial agreement will come about
in the first place. It is disingenuous to treat the
independence of federal regulatory bodies from Cabinet as
a scapegoat for federal-provincial conflict.
The information in the Appendices is provided for
reference purposes in conjunction with the first and
second parts of the paper.

Chapter I
SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
BODIES IN CANADA
There is no unanimity in Canada today either over
the proper governmental function of independent regula-
tory bodies or the adequacy of their performance of day-
to-day governmental functions. This situation seems to
stem in large part from the fact that independent regula-
tory bodies in Canada have grown up in ad hoc fashion as
they were perceived to be a politically expedient or
otherwise desirable means to solve the problems of
government in a period of rapid economic and techno-
logical growth and development. Expertise, insulation
from partisan political considerations in the development
of policy, and the adoption of a court-like model in
adjudication over specialized subject-matter, have all
been seen as benefits to be gained from their creation.
It would appear, however, that the political theory
underlying the adoption of an independent regulatory
model was never fully thought through, or, when it was
thoroughly examined the political implications of its
adoption were either not given a uniform interpretation
or not unanimously accepted. Lack of unanimity on the
political significance of use of a vehicle institution-
ally separate from Parliament and government departments
for purposes of regulation is, moreover, not a surprising
result where effective power over political decisions has
not been clearly and unmistakably reallocated as a result
of changes in the institutional framework or has been re-
allocated in a manner effectively different from that
intended by Parliament and enacted by statute.
In this matter as in other areas Canada has found
itself in a cross current between the British Parliamen-
tary tradition and the American Congressional model more
closely at hand. The two currents are in certain major
respects contradictory, the British system retaining the
notion of ministerial responsibility for each sector of
government whereas the American system in its preference
for a division of power has created the independent regu-
latory agency as a fourth head of power in government
without an apparent master other than the law and its own
conscience.. As yet these contradictory influences have
not been integrated in Canada in a coherent basic theory
of regulation. The practice of regulation in Canada is
seen to suffer as a result.
The lack of unanimity on the nature and function of
the independent regulatory body in Canada is reflected in
the fact that it is possible at present to obtain as many
diverse definitions of a regulatory body and its role as
there are spokesmen. At the same time it is quickly
realized that the institutional and administrative ties
of any person of whom a tentative assessment is requested
appear to strongly colour the answer given. The theo-
retical model chosen frequently, and not surprisingly, is
that which will most neatly accord with the speaker's
preferences as to the practical distribution of power in
the regulatory area in Canada. Most government officials
with close ties to a Minister's office or the Privy
Council tend to espouse a ministerial model cast in the
British tradition. At the same time they recognize that
in Canada ministerial responsibility is often collective
rather than individual by virtue of the sweeping powers
of approval vested in the Governor in Council and exer-
cised on the basis of ministerial recommendations. Asso-
ciates of the more independent of the regulatory bodies
tend to emphasize that the source of their mandate and
powers is statutory. Within the four corners of that
mandate they perceive themselves to be under a positive
duty to exercise the powers conferred by or pursuant to
statute as interpreted from time to time by the courts.
In the context of such distinct points of emphasis
it is easy for self-righteous confrontations to develop
between the Cabinet and individual Ministers on the one
hand and a federal regulatory body on the other. This is
seen in the area not only of policy generation but also
those of policy implementation and adjudication. It is
clear that somewhere in government there resides power
over each of these areas. What is terribly unclear at
present, however, is not only where in both theory and
practice these powers do primarily reside, for the effec-
tive independence of an institutionally separate regula-
tory body from other loci of political power may be
illusory, but also where they should reside.
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The preliminary stage to resolving this contest
over allocation of power in the regulatory area is to
clarify the facts and to identify sources of confusion
lying in the diverse conceptual frameworks to which the
protagonists refer and the allocations of power that are
theoretically associated with these conceptual frame-
works. It is hoped, for example, that the concepts of
"accountability" and "policy" will be clarified somewhat
during the course of this study paper and that a direct
consequence of greater conceptual clarity will be less
obfuscation in debate about distribution of power in the
regulatory area.
A. THE CANADIAN TRANSPORT COMMISSION
The predecessor of the Canadian Transport Commis-
sion, the Railway Committee of the Privy Council estab-
lished under the Railway Act of 1851, was the first
regulatory body established in Canada. Jurisdiction over
regulation of the railways was transferred in 1903 from
the Railway Committee of the Privy Council to the newly
established Board of Railway Commissioners. The McLean
reports tabled in 1899 and 1902 had suggested the trans-
fer of responsibility for regulation of the railways from
the part-time Cabinet committee to full-time, expert,
non-elected commissioners. The statutory review and
appeal provisions, now seen in section 64 of the National
Transportation *\ct ,2 were enacted at this time to provide
for judicial appeal from the board on questions of law or
jurisdiction and for variance or rescission of board
decisions by the Governor in Council either on petition
or by his own motion.
The period from 1903 until 1967, when the current
regulatory entity for transportation, the Canadian Trans-
port Commission (CTC), was created to assume the regula-
tory functions of the Air Transport Board, the Board of
Transport Commissioners for Canada, and the Canadian
Maritime Commission, saw a massive expansion of the
transportation industry in Canada. The most rapid
growth, both in the industry itself and in the regulatory
mechanisms, occurred in the period subsequent to World
War II. At present the Canadian Transport Commission,
like its sister the Ministry of Transport (MOT), is a
very large and intricate part of the Canadian government
exercising great power with sweeping economic and
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therefore political implications. The two significant
qualifications to the autonomy of the Commission under
the National Transportation Act are the availability of
variance or rescission of final Commission decisions by
the Governor in Council on petition or by his own motion
under section 64, as mentioned above, and the Ministerial
appeal under section 25. The former is applicable to all
final adjudicative decisions; the latter is applicable
only to decisions pertaining to air, water or motor
vehicle licences or certificates of public convenience
and necessity with regard to commodity pipelines.
Tension between the Ministry of Transport and the
Canadian Transport Commission developed rapidly in the
period after the passage of the National Transportation
Act in 1967. In large part this was a product of the
different interpretations of the respective functions and
powers of the executive and the Commission referred to in
the first section of this chapter. This tension, associ-
ated both with generation of policy and adjudication, has
not found any creative outlet.
In the area of adjudication supporters of the view
that the Commission was in essence a judicial body, and
in any event not a branch or extension of the department
but rather independent, resisted all inferences that the
Commission was required in the exercise of its adjudica-
tory powers to have reference to interim ministry policy
statements in addition to the policy content of the
legislation itself. From this stance the Commission was
viewed as an independent regulatory body in the strong
sense and any attempt to influence its interpretation of
the existing legislation by means of interim ministerial
policy statements were viewed as attempts at ministerial
interference and improper. At the same time and for the
same reasons exercise of ministerial review powers and
action by the Governor in Council on petitions were seen
as potentially abusive of Commission jurisdiction. Were
these forms of review to be available in response only to
the most broadly couched political questions or were they
to be available in any instance where the Commission was
seen to have interpreted transportation policy as set
forth in the National Transportation Act in a manner
different or to a different effect than that preferred by
Cabinet?
Section 22 of the National Transportation Act gives
extensive advisory powers to the Commission with regard
to on-going policy development. The section is clearly
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open to either a strong or weak interpretation. In the
early 1970 f s the Ministry of Transport took strong ini-
tiatives in the area of policy development with the
establishment of the Task Force on Transportation whose
Reports appeared in June of 1975.3 The personnel of the
Canadian Transport Commission had little involvement with
the work of this task force and, in some cases, felt
actually excluded from consultation. This was not bene-
ficial to relations between the Ministry and the Commis-
sion. Simultaneous with the tabling of the Reports by
the Task Force, the Minister of Transport affirmed the
view that it was the Minister who was the primary source
of policy on transportation matters and that the National
Transportation Act should be amended to make explicit
provision for a directive power in the Minister.
4
This position seems to have had at least four main
motivations. The first was that the CTC had not aggres-
sively exercised the mandate given to it in the National
Transportation Act to engage in policy planning and
development. The only mechanisms for policy interpreta-
tion and application or implementation available to it
were, in fact, adjudication and limited regulation-making
powers. Policy development by the CTC thus tended to
reach public attention only as a by-product of individual
adjudicatory decisions. Policy statements to inform the
public of the general outlines of Commission policy as it
evolved were not issued. The second was that the Minis-
ter of Transport either did not perceive the political
value of insulating the executive government from politi-
cal responsibility for the routine decisions in the area
of transport regulation or preferred a larger measure of
executive control and responsibility. The ministerial
appeal under section 25 had been used as a vehicle by the
Minister to implement his own policy where no other
formal mechanism whereby he might influence CTC policy
existed. The third was that the administrators in the
Ministry of Transport found themselves without a clear
legislative mandate to engage in the type of policy
analysis and development which would justify their exis-
tence; and fourthly, there was considerable pressure from
the transportation industry for a clear and coherent
transportation policy which would allow them to engage in
advanced planning. From the point of view of the client
of a regulatory board it is clearly preferable to be able
to make business decisions based upon a reliable antici-
pation of board policy rather than being placed in the
position of having to adjust expectations in response to
policy decisions made primarily as a by-product of
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individual adjudicative decisions. Although this request
from industry could have been met by the CTC within its
mandate under the Act, it is understandable that the MOT
would have relied on industry dissatisfaction with CTC
policy planning to support the position that the Minister
was the only appropriate source for policy.
Bill C-33, introduced in 1977, in fact contained a
provision for a directive power in the executive. This
draft provision was criticized as one which would enable
the government to engage in political rate-making. Bill
C-20, introduced November 16, 1978, did not contain such
a directive power. Proponents of a strong Commission are
relieved for they saw Bill C-33 as in effect an attempt
to reallocate significant power over policy interpreta-
tion from the Commission to the Ministry. The net
result, however, is that the tensions mentioned above
between the Ministry and the Commission still exist in an
unresolved form. The primary legislation is still suffi-
ciently ambiguous to be open to diverse interpretation,
the future outlines of transportation policy to be
enacted in secondary legislation have not been agreed
upon, and Commission clients remain dissatisfied because
of the existence of what they perceive to be a policy
vacuum.
THE CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
From 1932 until 1958 broadcasting in Canada was
regulated by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)
as an adjunct to its own broadcasting activities. In
1958 the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC) was
created and in 1976 jurisdiction over telecommunications
was transferred from the Canadian Transport Commission to
the newly created Canadian Radio-Television and Tele-
communications Commission. 5 Today regulation of broad-
casting and regulation of telecommunications are carried
on as distinct functions of the Commission.
The dominant motivation in the establishment of a
strong independent regulatory body for broadcasting and
telecommunications has been the widely held desire to
protect against the potential abuses of political control
over national communication and information dispersal
systems. The principle that regulation of communications
14
media in Canada must ensure freedom of expression and
respect the existing diversity of cultural, social and
political values and viewpoints has not been placed in
question.
Controversy has arisen, however, over how this
principle is to be implemented. Technological develop-
ment and a rebirth of strong regionalism after the tem-
porary mellow federalism of the late 1960 f s have both
added to the intensity of these controversies. As a
consequence, communications policy in Canada in the
1970* s has been marked by a series of federal-provincial
confrontations characterized by allegations of centralism
on the one hand and parochialism on the other. The role
in these confrontations of the significance of the com-
munications industry within the national economy cannot
be overlooked while at the same time recognizing that
practical implementation of protections for freedom of
expression and access to communications media have come
to be seen by the provinces as requiring that more
authority over the media be placed at the local level.
The last piece of draft communications legislation,
Bill C-16, tabled November 9th, 1978, provided in section
9 for a power of direction in the Governor in Council
whereby the Governor in Council, subject to certain
restrictions, could "issue directions to the Commission,
respecting the implementation of telecommunications
policy for Canada enunciated in section 3". The section
was drafted to prohibit the Governor in Council from
issuing directives with regard to particular licence
applications, rates for carriers, program content or
standards or "the restriction of freedom of expression" .6
Passage of a section like this would transfer significant
power over policy interpretation and development from the
CRTC to the federal Cabinet and indirectly to the Minis-
try of Communications.
In considering the appropriateness of a given allo-
cation of power over policy generation and interpreta-
tion, it must be realized, firstly, that neither the
Commission nor the Ministry alone can resolve the variety
of federal-provincial controversies mentioned above (pre-
cisely because resolution of these problems will require
a major redrafting of enabling legislation, both federal
and provincial, to provide for clearer definition of
problematic terms and greater inter-delegation of regula-
tory powers). Secondly, the Ministry often is appre-
hended to be by its nature more subject than the
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Commission to pressure from vested economic interests and
partisan political forces. In its interpretation of the
"public interest", the Ministry may be apprehended as
prone to give far greater weight against other considera-
tions than does the Commission to the long term economic
interests of the communications carriers. It is commonly
recognized' that when there is a strong free enterprise
sector in the national economy, government will neces-
sarily pay heed to the requirements of business, es-
pecially those of large corporations, as the well-being
of the national economy depends to an extent on the
continuing reinvestment of capital by private sector
enterprises. Thus although it is recognized that there
is some truth in the statement that "what f s good for Bell
Canada is good for Canada," the Commission, because of
its apparent insulation from political forces, is often
thought to be in a better position than the Ministry to
both perceive and pursue other truths as well and thus
define the "public interest" with reference to the
breadth of the mandate for Canadian communication policy
as expressed in section 3 of the Broadcasting Act . In
fact this conclusion may be based on false premises.
Commission members and staff, by virtue of a combination
of informal contacts with Ministry officials and staff,
political allegiances forged during assignments within
the public service or other government positions and
their own personal political ideologies, may in fact be
subject not only to informal partisan political pressures
but also to institutional biases previously acquired and
unexamined personal assumptions or opinions.
Certain of these flaws in the independence of the
Commission may be reduced by measures proposed in Chapter
VIII such as increased public participation in the regu-
latory process, an absolute prohibition on off-the-record
ex parte consultations by Commission members and staff
with officials and staff of government or industry, and
by a re-examination of the process by which members of
the Commission are selected for appointment. An alter-
nate approach to the problem would be an open recognition
of the highly political nature of the regulatory process,
recognition that the regulatory process involves choices
between fundamentally distinct views as to how national
resources should be allocated as well as the resolution
of technical or instrumental issues. As will be seen in
Chapter VIII, these alternatives are not mutually exclu-
sive.
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Moreover, repoliticization, which it should be
recognized would be one result of granting the executive
a directive power over "independent" regulatory bodies,
can be achieved by other means ensuring political input
into policy interpretation and development more represen-
tative of the multiple facets of the "public interest"
than can be reflected in the, at times narrow partisan,
orientation of the executive. In the following chapters
I argue that involvement of Crown enterprises in the com-
munications sector only increases the need for insulation
of the regulatory function from informal executive influ-
ence and formal executive dictation of policy such as
would occur with the ministerial or Governor in Council
directive.
C. THE NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD
The National Energy Board7 (NEB) was created in
1959 as a result of the Pipeline Debate in 1956. The
Gordon Royal Commission^, appointed by the Liberal
Government, and the Borden Royal Commission^, appointed
in 1957 by the Conservative Government, both suggested
the formation of a national energy authority to advise
the government on energy policy and exercise control over
exports of gas, oil and power. With the passage of the
National Energy Board Act , the Pipe Lines Act and the
Exportation of Power and Fluids and Importation of Gas
Act were repealed. Gas and oil were to be regulated by
the new Board, as was electrical power insofar as it was
exported. Thus, despite its name, the NEB was not con-
ceived as a general umbrella regulatory body for all
types of energy but had regulatory functions restricted
to a limited aspect of the energy field. The Board's
mandate under the Act to advise the government on energy
policy is very broad, extending to all aspects of energy
policy in Canada relevant to the public interest. At the
same time its regulations and many of its major decisions
are subject to Cabinet approval. In recent years it has
come under increasing public attention and pressure, both
to adhere to the procedures of natural justice in the
conduct of its hearings and to define the public interest
in broad and comprehensive terms rather than in reliance
solely on the traditional touch stones of rate-making
such as markets, supply, economic viability and the
financial competence of industry applicants.
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D. THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW AGENCY
The Foreign Investment Review Agency 10 (FIRA) was
established in 1974 to provide a mechanism whereby the
federal government could maintain control over the in-
vestment of foreign capital in Canada. Whether that
investment is to take the form of an acquisition of
existing firms, the creation of new businesses, or the
importation of the subsidiary of a foreign corporation,
it is the agency, itself a purely advisory body, which
performs the administrative work involved in reviewing
the application. Each application, together with the
agency recommendation as to its disposition, is laid
before the Governor in Council for a final determina-
tion. A high percentage of the applications made since
the creation of the review process have been approved.
H
E. UNDER THE ANTI-INFLATION ACT
The Anti-Inflation Act , 12 a piece of legislation
designed to provide temporary controls over inflation in
Canada, created three new administrative bodies: the
Office of the Administrator, the Anti-Inflation Board,
and the Anti-Inflation Tribunal. Each was designed to
perform distinct functions in the process of containing
inflation. The Board itself was designed primarily as a
conciliatory body whose function was to serve as a medi-
ator between management and employees in an attempt to
keep wage settlements within the Guidelines as estab-
lished from time to time by the Governor in Council. Its
only discretionary power was an option to refer any
matter to the Administrator. The Administrator was with-
out discretionary powers and could only make a finding of
adherence or non-adherence to the Guidelines and an Order
when this was required. The Tribunal, in turn, was a
purely adjudicative body whose sole function was to hear
appeals from Orders of the Administrator. Cabinet,
perhaps in response to the delicate political climate
surrounding the anti- inflation measures, never chose to
use the power vested in the Governor in Council under
section 24 to vary or rescind Orders of the Administra-
tor^. It may also be the case that no matter came
before the Governor in Council in which there were suffi-
cient inequities as a result of imposition of the Guide-
lines to warrant use of the extraordinary power to grant
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relief vested in the Governor in Council by virtue of
i /
section 24 of the Act,
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CREATION OF INDEPENDENT
BOARDS, COMMISSIONS AND TRIBUNALS
It can be seen from the few boards, commissions and
tribunals discussed above, only a handful compared with
the vast array of such administrative bodies in various
sectors of the federal government, that the nature of the
mandate and powers given an individual regulatory body
may differ greatly depending upon the nature of the job
to be performed and the political considerations con-
ceived to be relevant at the time. The Foreign Invest-
ment Review Agency, and the Anti-Inflation Board, the
Tribunal and the Administrator under the Anti-Inflation
Act , are examples of bodies created to perform a new
administrative function. The same functions might, as
well, have been performed within an existing government
department were it not for the additional considerations
of providing for impartiality and insulating the execu-
tive from both the lobbying tactics of applicants and
political pressures resulting from the application of the
guidelines.
Concern over insulating the political from the
regulatory area was also seen in the example of the
Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commis-
sion. There the emphasis was on protecting the regulator
and its decision rather than the Cabinet. It is fair to
say, however, that the aim of "depoliticization" is a
common theme throughout the regulatory area. Few people
pretend that the matters to be regulated are free from
content that is highly political. Recognition that the
priorities of a given Minister or of the Cabinet of the
day may not necessarily coincide with the long-term
public interest of Canada as a whole lends strength to
the view that the "public interest" is safer when left to
be interpreted by an independent body who can weigh all
legitimate conflicting interests including those of the
executive from a less partisan perspective than would be
taken either by Cabinet or Parliament as we know it. At
the same time Cabinet and Parliament are freed to direct
their attention to broader issues. I have suggested
above that the "depoliticization" actually achieved by
existing regulatory practices and procedures may be
illusory.
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Of late it has been argued that the public service
is now sufficiently professional and responsible as a
group that departmental officials can be entrusted with
the performance of all non-adjudicatory regulatory func-
tions without the danger that their decisions will be
influenced by partisan political considerations. It is
difficult to decide precisely how naive this view is. It
certainly overlooks the fact that part of the ordinary
duty, if you will, of a public servant is to exercise his
skills and experience in support of the political and
policy preferences of his Minister. Skill in identifying
politically relevant aspects of a problem and using these
effectively to advance ministerial policy is his job. If
the lawyer may be caricatured as a "hired gun", then the
professional public servant might be depicted as first
mate responsible for keeping the sail trimmed to the wind
for maximum speed in whichever direction the helmsman
steers the vessel. To ask a public servant within a
government department to approach regulatory matters in
an entirely different fashion from that in which he
usually functions may not be realistic. Concern over the
influence of overtly partisan matters aside, however, it
is still the case that persons associated with a particu-
lar hierarchy over a period of time adopt or are per-
ceived to adopt the values, priorities, perspective and
preferred solutions with reference to which that hier-
archy functions. The closer a person is to the source of
power within a hierarchy, the greater will be the real or
apparent opportunity to influence decisions as to how
that power is to be used. Control over use of power,
even if only partial or illusory, increases the tendency
of the individual to view the goals of the hierarchy as
his/her own. Insofar as he/she identifies with these
goals and the values on which they are grounded, over
time the individual gradually acquires a vested interest
in justifying the validity of certain key assumptions and
the appropriateness of the attitudes flowing from these
assumptions.
In theory, policy in the regulatory area will
therefore be more apt to be innovative and be seen to
reflect the "public interest" if the views of the execu-
tive must compete in an open forum on a merit basis with
alternative views. An example of such an open forum
would be an issue hearing held by a regulatory body in
public in which representations were entertained from all
interested parties including government departments.
Open competition between conflicting interests and view-
points and a dispassionate and impartial weighing of
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their merits will not necessarily occur with the absorp-
tion of regulatory functions into federal departmental
structures unless procedures designed with precisely this
aim in view are adopted.
Another common justification for the creation of
regulatory bodies independent from government departments
has been the perception of a need for an efficient
adjudicative mechanism independent from the Minister and
the department (if only for "high profile" appellate
tasks) together with the recognition that it is inappro-
priate to burden the already established courts with a
glut of highly specialized cases dealing with the inter-
pretation of regulatory provisions. This justification
is, of course, as valid now as it was twenty-five years
ago.
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Chapter II
A CLASSIFICATION OF CURRENT LEGISLATIVE SCHEMES FOR
DISTRIBUTING EXECUTIVE REVIEW AND APPEAL POWERS
There is no uniform structure for the regulatory
board, commission or tribunal in use in Canada at pres-
ent. Many administrative functions are performed within
government departments, with appellate adjudicative func-
tions being handled by a review committee and ultimately
or perhaps in the first instance by a tribunal. In other
cases, complementary or mirror capabilities or functions
exist in the regulatory body and the government ministry
or department with a high degree of inter-consultation,
as between Energy, Mines and Resources and the National
Energy Board, or occasional confrontation and a certain
measure of hostility, as has come to exist between the
Ministry of Transport and the Canadian Transport Commis-
sion, or the Ministry of Communications and the Canadian
Radio-Television and Telecommunication Commission. In
the case of the CTC the hostility has arisen primarily
because of an inherently unworkable division of responsi-
bility between the executive and the Commission for
exercise of the policy generation and implementation
function, and in the case of the CRTC because of Ministry
dissatisfaction with its own lack of power over policy
interpretation and implementation. Some government
departments receive advice from advisory councils, with
or without legislative status, made up either of experts
in the field — as occurs in the social planning area —
or of regulatory clients as has occurred in transporta-
tion and agriculture. The recent integration of the
Unemployment Insurance Commission with the Department of
Manpower and Immigration has created yet a new hybrid
creature — the Department/ Commission. This is not at
all to suggest that the diverse organizational structures
are inappropriate, but rather to emphasize that if one is
interested in understanding the scope of executive
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control over diverse aspects of the administration of
statutory decision-making powers in Canada today, it is
necessary to cast the net rather widely. 16
As was explained above in the Introduction, I
regard executive regulation-making powers and powers of
direction J:o be as significant in determining the extent
of executive control over the substance of the decisions
of regulatory bodies as are executive review and appeal
powers. Even Crown corporations must be considered, for
some of them are not only subject to mechanisms to ensure
executive control like those associated with regulatory
bodies but in a few instances also actually perform regu-
latory functions.
Certain Crown corporations, such as Air Canada and
Petro-Canada, are subject to the direction and control of
the Governor in Council. By section 8 of the Air Canada
Act
,
the corporation is required to comply with "direc-
tions of a general nature" given by the Governor in
Council. Some corporations are explicitly said to be
agents of the federal Crown. Financial re-organization,
the acquisition of subsidiaries or shares in other
corporations, incurring debts, appointment of directors
and alteration of by-laws commonly require the approval
of the Governor in Council. A certain number of Crown
corporations have corporate objects that require them to
engage in both business or the provision of a service and
regulation, as was the case with the CBC before the
creation of the CRTC to handle the regulatory functions
originally assigned to the CBC, and is now the case with
many marketing boards.
Many boards and commissions have a purely advisory
function or, like the Office of the Administrator under
the Anti-Inflation Act , have no discretionary powers and
simply apply a set of rules to the matters coming before
them. A large number of boards, tribunals, and commis-
sions with solely regulatory functions, though organiza-
tionally established as "independent" entities, are in
fact either agents of the federal Crown or are under the
"control and direction" of a minister or the Governor in
Council. At the other end of the spectrum are the CTC
and the CRTC where the independence of the regulatory
body is one of its key characteristics and is only
formally qualified by the provision for executive inter-
vention in a limited number of clearly defined circum-
stances.
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Given the vast array of institutional arrangements
presently in existence it is useful to characterize and
classify them. To do this I have made particular refer-
ence to the features relevant to the extent of executive
control over the substance of the decisions of regulatory
bodies (see Appendix A). Other studies focusing on dif-
ferent issues probably would find it useful to use other
systems of classification structured to emphasize quite
different features. 17 The legislative schemes or models
identified here for the sake of discussion are as
follows
:
1. agency.
2. effective agency.
3. advisory function only.
4. regulations made or approved by executive,
adjudicative decisions (with varying scope for
discretion) made by the regulatory body subject to
review and appeal to the executive, perhaps to a
tribunal, and to the courts, but not to approval
prior to their publication.
5. regulations by the Minister or Governor in
Council, original decisions made within the depart-
ment by delegation of ministerial powers, with or
without review by the Minister, with or without
reference to the report of an independent advisory
body, appeal to a tribunal and/or the courts, but
with no further executive involvement after minis-
terial review.
6. regulations not subject to approval, adjudica-
tive decisions by an independent regulator subject
to review or appeal to the executive and the courts
but not approval prior to their publication.
The essential characteristics differentiating these
models are the extent of control retained in the execu-
tive over policy generation, implementation, enforcement
and review. The individual institutional arrangements
are secondary characteristics. Description and classifi-
cation necessarily has reference to these secondary
characteristics. It can easily be the case, however,
that two institutional arrangements with distinct second-
ary characteristics share the same essential character-
istics of one common power model. The models identified
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are not to be regarded as anything more than a tool to
assist conceptualization of the implications of a given
institutional arrangement for the distribution of power
over policy generation and implementation. It must be
remembered that this task of classification, because of
the diversity of regulatory bodies in existence, is
almost as^artificial as it would be to designate types of
snowflakes. Devising a meaningful classification is
rendered yet more difficult by the fact that what is
provided for by statute is often transformed in practice
as, for example, where the high profile of an advisory
body renders its "recommendations" tantamount to final
decisions in all but the most exceptional cases. This is
seen in the case of the Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission and the Canadian Human Rights Commission, for
example. The classification below is based on statutory
provisions and thus does not in all cases reflect the
effective powers of regulatory bodies, and most certainly
does not reflect the common impression of the powers of
many regulatory bodies.
1 . Agency
Those regulatory bodies that are designated agents
of the federal Crown by statute or made subject to the
direction and control of the Minister or the Governor in
Council have no effective independence from the executive
unless it is obtained through delegation or through
failure by the executive to exercise powers of direc-
tion. The Atomic Energy Control Board, the Canadian
Wheat Board, The Employment and Immigration Commission,
the Fisheries Prices Support Board, the National Film
Board, the National Harbours Board, the Northern Pipeline
Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Commissioner,
the Crown Assets Disposal Corporation and the Royal
Canadian Mint all may be classified under Agency.
2. Effective agency
A regulatory body may make decisions based on
public hearings and yet still be an "effective agent".
This will occur, for example, when all the regulations
which it is responsible for applying and enforcing and
all or most of its major "adjudicative" decisions are
subject to approval by the Governor in Council. A board
of this type, while perhaps because of its expertise in
technical matters a valuable source of a perspective on
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the issues relevant to regulation not in fact available
within the department or Cabinet, cannot be said to be an
"independent decision-maker" save in those aspects of its
work not subject to approval by Cabinet, The National
Energy Board (in regard to the approval of licences and
certificates), the Superintendent under the Loan
Companies Act , the Investment Companies Act , the Canadian
and British Insurance Companies Act , the Foreign Insur-
ance Companies Act and the Trust Companies Act , the
Canadian Dairy Commission, the Canadian Grain Commission,
the Commissioner of Patents, the Northern Canada Power
Commission, the Commissioner of Corrections, a Special
Advisory Board under the Immigration Act
,
and the Statute
Revision Commission may be classified under Effective
Agency.
3. Advisory function only
Boards falling under the previous category, effec-
tive agency, will often in fact exercise a function that
is in practice purely advisory because they lack genuine
independent decision-making power. Where the explicit
mandate of a board consists solely of an advisory or an
inquiry and advisory function subject only to a general
direction as to the subject matter of their hearings,
research and reports, its advice may provide a perspec-
tive more independent, however, from that generated by an
"effective agency" arrangement. Publication of an advi-
sory report prior to the approval of its content by the
Minister or Governor in Council, requires the executive
to respond publicly to the recommendation and the facts
on which it is based. Confidential reports do not place
the executive under the same onus. Within the effective
agency arrangement (the National Energy Board, for exam-
ple, insofar as it falls into this category, as it does
precisely in respect of those of its decisions subject to
Cabinet approval) , decisions are not released until after
they receive the approval of the Governor in Council and
reports to the Minister in fulfilment of general advisory
duties are not necessarily released to the public or even
made available to the appropriate Standing Parliamentary
Committee. 18 Other boards, commissions or tribunals with
a similar advisory function are the Anti-dumping Tribu-
nal, the Anti-Inflation Board, the Canadian Human Rights
Commission, a person appointed to conduct an inquiry
under section 18 of the Clean Air Act , the Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission, the Canada Employment and
Immigration Advisory Council, the Environmental
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Contaminants Review Board, the Hazardous Products Board
of Review, the Law Reform Commission, the Industrial
Inquiry Committee under the Canada Labour Code, a
Commissioner appointed under the Canada Land Surveys Act
,
a Board of Review under the Ocean Dumping Act , a Board of
Review under Part II of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Act
,
and ,the Canadian Transport Commission under sub-
section 141(8) and section 190 of the Railway Act .
4. Executive policy, board adjudication,
executive review
In the fourth legislative scheme, policy is
generated or implemented by means of regulations made by
the Minister or Governor in Council. Adjudicative deci-
sions involve varying amounts of scope for the exercise
of discretion and thus for policy interpretation. They
are subject to review by the executive and the courts,
and in certain instances, to review by a special tribunal
as well, but not to executive approval prior to their
publication. The Anti-Inflation Act is an example of a
statute establishing a scheme of this type. Under the
Act the Guidelines were established, from time to time,
by the Governor in Council and enforcement was performed
by the Office of the Administrator. The Administrator
was an adjudicator without discretion whose sole function
was to interpret the Act and the Guidelines for the
purposes of their application to cases referred by the
Board or parties. Appeals to the Governor in Council, the
Anti-Inflation Tribunal and the courts were available.
5. Executive policy, ministerial or departmental
adjudication, either no further executive
involvement or severely restricted review powers,
review by an independent specialized tribunal and
appeal to the courts
A key distinction between models 4 and 5 is the
absence in the latter of a general executive review
power. Where executive review is provided for in a class
5 legislative scheme, it is strictly limited in its
scope. In both models basic policy is generated by, or
subject to approval of, the executive. The original
decision-making function in class 5 is either retained in
the Minister or exercised by delegation of ministerial
power. In model 4 it is performed outside a departmental
structure, often with reference to a highly codified set
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of rules or guidelines. Use of specialized review tribu-
nals, whose role is to provide a forum for appeals with-
out overburdening the ordinary courts, is common in model
5 and optional in model 4. I conclude from this pattern
that where the existence of a high degree of departmental
control over policy interpretation is ensured, by retain-
ing the original decision-making power in the Minister
and his delegatees, general executive review powers have
not been seen to be required. The National Energy Board
falls within neither model 4 or 5 or 6 in respect of
those of its decisions not requiring Cabinet approval.
It is not within model 4 because there is no executive
review. Adjudication by the Board rather than the
department places it outside model 5, and executive
control over regulation-making excludes the NEB from
membership alongside the CTC and the CRTC in model 6.
This deviation from the pattern may confirm the conclu-
sion of Lucas and Bell in their study of the NEB that the
regulatory function of the Board is seriously compromised
by their advisory function. *9 a high level of depart-
mental and board interconsultation may serve to produce
sufficient unanimity as to what is appropriate policy
that political review is superfluous.
The Income Tax Act
,
the Immigration Act , the Canada
Pension Plan Act , the Unemployment Insurance Act , 1971,
the Customs Act , the Excise Act , and the Anti-dumping Act
are all examples of statutes creating decision-making and
review mechanisms that are properly grouped under model
5. Bodies with purely advisory functions as under model
3 are often also created to fulfill special limited
duties within the parameters of model 5.
6. Commission policy, adjudicative decisions subject
to review or appeal to the executive and the courts
but not to approval prior to their publication
The Canadian Transport Commission (with certain
qualifications) and the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission are the only two examples
in existence at present of model 6. Regulations applied
by the CRTC are made by the Commission rather than by the
executive and are not subject to executive approval as to
substance. Regulations applied by the CTC may be made by
the Commission or by the Minister as, for example, under
section 6 of the Aeronautics Act . Powers of direction in
the executive are not broad, as they are in connection
with models 1 and 2 above, for example, but rather are
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restricted to a particular subject matter (as, for
example, under the Broadcasting Act — see sections 18,
22, 27 and 39(3)). Adjudicative decisions are not sub-
ject to approval by Cabinet prior to their publication
but are subject to review by the courts on a point of law
or jurisdiction and to review by the executive.
It is seen from these legislative schemes that
there are at present three key points for possible execu-
tive control over policy generation, interpretation,
implementation, and enforcement: (1) the translation of
a general policy as set forth by statute into rules and
regulations, (2) adjudication requiring interpretation
of those rules and regulations within the framework of
the statute, and (3) review of decisions by the courts
to establish whether the decision is legal and by the
executive to ensure political relief. Political relief
may involve the mitigation of an unconscionable situation
resulting from strict application of the statute and the
regulations or the substitution of a ministerial or
departmental interpretation of policy in response to
pressure from the public or a specific interest.
In models 1 and 2, above, all of these functions,
save review of legality by the courts, are under execu-
tive control. Control by the executive over the first
and third functions effectively restricts the indepen-
dence of the regulatory body to adjudication. The actual
scope for the exercise by the regulator of independent
interpretation of policy through adjudication may be
severely truncated where executive review powers are used
as a vehicle to implement policy and in effect deliver
policy directives to the regulator. The existence of
many model 5 bodies makes it clear that where statutory
policy is either itself detailed or has been translated
with executive oversight into a detailed body of rules
and regulations which are then themselves interpreted
within a departmental structure under Ministerial super-
vision, general executive review of adjudicatory deci-
sions has been seen to be unnecessary. Where executive
review is provided, it is designed to provide relief on
humanitarian or compassionate grounds (see Immigration
Act
, 1976, s. 115) or applies only to a narrow class of
cases (see Trust Companies Act , T-16, s. 71 (a.) and Small
Loans Act , s. 11, s. 5 making identical statutory provi-
sion for appeal to the Governor in Council against denial
of licences).
It is arguable that the ultimate justification for
inclusion of an executive review power in model 6, where
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policy interpretation and implementation are not firmly
under executive control, is to provide a mechanism for
executive review not merely in the sense described above
wherein political relief against the interpretation of
the secondary legislation is granted, but also to provide
effective executive review of the first function, trans-
lation of statutory policy into rules, regulations and
guidelines. Supervision of the independent commission's
regulation-making function, if required, could as well be
supplied by making regulations subject to a negative or
positive resolution of Parliament. Periodic up-dating of
the policy content of the primary legislation could be
provided by means of amendments to the policy provisions
of the Act itself. This mechanism could be supplemented,
in those instances where there is adequate justification,
by statutory provisions for executive directive powers
with regard to specific, narrowly defined subjects.
Executive review powers would thus no longer be needed
for the purpose of general policy review and therefore
could be eliminated on the grounds that the other func-
tion of executive review — generally described as "poli-
tical relief" — is not only equivalent to second-
guessing the adjudicator on issues of public interest and
is therefore destructive of the regulatory process, but
is also undesirable because of the scope it is perceived
to offer for abuse of power.
With the elimination of ultimate executive review
powers from bodies grouped here under model 6 one may
query whether it is appropriate for the executive, rather
than the regulator, to have control over the translation
of statutory policy into regulations as it does in all
the other legislative schemes classified. I would argue
that, wherever a statutory policy mandate is broadly
couched and not subject to an obvious and unambiguous
translation into concrete rules for implementation in the
form of regulations, the original dec ision-making body,
whether it be a regulatory body structurally separate
from the department or the department itself, will tend
to be the most appropriate interpreter of the "public
interest" and should be responsible for policy develop-
ment and interpretation. Clarity as to the locus of
delegated legislative power will eliminate non-productive
power struggles between regulators and government depart-
ments. Placing policy planning and implementation powers
in one body should be conducive to more coherent policy
development than is possible when these powers are split
between a commission and a department. 20 The Cabinet
will at the same time be freed of the burden of approving
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regulations, a task too time-consuming to be adequately
dealt with at the Cabinet level in any event. As men-
tioned above, regulations and other secondary legislation
should be subject to the negative or positive resolution
of Parliament, Limited powers of direction may be vested
in the executive as this is deemed appropriate by Parlia-
ment. -*>
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Chapter III
SELECTED STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR EXECUTIVE POWERS OF
REVIEW AND APPEAL AND THEIR RECENT EXERCISE
Chapter II concerned itself with analyzing over-all
patterns of executive control in the regulatory area.
This Chapter, by contrast, focuses directly on the
variety of statutory executive review and appeal powers
from the decisions of statutory decision-makers. There
are numerous statutory provisions for executive review
and appeal. As may be seen from the table below in
Appendix A, these powers take many different forms — the
appeal to the Minister, review by the Minister or the
Governor in Council of a recommendation on the basis of
which he comes to a final determination, approval of a
decision by the Governor in Council, or review by the
Governor in Council on petition or by his own motion.
The review and appeal provisions affecting five regula-
tory bodies, or combinations of related bodies each serv-
ing a regulatory function, will be considered.
A. FROM DECISIONS OF THE CANADIAN TRANSPORT COMMISSION
There are two statutory provisions for executive
review of decisions of the Canadian Transport Commission,
an appeal to the Minister under Section 25 of the Nation-
al Transportation Act and a petition to the Governor in
Council under section 64 of that Act. The Governor in
Council may also act on his own motion under section 64.
The sections are set out below:
25.(1) An applicant, or an intervener on an
application to the Commission, for
(a.) a licence under the Aeronautics Act to
operate a commercial air service,
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(Jb) a licence under this Act to operate a motor
vehicle undertaking,
(_c) a licence under the Transport Act to engage
in transport by water, or
"(d) a certificate of public convenience and
necessity under this Act in respect of a commo-
dity pipeline,
may appeal to the Minister from a final decision of
the Commission with respect to the application, and
the Minister shall thereupon certify his opinion to
the Commission and the Commission shall comply
therewith.
(2) Where pursuant to any power vested in the
Commission by this or any other Act of the Parlia-
ment of Canada the Commission suspends, cancels or
amends any licence to operate any transportation
service or any certificate of public convenience
and necessity in respect of a transportation ser-
vice, the carrier whose licence or certificate has
been suspended, cancelled or amended may appeal to
the Minister, and the Minister shall thereupon cer-
tify his opinion to the Commission and the Commis-
sion shall comply therewith.
(3) An appeal to the Minister under this sec-
tion shall be brought within thirty days of the
date of the decision, ruling or order appealed from
or within such longer period as the Minister may
allow.
(4) The Commission may make rules prescribing
the manner in which appeals to the Minister may be
made. 1966-67, c. 69, s. 18.
64.(1) The Governor in Council may at any time,
in his discretion, either upon petition of any
party, person or company interested, or of his own
motion, and without any petition or application,
vary or rescind any order, decision, rule or regu-
lation of the Commission, whether such order or
decision is made inter partes or otherwise, and
whether such regulation is general or limited in
its scope and application; and any order that the
Governor in Council may make with respect thereto
is binding upon the Commission and upon all par-
ties.
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There is no appeal to the Minister from CTC deci-
sions in rail matters. Procedure on ministerial appeals
is prescribed not by the Minister but by the Commis-
sion, 21 An examination of judgments made by the Minis-
ter of Transport from 1975 to 1978, inclusive, on appeals
under this section indicates that the ministerial appeal
provision was not used to excess during this period,
although the absolute number of appeals has approximately
doubled since 1972.21a a small proportion of the deci-
sions reviewed by the Minister were actually modified,
with the exception of 1975 and 1978. In 1975 slightly
more than fifty percent of the decisions challenged on
appeal were modified and only twenty-five percent were
actually affirmed; in 1978 almost fifty percent were
modified. 22 These figures mark 1975 and 1978 as periods
when MOT took an activist stance with regard to policy
and attempted to use the ministerial appeal as a vehicle
to transmit policy to the Commission.
Occasionally appeals seem to have been granted
rather than referred back to the CTC for review simply
because the nature of the relief sought required such a
speedy decision that reference back in the circumstances
would have only rendered the question moot. The Minis-
ters rendering judgment were consistent in refusing to
entertain appeals where there had been no error of prin-
ciple nor additional submissions with regard to the facts
which would warrant a different decision. New facts,
moreover, were commonly treated as the possible basis for
a new application but not as matters which it was appro-
priate for the Minister to entertain on appeal. The
Ministers were consistent, by and large, in their refusal
to attempt to second-guess the CTC on the issue of
demand. In borderline cases where the issue of whether
existing demand was being met was at issue, Ministers
commonly referred the matter back to the Commission for
review. 23
In a handful of cases Ministers recommended or
directed, on the grounds of public convenience, a reduc-
tion of the time during which a licence was to be sus-
pended as a penalty for violation of Air Carrier Regula-
tions. In only three appeals, those of Air West Airlines
Limited (October 13, 1976), Bradley Air Services Limited
(December 15, 1976) and Arctic Transportation Limited
(May 30, 1978), were procedural flaws and a denial of
natural justice alleged. In each of these cases the
appeal was dismissed. The judgments in the first two
cases stated that procedural errors were not grounds for
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granting an appeal from a decision of the Air Transport
Committee (ATC) or the Water Transport Committee (WTC).
The Minister did take note of the fact, however, that
since the filing of the appeal to the Minister, the Com-
mission had in effect modified its own decision in these
two cases, to remove the practical effect of the alleged
procedural defect.
In the third case the Commission was directed to
modify its decision on a ground other than the alleged
procedural flaw. Thus, whereas denial of natural justice
when it takes the form of the denial of a hearing, a
matter within the discretion of the Commission, does not
constitute grounds for granting a ministerial appeal
under section 25, in practice it appears that the Minis-
ter of Transport will take the general issue of fairness
into account. A well-argued allegation of the denial of
natural justice may thus have the side effect of ensuring
that an appeal receives due consideration on the facts.
In summary exercise of the review power vested in
the Minister under section 25 of the National Transporta-
tion Act , for the most part, appears to have been exer-
cised with the same reasoned constraint that one would
expect from any appellate body. The principal difficulty
with the section 25 appeal provision has arisen insofar
as MOT has used it as a vehicle for transmitting policy
to the CTC.24 In those instances where the CTC has
showed independence by failing to implement ministry
policy (the legal status of which is merely informal as
the National Transportation Act provided for no effective
policy development outside the Commission) MOT has used
the ministerial appeal as an opportunity to assert the
relevance of ministry policy. The ministerial appeal can
thus be as much a vehicle for political interference with
the regulator as is the petition to Cabinet provided for
by section 64 and discussed below. It is anomolous to
place the task of regulation in a body relatively inde-
pendent from the ministry and then provide for political
appeals.
It would be more straightforward, if a high level
of ministry influence is desired, to absorb regulation
into the Ministry. An appeal to the Minister from a
Ministry decision would then enhance the already institu-
tionalized responsibility of the Minister for all policy
interpretation. If regulation of transport independent
from the Ministry is still desired however, then those
current functions of the section 25 appeal which are
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legitimate can be assumed by the CTC Review Committee and
new mechanisms devised to ensure that there are formal
channels by which the Ministry and Parliament can trans-
mit their preferences on policy to the CTC. A variety of
options to achieve this end are available and are dis-
cussed in later chapters.
There has been only a limited use of the power to
vary and rescind orders of the Canadian Transport Commis-
sion that is vested in the Governor in Council under sub-
section 64(1) of the National Transportation Act . In the
last seven years five orders have been varied and only
two of these were varied in response to petitions, eleven
of which have been brought to the Governor in Council
since 1972.25 The statistics in Appendix C below show
the number of petitions to the Governor in Council under
subsection 64(1) to have been on the increase — there
were two in 1976, three in 1977 and four in 1978 — des-
pite the fact that the success rate on petitions in the
same period went from fifty percent in 1976 to thirty-
three and a third percent in 1977 and down to nil in
1978.
Examination of the cases brought before the Gover-
nor in Council under section 64 (see Appendix B, section
2 below) reveals that the action taken in 1976 on each
matter was administrative in nature. Order in Council
P.C. 1976-894 merely directed the CTC to arrive at "mini-
mum compensatory levels" for rates for the transport of
rapeseed, oil and meal. The CTC was not told what prin-
ciples to use in arriving at these levels.
Order in Council P.C. 1976-2066 was in effect an
injunction against the movement of the Pacific Western
Airlines (PWA) head office pending disposition of the
action by the CTC against PWA for the latter 1 s alleged
violation of the notice of acquisition requirements in
the Air Carrier Regulations. Order in Council P.C.
1976-3320 not only denied the petition of Canadian Paci-
fic Limited against the CTC Order requiring reconstruc-
tion of two bridges within twelve months, but also
"varied" the CTC Order to require that construction begin
"forthwith".
P.C. 1977-362 and 1977-717 dealt further with the
rapeseed and the PWA issues, again to a purely adminis-
trative effect. The McCord Helicopter case is quite
different, however, as the Governor in Council there
apparently addressed himself to the issue of whether
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existing demand for service was in fact being met or
being met by the appropriate carrier. If so, this is
then a case involving a review of the merits or use of
the power under section 64 as if the Governor in Council
were functioning as an appellate body in the full sense
rather than with a merely supervisory power to be exer-
cised on ,the basis of facts as found by the body from
whose decision the petition is brought. Policy with
regard to criteria for the issuance of licences for heli-
copters and light planes as opposed to those for heavy
commercial planes may have been at issue here as well.
The McCord Helicopter case is examined in greater detail
in the case studies in Chapter VI, below. In Order in
Council P.C. 1977-2353, the Governor in Council declined
to second-guess the CTC on the issue of an abandoned
rail-line.
The only Order in Council in 1978 varying a deci-
sion of the CTC was made with reference to ABC domestic
flights in general. It directed the Commission to
temporarily liberalize its Order on ABCs to allow a
longer period for experimentation to discover the impact
of the new fares, and to entertain the possibility of
revising the Air Carrier Regulations so as to facilitate
a permanent expansion of the use of ABCs. Trunkline
carriers were barred from any primary rights over these
expanded operations.
By contrast all of the petitions denied in 1978
concerned particular decisions of the CTC. It is argu-
ably the case, however, that broad issues were at stake
in some of these cases, as in NordAir for example, and
that by declining to grant any variation of the CTC deci-
sion, the Governor in Council has also effectively con-
firmed the general policy applied by the CTC in the
particular case. In the absence of support from the
Minister of Transport for a change in CTC policy, would-
be petitioners would be best advised to seek a full
hearing of the general issue before the CTC, even if the
hearing must occur within the context of a particular
case, and to generate media interest in the issue. Even
if the party is unsuccessful before the CTC, the ground
may have been laid through public debate for a more
sympathetic hearing on a subsequent petition to the
Governor in Council. On petitions to the Governor in
Council lobbying is a standard practice. Parties without
established lobbying mechanisms and power must learn to
use the media effectively if they are to have any
significant impact on the decisions of the Governor in
Council.
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B. FROM DECISIONS OF THE CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Section 23 of the Broadcasting Act and section 64
of the National Transportation Act provide for petitions
to the Governor in Council from decisions of the CRTC
with regard to broadcasting and telecommunications
respectively. The provision from the Broadcasting Act
is as follows:
23. ( 1 ) The issue, amendment or renewal by the
Commission of any broadcasting licence may be set
aside, or may be referred back to the Commission
for reconsideration and hearing by the Commission,
by order of the Governor in Council made within
sixty days after such issue, amendment or renewal,
and subsection 19(4) shall not apply in respect of
any such hearing.
(2) An order of the Governor in Council made
under subsection (1) that refers back to the Com-
mission for reconsideration and hearing by it the
issue, amendment or renewal of a licence shall set
forth the details of any matter that, in the
opinion of the Governor in Council, is material to
the application and that, in his opinion, the Com-
mission failed to consider or to consider ade-
quately.
(3) Where the issue, amendment or renewal of a
broadcasting licence is referred back to the Com-
mission under this section, the Commission shall
reconsider the matter so referred back to it and,
after a hearing as provided for by subsection (1),
may
(a.) rescind the issue of the licence;
(_b) rescind the issue of the licence and issue
a licence on the same or different conditions to
any other person;
(c) rescind the amendment or renewal; or
(d_) confirm, either with or without change,
variation or alteration, the issue, amendment or
renewal.
(4) The issue, amendment or renewal by the Com-
mission of any broadcasting licence that has been
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referred back to the Commission pursuant to subsec-
tion (1) and confirmed pursuant to paragraph (3)(d_)
may be set aside by order of the Governor in Coun-
cil made within sixty days after such confirmation.
1967-68, c. 25, s. 23.
Se-etion 64 of the National Transportation Act
,
quoted in section A above, is now familiar from discus-
sion of it there. Section 23 is the more restricted of
the two review provisions in that it does not allow the
Governor in Council to substitute a different decision
for that of the Commission and bind the Commission by the
new decision (as Section 64 of the National Transporta-
tion Act has been held to allow). 27 Nor, and more sig-
nificantly, (and again unlike Section 64), can section 23
be used to launch an appeal against the refusal of a
licence (except indirectly where a licence has been
granted to a competitor). Under section 23 the Governor
in Council is limited to setting aside a decision or
referring it back to the Commission for reconsideration.
The restricted nature of the power vested in the Governor
in Council under section 23 renders it most properly
classified not as a "Cabinet appeal" but rather as a
"specific directive power". 28 Section 23 is thus to be
preferred to section 64 as a review provision insofar as
it is more protective of the integrity of the decision-
making process of the Commission, but less desirable
insofar as interminable delays could result from irrecon-
cilable positions being taken and maintained by Cabinet
and the Commission. In practice this has not occurred
implying that whenever the Commission and the Cabinet
have been confronted with this possibility one or the
other or both have revised their positions.
During the period from 1968 to 1972 there were no
Orders in Council with regard to either broadcasting or
telecommunications. 29 The three Orders in Council in
1973 all pertained to review by Cabinet of the Bell
Canada rate increase allowed by the CTC in early 1973.
All three of these Orders in Council were on the recom-
mendation of the Minister of Communications. No orders
were issued with regard to broadcasting or telecommunica-
tions in 1974 or 1975.
On April 1, 1976, jurisdiction over telecommunica-
tions passed from the CTC to the newly constituted
Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commis-
sion. The one Order in Council in 1976 regarding a deci-
sion by the CRTC was made under section 23 of the
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Broadcasting Act setting aside the issuance of licences
for cablevision service in Manitoba. The licences had
been authorized in Decisions 76-650 and 76-651 on the
16th of September 1976. On the 10th of November, 1976,
the Government of Canada and the Government of Manitoba
entered into an Agreement with regard to aspects of regu-
lation of communications in Manitoba incorporating an
approach to ownership of cable facilities distinct from
CRTC policy. The cable licences in question had been
issued subject to conditions requiring the licensee to
own the local head-end, amplifiers, and drops which form
part of the cable television distribution system.
The Order in Council setting aside these licences
was made November 10, 1976, the same day as the federal-
provincial Agreement was concluded. The Commission took
the position that it was not legally bound by the Agree-
ment and proceeded to entertain further cable licence
applications on that basis. 30 in the public notice
calling for new applications the Commission indicated
that, while it affirmed the value of its policy on cable
hardware ownership, in future applications the Commission
would appreciate receiving comments on the terms and
scope of the Agreement, particularly as those related to
the Commission's underlying concerns with regard to
control over cable television undertakings. The lines of
confrontation over policy between the Minister of Com-
munications and the expanded CRTC were thus already fully
drawn in 1976. Allocations of control over policy which
function acceptably in the absence of controversy clearly
are not necessarily ones which can continue to function
smoothly in the midst of fundamental discord.
Five Orders in Council disposing of petitions to
the Governor in Council were issued in 1977. The one
brought under section 23 by the Capital Cable Co-
operative against Decision CRTC 77-193 renewing the
licences of Victoria Cablevision Limited was denied. ^
Capital Cable had intervened at the public hearing with
regard to CRTC licence renewal procedures. Two petitions
were brought by interveners before the CRTC with regard
to the rate increase granted Bell Canada by the CRTC in
Telecom Decision 77-7 dated January 1, 1977. Both of
these petitions were denied, 33 a s was the petition of
Canadian National from the CRTC denial in Telecom Deci-
sion 77-3 of its application for rate increases.
The final Order in Council with regard to telecom-
munications in 1977 in effect reversed Telecom Decision
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CRTC 77-10 and approved the Telesat Canada Proposed
Agreement made as of December 31, 1976, with the Trans-
Canada Telephone System, This case is reviewed at length
in the case studies in Chapter VI below. It provides an
excellent example of the extent to which telecommunica-
tions decisions of the CRTC are, because of the breadth
of the review powers under subsection 64(1) of the
National Transportation Act , subject in effect to a full
review and reconsideration on the basis of Cabinet or
ministerial policy rather than Commission policy, without
an actual rehearing of the issues, with no procedural
safeguards, and without the issuance of clear or specific
reasons.
Cases of this sort are destructive of the credi-
bility and integrity of the regulatory process and,
because of the secrecy surrounding the handling of
Cabinet "appeals", are widely suspected to involve an
abusive use of statutory power. Possible procedural
inadequacies in conjunction with petitions to Cabinet, of
serious concern to petitioners under section 64 for some
time, have finally come to the attention of the courts in
Inuit Tapirasat of Canada v. His Excellency the Right
Honourable Jules Leger .34 The case arose from one of the
two petitions, mentioned above, to the Governor in
Council in 1977 against Telecom Decision CRTC 77-7 grant-
ing Bell Canada's application for certain rate increases.
Only one Order in Council was made in 1978 with
regard to decisions of the CRTC. Order in Council P.C.
1978-3577 denied a group of petitions under section 23 of
the Broadcasting Act against the issuance of cable
licences. The petitioners were persons whose competing
applications had been denied by the CRTC.
Thus far in 1979 one Order in Council has been made
under section 23 of the Broadcasting Act not to set aside
Decision CRTC 78-724 granting approval for a new licence
and transfer of effective control of the proposed cable-
vision company. The case involved a preliminary motion
by the Association of Public Broadcasting in British
Columbia (A. P. B. B.C.) for time to prepare a competing
application for the licence on the grounds that the Com-
mission did not have the authority to effectively confine
or restrict the class of those applying for new licences
to the party nominated by the present licensee. Cabinet
is apparently not interested in using the powers under
section 23 to encourage the CRTC to re-examine its pro-
cedures on either licence renewals or transfer applica-
tions.
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One petition, of considerable interest, is now
pending before the Governor in Council — Bell Canada's
petition against Telecom Decision CRTC 78-7 with respect
to the inclusion, for the purpose of regulation of tele-
phone rates in Canada, of the profits from a contract
with Saudi Arabia. The contract is for a period of five
years with anticipated revenues of 168 million dollars,
less costs and losses. The case does not appear to
involve the issues of ministerial interference with the
independence of the regulatory process seen in the
Manitoba Cable case, the Telesat case, and the NordAir
Affair (see Chapter VI, Case Studies). It does, however,
in the light of the decision of the Federal Court of
Appeal in the Inuit case, again raise the question of
fair procedure. In addition the pending petition raises
the spectre of economic power being used to pressure
Cabinet into granting relief to Bell shareholders. Bell
has suggested that denial of their request by Cabinet
will result in a reallocation of company resources into
alternative business activities (this possibility was
bluntly posed by Bell Canada in its petition). It
remains to be seen whether this threat, regarded by
opponents of the Bell petition as an obvious bluff, will
cause Cabinet to choose to override regulatory policy
carefully developed by the CRTC over the last few years
in conjunction with the Cost Inquiry and a series of rate
applications. Cross-subsidization has recently been the
subject of widespread debate and extensive economic
analysis. Cabinet does not possess the expertise in this
area to presume to grant Bell Canada's application on
technical grounds. Should the petition be granted the
Cabinet will be perceived by parties opposing the peti-
tion to have in effect responded to a combination of the
threats and inducements of Bell Canada and to the view
that the issue of cross-subsidisation is not properly
within CRTC jurisdiction and should be handled instead by
the Ministry of Communications and the Department of
Corporate and Consumer Affairs.
FROM DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD
The independence of the National Energy Board (NEB)
is severely circumscribed by the requirement that most of
its major decisions be approved by Cabinet. All certifi-
cates of public convenience and necessity and amendments
of certificates are subject to approval by Cabinet as are
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suspensions and revocations of certificates for non-
compliance with their terms and conditions. Oil, gas,
and hydro-electric power, can be neither exported nor
imported without a licence issued by the Board. Licences
authorizing the export of gas or hydro-electric power,
the export of oil for a period exceeding one year, or the
import of gas, all require Cabinet approval under the
Part VI Regulations made pursuant to the National Energy
Board Act . Oil and petroleum products and propane and
butane may be exported under a short-term licence not
requiring Cabinet approval. Like certificates, licences
may be either suspended or revoked with Cabinet approval.
Board powers with regard to rate applications and facili-
ties applications are exercised without the requirement
of Cabinet approval. Export prices are now established
by Cabinet.
The procedure used by the National Energy Board in
processing those applications where the decision is sub-
ject to approval by Cabinet is illustrative of the extent
to which energy policy in Canada today is determined
jointly by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources,
the Cabinet and the National Energy Board functioning in
its dual capacity as regulator and advisor to the Minis-
ter. In practice decisions requiring Cabinet approval
are not released until Cabinet approval is actually
received.
The 1974 application by Interprovincial Pipe Lines
Limited for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity to build a pipeline extension from Sarnia to
Montreal provides a good example of the extent to which
the National Energy Board's adjudicatory function is
prejudiced by its advisory and regulatory functions. In
that case Cabinet had approved the application in prin-
ciple before it was even laid before the NEB. A Task
Force, drawn from a number of government departments and
the NEB, was constituted to study various problems that
would require solution if the application was to be
"facilitated". The result was that at the subsequent
public hearing the basic issues of whether the pipeline
was in the public interest and whether the Sarnia-
Montreal route was indeed to be preferred were already
decided and the NEB was left, in effect, only to work out
the details.
Prior to the hearing, members of the National
Energy Board and staff had been involved in meetings
between the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources and
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officials of Interprovincial Pipe Line Limited, as well
as with the Inter-departmental Task Force itself. 35
Within this context it would not be reasonable to regard
the public hearing on the Interprovincial Pipeline appli-
cation and the Board decision issued in consequence of
this hearing as constituting the exercise of an inde-
pendent adjudicatory function. If there is a place in
Canada today for independent regulation in the energy
sector, independence here implying a significant measure
of insulation of the adjudicatory process, at minimum,
from political influence, then it is clear that a dif-
ferent statutory model must be adopted than is currently
seen in the National Energy Board Act .
Similar problems exist with regard to regulation by
the Atomic Energy Control Board. By virtue of section 3
of the Atomic Energy Control Act the Board is the agent
of the Federal Crown and is subject to any general or
specific directions by the Minister under section 7.
Here there is clearly no mechanism at all for insulation
of the regulatory process from political influence. It
would indeed appear to be the case that there is a seri-
ous need for re-examination of regulatory schemes in the
entire energy area which, of course, has vastly expanded
since the early 1960s and the early years of the National
Energy Board. At that time energy was commonly thought
of as being concerned primarily with oil, gas and hydro-
electric power. Recent growth of the Department of
Energy, Mines and Resources is indicative of the manner
in which the problem of energy policy has expanded since
the original conception and enactment of the National
Energy Board Act . 36
D. UNDER THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT
The Foreign Investment Review Act is an interesting
piece of legislation for the purposes of comparison with
other statutory provisions constituting bodies whose
primary function is to prepare a recommendation and
report for executive approval. In this instance the
Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) prepares a report
to the Minister, who in turn presents this report to-
gether with his recommendations to the Governor in Coun-
cil. A striking, and somewhat ironic, feature of this
Act is the number of provisions it contains to protect
the applicant foreign investor against the joint hazards
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of executive delay and arbitrariness. Applicants for UIC
benefits should only be so well protected.
The policy underlying the Act is laid out in more
specific detail than in the average statute constituting
a regulatory body. The Governor in Council is empowered
to make regulations while the Minister is authorized to
issue guidelines from time to time for the application
and administration of both the Act and any regulations
made pursuant to it. The definition sections of the Act
appear to have been drafted with care.
Under section 8 any person who is not eligible to
acquire control of a Canadian business enterprise without
approval by the Governor in Council must give notice in
writing to the Foreign Investment Review Agency of
his/her proposal, containing full details as prescribed
in the regulations. Following receipt by the Agency of
the notice provided for by section 8 the Minister is to
review the information contained in the notice together
with any other relevant information submitted to him by
any party or any province or party in Canada with regard
to the proposed investment for the purpose of assessing
whether or not, in his opinion, "the investment is or is
likely to be of significant benefit to Canada. "37
In those cases where the Minister, having completed
the assessment provided for in section 9, is of the
opinion that the investment should be allowed, the Minis-
ter is to recommend to the Governor in Council that the
investment be allowed and to submit in support of this
recommendation a summary of the information and written
undertakings on the basis of which the recommendation is
made. In those cases where the Minister is unable to
recommend approval of the investment to the Governor in
Council, the Minister is to notify the Agency of this
fact. The Agency in turn is to advise the parties to the
application of their right to make such further repre-
sentations in connection with the matter as they see fit.
Where no such representations have been received within
30 days after the notice was sent or within such longer
period as is provided for in the notice or is agreed in
writing by the Minister and each person concerned, the
Minister is to proceed to submit the matter to the
Governor in Council together with his recommendation and
a summary of the available information. Where further
written representations and consultations are held, the
Minister is to suspend his consideration of the matter
until they are concluded. At that point he is to
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reconsider the proposed investment and on the basis of
the further submissions come to a recommendation to the
Governor in Council as to whether or not the investment
shall be allowed or disallowed. As in the former case
the recommendation by the Minister to the Governor in
Council is to be accompanied by a summary of all informa-
tion and proceedings taken by the Agency with respect to
the investment in question.
Each recommendation by the Minister is disposed of
by an Order in Council either allowing the investment or
refusing to allow the investment. In cases where the
Governor in Council does not accept a recommendation by
the Minister to allow an investment and less than 60 days
have elapsed since the original receipt by the Agency of
the notice of intent to acquire, to which the recommenda-
tion relates, the Governor in Council may direct the
Minister to notify the applicant of his/her right to make
further representations under section 11, rather than
denying the investment forthwith.
Investors are protected against a delay by either
the Minister or the Governor in Council by section 13
which provides that where 60 days have elapsed since the
original notice of intent to acquire a Canadian business
enterprise, no Order in Council has been made by the
Governor in Council under subsection 12(1), and no notice
of the right to make further representations has been
sent by the Agency under subsection 11(1) to the parties
concerned, the Governor in Council shall be "deemed to
have allowed the investment to which the original notice
under subsection 8(1), (2) or (3) relates". This section
has been successfully relied on by applicants under the
Act. 38
Statistics on the disposition of cases under the
Foreign Investment Review Act since its implementation in
April of 1974 to July of 1978 are available at the Law
Reform Commission. Many of the applications withdrawn
reflect recognition of failure by a competing applicant.
The legislation has been successful in ensuring somewhat
greater Canadian control in certain sectors of the
economy such as oil and gas, for example, than would
probably otherwise exist. The review process does not
extend to reinvestment of profits in an on-going concern
by foreign controlled firms already in existence. It
goes without saying, of course, that the statutory model
used for FIRA was never intended to provide any means of
insulating review of proposed acquisitions of business
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enterprises in Canada from political influences. The
relative degree of rigour or lack thereof in the use of
the review powers provided by the Act is itself a politi-
cal decision. The extent to which undertakings made in
conjunction with applications have been rigourously
enforced is not clear. This also is a political deci-
sion. It is my understanding that, despite the signifi-
cant statutory protections against delay and against the
possibility that decisions will be made on the basis of
incomplete information, the procedures used by FIRA have
been subject to criticism and consequential review by the
Agency itself and the Department of Justice during 1978.
UNDER THE ANTI-INFLATION ACT
The Anti-Inflation Act3 9 i s also of interest for
comparative purposes because of the innovative combina-
tion of statutory provisions it utilizes to provide for
policy generation, adjudication, enforcement, and execu-
tive review. The policy function is clearly and unequivo-
cably left to the Governor in Council who is to issue
Guidelines, from time to time, by way of regulations
which constitute directions to the Anti-Inflation Board
(AIB). The Board itself, established under section 6 of
the Act, is both to advise the Governor in Council with
regard to the Guidelines, their workability and effect-
iveness, and to attempt to act as a conciliatory force by
engaging in consultations and negotiations with relevant
parties with the aim of keeping proposed changes in
private prices, profits, compensation and dividends with-
in the margins allowed by the Guidelines in effect from
time to time. The discretionary power of the Board it-
self is limited to deciding whether there are reasonable
grounds for belief that the Guidelines had been contra-
vened, were being contravened, or likely to be contra-
vened, as to warrant a reference to the Administrator
appointed by the Governor in Council pursuant to Section
15 of the Act.
Under section 17 the Administrator is empowered to
make investigations, as required, to enable him to deter-
mine whether in fact a contravention of the Guidelines
has, is, or is likely to occur. By section 20 of the
Act, the Administrator is empowered to make Orders, as he
deems appropriate, to prohibit contravention of the
Guidelines.
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The Act provides appeals from Orders of the Ad-
ministrator under the Act to the Governor in Council and
the Anti-Inflation Tribunal. The relevant sections from
the Act are as follows:
24.(1) The Governor in Council may, on petition
of any person affected by an order of the Adminis-
trator or of his own motion, by order, rescind the
order of the Administrator or instruct the Adminis-
trator to vary his order pursuant to the authority
vested in him by section 22 in a manner specified
in the order of the Governor in Council, and an
order made by the Governor in Council under this
section is binding on the Administrator on a copy
thereof, certified by the Clerk of the Privy Coun-
cil, being sent to the Administrator and each per-
son against whom the order of the Administrator was
made by or on behalf of the Clerk of the Privy
Council, by registered mail or in such other manner
as is prescribed by the regulations.
(2) An order of the Governor in Council under
this section in relation to an order of the
Administrator may only be made
(a) where the Governor in Council acts on the
petition of any person affected by the order of
the Administrator, within thirty days of receipt
by the Clerk of the Privy Council of the peti-
tion where the petition was received by him
within thirty days of receipt by him of a copy
of the Administrator's order; and
(_b) where the Governor in Council acts of his
own motion, within thirty days of receipt by the
Clerk of the Privy Council of a copy of the Ad-
ministrator's order.
30.(1) Any person or body that
(a.) is affected by an order made by the Adm-
inistrator pursuant to section 20 or 21, or by
an order made by the Administrator pursuant to
section 22 without his or its consent, and
(_b) is a person or body that was entitled pur-
suant to paragraph 12(l)(_d.l), to require the
Anti-Inflation Board to refer to the Adminis-
trator for consideration by him the matter that
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is the subject of the order or would have been
such a person or body if that paragraph had been
in force at the time the matter was referred to
the Administrator,
may appeal against the order to the Appeal Tribu-
nal, but no appeal under this section may be insti-
tuted after the expiration of sixty days from the
day the order pursuant to section 20, 21 or 22, as
the case may be, was made.
(2) The Appeal Tribunal may dispose of an
appeal by
(a.) dismissing it; or
(_b) allowing it and
(i) vacating the order appealed against,
(ii) varying the order appealed against,
or
(iii) referring the matter back to the
Administrator for reconsideration and vari-
ation of the order.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), the Appeal
Tribunal shall dispose of an appeal by dismissing
it unless the appellant establishes to the satis-
faction of the Tribunal that a disposition referred
to in paragraph (2)(_b) is warranted.
(4) Where, on an appeal to the Appeal Tribunal,
an order made pursuant to subsection 20(7) direct-
ing payment of a penalty amount is in issue, the
burden of establishing the facts justifying the
making of an order under that subsection is on the
Administrator.
(5) Where, after an appeal is taken to the
Appeal Tribunal against an order made pursuant to
section 20 or 21, that order is varied pursuant to
section 22, the appeal is not affected by the vari-
ation and, except where the variation was made with
the consent of the appellant, an appeal against the
variation may be joined with the appeal against the
order made pursuant to section 20 or 21.
Section 24 closely resembles section 64 of the
National Transportation Act in the powers that it bestows
on the Governor in Council, i.e. the Order may be either
50
rescinded or, in effect, varied. The powers of the
Appeal Tribunal under section 30 are equally broad al-
though differently worded. There is no indication in the
Act as to the order in which appeals are to be launched.
However, if a petition is to be laid before the Governor
in Council it must be received by the Clerk of the Privy
Council within 30 days of receipt by hira of a copy of the
Administrator's order, whereas on an appeal to the Appeal
Tribunal the period allowed is 60 days from the day the
order was made. As is clear from Reports of the Office of
the Administrator and the enumeration of dispositions on
petitions to the Governor in Council under section 24 in
Appendix B, a very small proportion of Orders made by the
Administrator were made the subject of petitions to the
Governor in Council and of those which were taken on
petition to the Governor in Council relatively few were
also appealed to the Tribunal. For the most part only
one appeal route was chosen with reference to the nature
of the grounds upon which the party relied.
All petitions to the Governor in Council under the
Act were disallowed. One may only speculate to what
extent this was due to the delicate political nature of
the Anti-Inflation Act itself, or to the accurate inter-
pretation and enforcement by the Administrator of the
policy contained in the Guidelines together with the fact
that no case during the period in question arose where
the effect of application of the Guidelines was such as
to arouse the conscience of the Governor in Council thus
justifying political relief on what one might call equi-
table grounds or extenuating circumstances. 40
Appeals brought before the Appeal Tribunal relied
on the following grounds:
1. historical relationships as provided for in
paragraph 44(1) (a.),
2. calculations under the Guidelines,
3. jurisdictional issues, and
4. in one instance a procedural matter.
Executive control over policy was possible through
issuance of amendments to the Guidelines by way of Regu-
lations. These amendments provided a mechanism for on-
going adjustment of the anti-inflation program in
response to political considerations, and permitted the
executive to gradually implement de-control and thus
phase out the anti- inflation measures. Administrative
problems identified by the Appeal Tribunal and the
Federal Court were also dealt with by way of Regulations
pursuant to the Act. *
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The exercise or, more accurately, non-exercise of
the executive review power provided for under section 24
of the Anti-Inflation Act confirms the view, put forward
in Chapter II, that where there is on-going control by
the executive over implementation of policy and a narrow
scope for interpretation and policy generation by way of
adjudication, there is little or no need to provide (save
perhaps by way of extraordinary relief)^2 for an execu-
tive review power. Where the rules and regulations
applied by an adjudicator are detailed, the scope for
confrontation between the executive and the adjudicatory
body is minimized.
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Chapter IV
FORMAL AND INFORMAL REVIEW AND APPEAL PROCEDURES
It is difficult to obtain reliable information
about informal procedures and practices used on executive
review and appeal. This is in large part the product of
a tradition of secrecy surrounding the mechanics of
performance of Crown duties and functions. Habit and
tradition, combined with the Official Secrets Act , render
it impossible to obtain precise comments from government
officials with regard to procedure. And from one point
of view it is arguably the case that obtaining precise
information about informal appeal and review procedures
is of little value so long as those procedures remain
informal and flexible. Informal and flexible procedures
are subject to adjustment at any time to fit the require-
ments of an individual case, as perceived by government
officials responsible for processing appeals. This
aspect of informal procedures is regarded as a positive
feature by Privy Council officials. Political considera-
tions combined with bureaucratic considerations will
clearly continue to dictate the informal procedures
followed in any given case as long as no constraints or
requirements are imposed by statute, regulation or any
other statutory instrument recognized as having the
status of "positive law", 43 or by the courts on the basis
of a general "duty of fairness".
Recent case law in Canada^ has shown a tendency to
require that statutory review and appeal powers be exer-
cised, not necessarily with the full regalia of the
requirements of natural justice, but by means of proced-
ures which provide sufficient safeguards to ensure "fair-
ness". The case law leaves no doubt that this principle
applies to the executive, insofar as statutory powers are
exercised, as it would to any other statutory decision-
maker. Only in those cases where procedure is spelled
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out in positive law are the dec ision-maker and the
courts, insofar as the issue is laid before them,
relieved of the task of determining what would constitute
fair procedures in the context of a given case, forum,
and statutory framework. If the Supreme Court of Canada
upholds the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in
the Inuit4 5 case
>
adding further support to the precedent
established in Re Nicholson , ^6 there could well be
several cases in the area of administrative law from
decisions of less august statutory decision-makers than
Cabinet brought for the purpose of clarifying the proced-
ural requirements imposed by the "duty of fairness" in
various types of circumstances with reference to the
framework of distinct statutes.
With regard to executive review powers three alter-
natives to detailed development of the "fairness" prin-
ciple by the courts are available: (1) the adoption of
procedural requirements by way of regulations pursuant to
individual statutes tailored to the perceived require-
ments of the types of matters reviewed and the weighti-
ness of the issues involved (such regulations would in
turn be open to attack on the grounds that they were
ultra vires given the statutory framework and the issues
or rights at stake); or (2) the generation of a general
code of procedure for the conduct of executive review and
appeal functions to be adopted by statute; or (3) par-
tial or total elimination of executive review functions.
In practice a combination of these three approaches would
probably be most workable.
At present the principal flaws in executive review
procedures are a lack of openness and a high degree of
flexibility. It should go without saying that it is most
"difficult" to evaluate performance in the face of
secrecy surrounding a moving target. In principle at
least, openness with regard to procedure would appear to
be the first step towards fairness and consistency the
second.
A. MINISTERIAL REVIEW
Procedure for the performance of the ministerial
appeal and review function is set forth by statute in
some cases, by regulation in other cases, by rules in yet
others, and by a combination of habit, practice and
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fortuity in the remainder. The Foreign Investment Review
Act is exceptional among statutes, as was noted in Chap-
ter III, for the procedural protections it contains for
the interests of the applicant against delay, failure by
the Minister or Governor in Council to dispose of the
matter, or a negative decision on the basis of written
representations alone (providing no opportunity for ques-
tioning and consequential clarification) without notifi-
cation of the opportunity to make further submissions.
The executive review and appeal function does not
usually involve hearings save insofar as a board, commis-
sion, tribunal or department may, either at the request
of the Minister or as a condition precedent to the matter
being placed before the Minister, hold hearings and
prepare a report and recommendation. ^7 The courts may
impose standards on procedure used at such hearings by
virtue of the fact that the report based on the hearings
is a critical factor in the decision taken by the Minis-
ter and therefore its status as a mere "recommendation"
cannot be used to justify lack of fairness in the hear-
ings on the basis of which it was prepared. °
Ministers, almost without exception, assess a
matter under review or appeal on the basis of written
representations, the record or file, and any recommenda-
tions prepared by department and agency officials. The
extent of delegation of Ministerial discretion in the
handling of review and appeal matters is unknown. Effec-
tive delegation is, moreover, fully compatible with the
technical non-delegation of decision-making power and
thus the issue is one necessarily left to the conscience
of the individual Minister. Strictly speaking actual
delegation must be authorized by statute or by a valid
regulation to be legal. The validity of regulations is,
of course, subject to interpretation by the courts. ^
Procedure on appeals to the Minister of Transport
under section 25 of the National Transportation Act is
governed by General Rules 800-890 made by the Commission
pursuant to subsection 25(4) of the Act.
GENERAL RULES 800-890: Appeals to the Minister
800 An appeal to the Minister shall be instituted by
serving the Minister, the Secretary and, where
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applicable, the applicant, respondent and inter-
veners by registered mail with a notice of appeal.
810 A notice of appeal to the Minister shall set out
(a) the matter appealed against;
(b) the grounds of appeal; and
(c) the relief sought.
820 Concurrently with the institution of an appeal, an
appellant may apply ex parte to the Commission for
an order staying the Commission's decision, ruling
or order pending the outcome of the appeal.
830 The Commission shall not make an order staying the
Commission's decision, ruling or order pending the
outcome of an appeal unless the appellant files
with the Secretary an undertaking, under seal, to
save harmless all other parties from damages re-
sulting from the operation of such an order.
840 Within fifteen days from completion of the service
of the notice of appeal the appellant shall serve
by registered mail the Minister, the Secretary and,
where applicable, the applicant, respondent and
interveners with complete documentary evidence sup-
ported by a declaration that sets out the reasons
for which and the grounds upon which relief is
sought.
850 Within fourteen days from receipt of the documen-
tary evidence required, any party who intends to
oppose the appeal shall file with the Minister and
serve by registered mail the appellant, the Secre-
tary and any other party with an answer setting out
full particulars of the grounds upon which the ap-
peal is opposed.
860 Where an appellant desires to reply to an answer,
he shall, within seven days of receipt, serve with
a reply by registered mail the Minister, the Secre-
tary, the person who served the notice and any
other party.
870 The Commission may provide the Minister with a
statement of
(a) its reasons or additional reasons for the
decision, ruling or order appealed from; and
(b) any reasons for opposing the relief sought in
the appeal.
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Such statement shall be served upon all parties.
880 There shall be no oral argument on an appeal to the
Minister unless he otherwise directs.
890 The decision of the Minister shall be communicated
by mail to the appellant, to the Secretary and
other parties, if any. u
A minimum of thirty-six days in the case of a con-
tested appeal, and of twenty-nine days in an uncontested
appeal, are required from the time of delivery of the
notice until the decision. This is superior to a scheme
whereby the Minister may curtail the pleadings stage by
the release of a decision. There is no provision for a
reply by the parties to the statement from the Commission
nor for further rejoinder to the appellant's reply under
Rule 860. Oral argument is held at the option of the
Minister.
In practice, on those occasions when an appeal is
launched to the Minister and the Review Committee simul-
taneously, the Minister reserves his judgment on the
matter until after it has been disposed of by the Review
Committee. On very rare occasions an issue will come
before the Minister on appeal, be referred to the Review
Committee for consideration with regard to a particular
point of policy, and then again be made the subject of an
appeal to the Minister. The reasons provided by the
Minister are written and fully adequate. Matters before
the Minister on appeal under section 25 have not been
made the subject of court action on procedural or other
grounds. Effective delegation of ministerial powers on
section 25 appeals is described later in this chapter.
Canadian Grain Commission Orders, with regard to
licences under the Canada Grain Act51 t and under sections
8 and 10 of the Grain Futures Act , 52 are subject to
review and appeal by the Minister of Agriculture under
section 78 and section 11 of these Acts, respectively.
These review and appeal provisions have never been used
and no formal procedures exist to govern their exercise
in any event. Any complaints with regard to decisions of
the Commission are in practice dealt with informally or
in any event without reference to section 78 or section
11.
By contrast, procedures for appeals to the Minister
of National Revenue, under the Unemployment Insurance
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Act
,
with regard to reassessment of premiums under sec-
tion 75 of the Act, and under the Canada Pension Plan
Act
,
with regard to liability to contribute under sub-
section 28(2) of the Act, are specified with reasonable
detail in the Acts themselves. The procedures under the
two Acts are quite similar, that provided for in section
28 having^been modelled on those in section 75. Appeals
under both sections are processed by the Appeals Branch
of Revenue Canada.
On a section 75 appeal the appellant initiates the
appeal by writing a letter to the Minister, which is
forwarded to the Appeals Branch of Revenue Canada. The
Appeals Branch conducts an investigation to collect the
facts from all parties concerned and, on the basis of
these facts, makes a recommendation to the Minister. The
Minister in fact has no personal involvement in the case.
The Appeals Branch itself issues its decision under the
signature of the Director of Legal Services to whom
authority is delegated by the Minister pursuant to sec-
tion 5 of the "Delegation of Powers" (Part IV, U. I.C.
Act) Regulations. 53 Copies of the decision are sent to
all parties — the payor or employer as the case may be,
the employee and the Unemployment Insurance Commission.
In the event that employees other than one who was a
party to the appeal may be affected by the decision, they
are sent copies of the decision as well.
Appeals regarding liability to contribute under
subsection 28(2) of the Canada Pension Plan Act are
handled in a fashion almost identical to that just des-
cribed and disposed of by decisions signed by the Direc-
tor of Legal Services acting with power delegated to him
by the Minister as authorized under section 5 of "Delega-
tion of Powers" (Part I, Canadian Pension Plan Act ) Regu-
lations.
Appeals to the Minister of Health and Welfare under
subsection 83(1), to reconsider a decision made under
section 59 of the Canada Pension Plan Act with regard to
benefits, are processed by the Office of the Administra-
tor of Appeals, Canada Pension Plan. Other than the
provision in subsection 83(2) that the Minister shall
notify the applicant or beneficiary of his decision in
writing with reasons, there are no statutory provisions
setting out procedures for the handling of these appeals,
nor is there any statutory provision, either in the Act
or by way of regulation pursuant to the Act, for delega-
tion of the decision-making power vested in the Minister
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under section 83. The informal procedures used are as
follows. The appeal branch receives notification by way
of letter from the applicant of the applicant's wish to
launch an appeal under section 83. This letter is ack-
nowledged by the Appeals Office. The facts are reviewed
by departmental officials and further information, as
required, is sought from the applicant. Cases involving
medical issues, as 97% of the appeals brought under sec-
tion 83 do, are then referred to physicians retained on
staff by Canada Pension Plan who assess the medical
information contained in reports supplied by the appli-
cant and his physicians and arrange any further consulta-
tions deemed necessary. A staff physician then prepares
a statement which, in practice, is decisive for the out-
come of the appeal.
Appeals brought on non-medical grounds concern such
matters as eligibility for retroactive benefits where
benefits were not applied for until some time after the
effective date of retirement, eligibility of orphans who
have left school, and competing claims by common law and
legal spouses. When the Appeals Office has completed its
reassessment based on the facts gathered and the relevant
law, a letter is prepared explaining the decision and the
rights to further appeal under section 84. The letter is
signed by the Administrator of Appeals on behalf of the
Director-General. The Minister has no personal involve-
ment in the handling of appeals under section 83. The
legality of this informal delegation of decision-making
power is currently under review by Canada Pension Plan
legal officers.
This sampling55 f the actual exercise of minis-
terial review powers confirms what common sense would
expect to be the case, that is, these powers are exer-
cised by way of delegation to departmental officials in
almost all cases, either as authorized by a statutory
instrument or by informal arrangements born out of consi-
derations of expediency. One might anticipate degrees of
personal ministerial involvement in appeals based on such
factors as the volume of appeals, whether technical or
non-technical issues were involved, the extent to which
policy is subject to interpretation on appeal, the extent
to which individual as opposed to public interests will
be affected by the outcome of the appeal, and the indi-
vidual style of a Minister in overseeing the work of
his/her department. Even in transport, however, where
the appeals are relatively few in number, the practice in
recent years has been for judgments on appeals to be
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prepared by MOT Legal Services and approved by the Policy
Branch, In practice the final draft was simply signed by
the Minister who had no other personal involvement unless
the case was potentially politically sensitive, involved
interests in the Minister's riding or in some other
respect captured the Minister's attention as, for exam-
ple, it iflight as a vehicle to influence the CTC on a
particularly contentious issue. "
It is, of course, desirable that appeals be handled
by decision-makers with sufficient expertise and time to
give just attention to the issues raised in the appeal,
rather than by blind and uniform application of one ideal
appeal model to each and every area of governmental
decision-making activity or by a Minister who is too
overburdened with work to direct his mind fully to issues
raised on each and every appeal. At the same time it is
desirable that appeals, insofar as they are allowed, are
conducted according to law. It is rather artificial to
empower a Minister to conduct appeals and then by way of
regulation or in another section of the statute to em-
power the Minister to delegate his decision-making power
in recognition of the demands of expediency. It ought
not to be overlooked that the present practice of dele-
gating ministerial decision-making power by way of regu-
lations pursuant to an Act may in fact be ultra vires.
B. PETITIONS TO THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL
The procedure used in handling petitions to Cabinet
must be seen within the context of the overall organiza-
tion of Cabinet. In 1964 under Prime Minister Pearson
the Cabinet underwent a major reorganization. There had
been Cabinet Committees since 1939. Under Pearson, how-
ever, each of the Committees, of which there were nine,
was to be responsible for a portion of the work before
Cabinet. Basic procedures were therefore changed. In
the past matters coming before Cabinet had gone before
the Cabinet first and only been referred to Committee
when further information and special consideration was
required. With the reorganization in 1964 Cabinet
business was first brought before the appropriate Stand-
ing Committee and only when it was ready to be disposed
of was it placed on the Cabinet agenda.
In January, 1968, a tenth committee called the
Committee on Priorities and Planning was added. Further
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changes in the Cabinet committee system were introduced
by Prime Minister Trudeau in April of 1968. At that time
he said:
"this system has worked well for the past five
years and greatly improved the efficiency of
government. It has, however, become apparent that
further changes are now required to permit a
greater centralization of functions and the delega-
tion of certain powers of decision to the commit-
tees.
To meet these difficulties, I have revised the
system of Cabinet Committees to reduce the number
of Committees and to provide for a regularity in
their meetings. "^°
A second major change in Cabinet procedure occurred
in 1968. Cabinet Committees were given the power not
merely to recommend a decision to Cabinet but, in effect,
to take decisions in the areas under their jurisdiction.
This change was qualified by the provision that each
Minister, whether or not he/she served on a particular
committee, would receive copies of documents and agendas
of all committees, could attend any committee he/she
wished with the exception of the limited-attendance
Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning, and could
request that a particular Committee decision placed on
the agenda be discussed in Cabinet. In practice at
present there is, in effect, an active and a passive
agenda for each Cabinet meeting. The Prime Minister
reads off the items on the passive list. Any member of
Cabinet wishing to object to a particular committee
decision has an opportunity to do so at this time. In
the absence of any objection, matters on the passive
agenda receive approval and become the decisions of
Cabinet. 59
The limited-attendance Cabinet Committee on Priori-
ties and Planning directs itself to problems of long-term
policy and broad government objectives. It is in this
Committee that government priorities are hammered out
with regard to long-term goals and allocation of re-
sources. It is clear that despite the fact that the
Committee has no official decision-making function as
such with regard to specific matters, policies arrived at
in this forum may well have a significant impact on the
deliberations of other committees and the full Cabinet.
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Within this context it is possible to discuss more
detailed matters of procedure and the handling of peti-
tions to Cabinet. Reference in the following paragraphs
is to procedures used prior to the change of government
in May, 1979. The extent to which they will be changed
under the new government remains to be seen. The process
is initialed when the Clerk of the Privy Council receives
a "petition". The petition is sent to Operations where a
decision is taken as to whether or not the matter is in
fact petitionable. The Privy Council Office receives a
broad range of formal and informal requests and com-
plaints. Any individual matter may or may not fall under
the petition provisions of a particular statute. Where a
matter does not fall under a statutory review provision
it is dealt with as seems best in the circumstances,
which is often by way of referral to a Minister or
government department for acknowledgment and considera-
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Petitionable matters are forwarded to the appro-
priate Privy Council Office Secretariat. The Secretariat
performs the function of co-ordinating correspondence
between the parties and the Minister. On receipt of the
petition by the Secretariat it is referred to the appro-
priate Minister. The Minister (or his/her office) in
turn prepares a recommendation for the members of the
relevant Cabinet Committee and returns it together with
the file to the Secretariat. The Secretariat forwards
the recommendation together with any original documents
to the appropriate Cabinet Committee. A channelling
procedure is used. Petitions from decisions of the CTC
go to Government Operations, from NEB decisions they go
either to Government Operations or Economic Policy, from
AIB decisions they go to the Committee on Economic
Policy, and from CRTC decisions they go to the Committee
on Cultural and Native Affairs. 2
A Cabinet Committee consists of nine Ministers,
four of whom constitute a quorum. The Cabinet Committee
makes a recommendation to Cabinet and may or may not
follow the ministerial recommendation received by it from
the Secretariat. The Cabinet Committee has before it all
the original materials and refers to them to a greater or
lesser extent as it chooses. Its choices in this matter
are clearly influenced by the individual political
interests of the Ministers on the Cabinet Committee. For
example, in a matter such as the recent petition regard-
ing NordAir, Ontario Ministers were far more apt to take
a strong interest in the matter than were Ministers from
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British Columbia. The Cabinet Committee may or may not
ask for clarification of the matter from parties con-
cerned. The Cabinet Committee recommendation then goes
to Cabinet which functions by way of consensus rather
than vote; as indicated earlier, "controversial" matters
are placed on the main agenda, "non-controversial" mat-
ters being placed on a list for simple ratification. 63
At least twice a petition has been disposed of by Cabinet
apparently without the knowledge of a Minister who indi-
cated his interest in the matter to one of the parties. ^
The key characteristic of the procedure used in
taking a decision on a petition to Cabinet is its flexi-
bility. Officials in the Privy Council Office emphasize
that the law in fact provides no procedures for proces-
sing petitions and that it is in their view preferable to
keep procedure informal as it is only in this way that
each petition can receive the attention it requires with-
out at the same time constituting an undue burden on the
resources of Cabinet. At present the Privy Council
Office finds itself under considerable pressure from
parties to petitions to introduce a measure of formality
into its handling of petitions. In particular, parties
seek a universal exchange of pleadings, the opportunity
to reply, and assurances that the pleadings stage will
not be curtailed by an early decision being taken by
Cabinet. At present the Privy Council Office is facili-
tating the process of exchange of pleadings although it
is not required to do so. Privy Council officials regard
this as a good example of flexible procedure adjusting
itself to the circumstances including the expectations of
the parties.
The regulatory bodies from whose decisions peti-
tions are brought are allegedly not involved in the peti-
tion process. Privy Council officials suggest that it
would not be appropriate for a board, commission or
tribunal to defend its decision, that once a decision has
been made the regulatory body is finished with the
matter. Practice is evidently flexible in this area as
well, however, for the CRTC was asked to provide the
Cabinet with a submission with regard to the Inuit
Tapirisat petition. The submission was in fact, however,
never placed before Cabinet because the Cabinet decision
was taken while the submission was still under prepara-
tion and in draft form. ^
An alternate explanation offered by Privy Council
officials for the non- involvement of regulatory boards,
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commissions and tribunals in the in formation-gathering
stage of processing a Cabinet petition is that the Cabi-
net prefers not to be seen to place pressure on the regu-
latory body. This explanation was accompanied by the
comment that controversial matters are, in any event,
widely discussed in the press and that as Ministers are
politicians, they will take due note of this public dis-
cussion. In summary, there appears to be little interest
in the Privy Council Office in gaining a first-hand
presentation of the regulator's point of view with regard
to an individual case.
No comment was obtained as to whether or not the
Minister or Deputy Minister might discuss matters made
the subject of a petition with the staff of a regulatory
board, tribunal or commission. The view is that what a
Minister does to inform himself prior to making a recom-
mendation is not only not a matter of formal procedure
but also not the proper subject of knowledge to Privy
Council officials nor properly a matter of public infor-
mation. The personal recommendation of the Minister to
his colleagues takes the form of a Memorandum. Unless
copies of a petition and any other pleadings have been
sent directly to individual Ministers by the parties,
most Ministers will only see the Memorandum. 66 a Discus-
sion Paper may or may not be prepared with regard to any
given petition and is released to the public in either
its original or re-written form only in the discretion of
the Minister. Discussion Papers are produced by the
department under the supervision of the Deputy Minis-
ter. 67 Replies to either of these documents by the
parties to a petition clearly cannot be made when they
are kept confidential. Any inaccuracies or debatable
opinions contained in these materials, so crucial for the
"decision" by Cabinet, are thus apt to pass unchallenged
in Cabinet.
Once a Cabinet decision on a petition is taken, it
is published in the form of an Order in Council. The
Clerk writes the parties to the petition indicating that
the matter is concluded and encloses a copy of the Order
in Council. There are no reasons given, either orally or
in writing, other than those appearing on the face of the
Order in Council. The official view is that the Order in
Council need not be defended by reasons. As a matter of
practice, release of a decision on a controversial peti-
tion is frequently accompanied by a ministerial press
release with regard to the subject. 8
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Privy Council officials state that the most appro-
priate subject for petitions to Cabinet from the deci-
sions of regulatory bodies is policy of a non-technical
nature. Issues of procedure before regulatory tribunals
are properly the subject of legal recourse by way of
judicial review as are points of legal interpretation.
Faced with a technical policy issue, Cabinet and the
Cabinet Committee have little choice but to accept the
weight of technical evidence as it has been assembled by
the specialist regulatory body. The only exceptions to
this would be cases where there was a confrontation
between a department and a regulatory body over policy
involving highly technical issues. In these instances,
Cabinet finds itself required to act as umpire between
two groups of "experts". Placed in such a dilemma, the
odds are quite good, assuming the Minister concerned is
not strong enough in Cabinet to simply successfully
demand support for the position of his department or
ministry, that Cabinet will be swayed one way or the
other by non-technical policy and political considera-
tions. The consequence in either case, of course, may be
interference with the orderly development of a highly
technical aspect of regulatory policy.
Non-technical policy issues are clearly a more
suitable subject for petitions to the Governor in Council
than technical ones but I would argue that insofar as
policy interpretation independent from narrow partisan
political influences is desired, neither one should be
the subject of political appeals. For example, the
series of conflicts between the Ministry of Communica-
tions and the CRTC over commercial deletion, the
Telesat-TCTS Agreement, cable hardware ownership, and
pay-TV, all matters involving fundamental issues going to
the root of the Commission' s mandate to regulate in the
public interest, make it clear that a coherent communica-
tions policy can only be developed if the Ministry is
prevented from inappropriate forms of interference such
as initiating action by the Governor in Council under
section 23 of the Broadcasting Act or section 64 of the
National Transportation Act .
It was observed above that the officials of the
Privy Council Office see the informality of procedures on
petitions to the Governor in Council as being of positive
value. Persons and groups who have been parties to peti-
tions to the Governor in Council are somewhat less con-
vinced of the value of procedural flexibility. Petitioner
dissatisfaction with flexibility goes to all aspects of
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procedure used in handling petitions but in recent years
has focused primarily on the need for uniform treatment
of the pleadings stage including the incorporation of an
assured period of time for the exchange of pleadings
which cannot be curtailed by Cabinet at its own option by
the issuance of a decision. Pressure from the parties to
regularize the matter of pleadings and time limits, com-
bined with the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in
the Inuit Tapirisat case, and simple considerations of
internal expediency in the face of mounting correspon-
dence with the parties precisely with regard to the
matter of an orderly exchange of pleadings and time limi-
tations, may in fact in the very near future induce the
Privy Council Office to inaugurate the the use of rules
to govern these two matters; that is, if political ap-
peals are not abandoned entirely.
A good example of why expediency, pure and simple,
may dictate the adoption of rules regarding the order and
timing of pleadings is seen in the actual exchange of
pleadings in a 1975 petition to Cabinet by the CAC from a
decision of the Canadian Transport Commission made on May
26, 1975 by way of oral reasons. The Consumers 1 Associa-
tion of Canada, Regulated Industries Board, prior to
submitting its petition to the Privy Council, wrote to
the Secretary of the Privy Council noting the lack of any
directions with regard to procedure. Prior to the issu-
ance of written reasons by the CTC, the CAC, the Province
of Manitoba and the Province of Saskatchewan filed peti-
tions to the Governor in Council.
Pleadings were then exchanged between the parties
in the following order. "Replies" were submitted by Air
Canada on July 17, 1975 and by CP Air on July 21, 1975.
CAC filed its "Reply" to the "Replies" by CP Air and Air
Canada on July 25, 1975. On July 26, 1975 the "Replies"
of Eastern, PWA, NordAir, Transair Ltd. and Quebecair
were filed. The Answer by Air Canada to CAC's Reply was
filed August 20, 1975. On the 22nd of August, CP Air
filed a "Further Submission" and Eastern, PWA, NordAir,
Transair and Quebecair filed their "Answers" to the July
25, 1975 "Reply" by CAC. The final pleading exchanged
was filed by CAC et al on the 16th of September, 1975,
addressed to the further representations by Air Canada
and the regionals. This sequence verges on chaos and is
largely the co-product of the total absence of procedural
direction and the lack of assurance that the pleadings
stage would not be cut off without notice by the issuance
of a decision. Ironically, in view of the effort ex-
pended by the parties, no disposition of the petitions
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was ever made in this case and therefore no Order in
Council was issued. The case was concluded by a letter
to the parties from the Privy Council Office at the time
of the 1976 air rate case stating that the matters at
issue were now moot in view of the fact that air fares
were again under consideration by the CTC.
The manner in which this case was disposed of high-
lights the fact that the non-issuance of any Orders in
Council disposing of petitions or on his own motion
merely indicates that the Governor in Council has not
chosen to exercise his powers under section 64, but not
necessarily that no petitions were submitted. There is
no public record of petitions submitted but only of
Orders in Council issued. I know of only a few petitions
submitted on which no action was taken but this should
not be taken to imply that there were not others of which
I have no knowledge. The records kept by the Privy Coun-
cil Office would probably provide no reliable picture of
the number and nature of the petitions submitted to the
Governor in Council. This statement is based on the fact
that this Spring the Privy Council Office found itself
dependent on the Office of the Administrator under the
Anti-Inflation Act to compile a list of petitions sub-
mitted under that Act. The absence of a public record of
petitions merely serves to intensify the gravity of
another problem; Privy Council Office control over
whether a petition is placed before Cabinet. The current
arrangement renders it possible for the Privy Council
Office to, in essence, suppress a petition without leav-
ing any public record of its existence. Only those
parties with major political clout or strong media ties
are in a position to protect themselves against the
possibility that their petitions will achieve oblivion
with the flick of a Privy Council Officer's pen.
Privy Council Office officials decide whether to
place or not to place any given petition before Cabinet.
A decision not to place a matter before Cabinet implies
either a decision that the petition has no merit at all
or that it is not within the jurisdiction of the Governor
in Council. The question is whether it is open to Cabi-
net to delegate such extensive control over its business
to officials of the Privy Council Office or even to indi-
vidual ministers.
The problem is illustrated by the recent example of
the decision by the Minister of Communications, taken on
advice, that the petition submitted to the Governor in
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Council February 6, 1979, by the Canadian Broadcasting
League pursuant to Section 23 of the Broadcasting Act
against CRTC Decision 79-9, approving the indirect trans-
fer of effective control of Canadian Cablesystems Limited
to Rogers Telecommunications Limited, could not be appro-
priately weighed or considered by the Governor in Council
because t-he decision in question technically did not
involve the issue, amendment or renewal of a broadcasting
licence and therefore did not fall under Section 23.
Madame Sauve was of the view that there was no purpose to
be served by referring the petition to Cabinet since the
Governor in Council, in her view, had no jurisdiction to
grant it. 69 in a further exchange Madame Sauve reiterat-
ed the above position and added that she had no intention
of referring the jurisdictional issue to the Supreme
Court. 70
The parties to petitions to Cabinet have a range of
other concerns more global than those mentioned so far,
and for the most part these concerns are grounded not
simply on suspicion of abuse of power resulting from the
high level of secrecy and the flexibility of Cabinet
procedures but are grounded in their perception of the
whole history of the treatment of individual matters
which eventually became the subject of petitions to
Cabinet. Ministerial interference with the regulatory
process from the stage prior to an actual application to
the regulatory body for a licence, ruling, or other deci-
sion, to the stage of the Cabinet petition itself, is one
such area of concern. Delegation of executive decision-
making powers is another. Issues of this sort are high-
lighted in the case studies in Chapter VI and subjected
to further comment in Chapter VII in conjunction with an
overall assessment of the exercise of executive review
powers and their impact on the administrative law area.
The perspective on petitions obtained from staff
and members of regulatory bodies is yet a third one.
Being somewhat removed from the hurly-burly of the peti-
tion process itself Commissioners focus less on problems
of expediency than do officials of the Privy Council
Office and are less personally involved or committed to
the outcome of a particular decision than are the parties
to the petition itself.
The members of boards, commissions and tribunals
appear to be quite aware that they have power only as it
has been delegated to them from Parliament, although some
of these powers may be very broad discretionary powers.
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The principal concerns voiced by Commissioners with
regard to procedures on Cabinet petitions arise from the
view that a decision arrived at with care and in accord-
ance with the law ought not to be, nor be seen to be,
casually or arbitrarily over-turned on a petition to the
Governor in Council. 71 The role of the Governor in Coun-
cil is perceived as a supervisory rather than appellate
one, and sparing use of the review and appeal power is
regarded as being key to its value. Allegiance to what
some regulatory body members and staff refer to as the
"rule of law" tends to make them feel strongly that the
flexibility of procedure so valued by Privy Council offi-
cials is in fact highly inappropriate. Regulatory board
staff cite recent cases which have been intentionally
rushed through Cabinet to preclude even the possibility
of representations being made by the parties concerned,
as examples of the handling of petitions in an unjust
manner. The impression given was that staff were con-
cerned that the net result amounted to a mockery of the
regulatory process. A procedure incorporating the main
elements of "natural justice" would allay some of this
concern. Use in the past of an actual hearing procedure
on petitions to the Governor in Council is commonly
referred to by commission members and staff to illustrate
the feasibility of some degree of formality in pro-
cedure. 2
Relief on petition to the Governor in Council, even
where it is provided for by statute and therefore must be
justified on grounds within the four corners of the
statute in question, remains highly political. In part,
but only in part, this can be explained by a combination
of tradition, the lack of procedural safeguards, which
may make it easier for Cabinet to lose sight of the need
to limit their decision however "political" to considera-
tions relevant to the statute rather than on any and all
other considerations with which they may be preoccupied,
and the absence of any requirement that "reasons" be
provided to justify their disposition. It is arguably
the case that formal procedures and the provision of
reasons would only cause the underlying political
motivations for finding a particular disposition
"reasonable" to become veiled. In the end therefore the
fundamental choice is that of whether a continuation of
political appeals from the decisions of statutory
decision-makers is desirable or not. If not, petitions
to the Governor in Council from the decisions of regula-
tory bodies should be abolished. The present lack of
popularity of such political appeals is reflected in the
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reluctance of some, but by no means all, Privy Council
Office and other government officials to squarely
acknowledge the basic political nature of all petitions
to the Governor in Council.
An, alternate explanation of the function of
petitions' I have been offered is their use to alleviate
unfairness arising out of a strict application of regula-
tory policy. The McCord Helicopter case is an example to
which this explanation would appear to apply. As well,
however, I have heard the corollary of this view — the
absence of sufficiently discriminatory or harsh effects
as a result of application of a regulatory policy — used
as an explanation for failure by the Governor in Council
to interfere with the decision of a regulatory body.
Clearly, however, even insofar as relief on petitions to
the Governor in Council is plausibly construed as justi-
fiable on what may be called "equitable" grounds, this
relief too must be subsumed under the general category of
political relief. This flows from the nature of the
forum.
While there may be a need to provide a mechanism to
review decisions in the light of equitable principles
from time to time it could be supplied by limiting the
power of Cabinet to that of setting aside and referring
back matters for reconsideration and a final decision by
the regulatory body. While this might be regarded as
broadening the discretionary powers of regulatory bodies,
it would provide a means to deliver "equitable" relief in
policy matters and would at the same time eliminate the
possibility that the power of the Governor in Council to
vary or rescind decisions of regulatory bodies may be
used in pursuit of other ends and to a total effect that
is destructive of the credibility and integrity of the
administrative law process. In any event the continued
existence of petitions to Cabinet as we know them cannot
be said to be necessitated by the simple need for occa-
sional relief from harsh effects arising out of applica-
tion of a regulatory policy.
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Chapter V
PETITIONS TO THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL. THE PARTIES, COSTS,
NATURE OF THE ISSUES, DISPOSITIONS, REASONS, IMPACT ON
THE REGULATOR, AND INCIDENCE OF COURT ACTIONS
The parties to petitions to the Governor in Council
tend to be drawn primarily from among the principal
parties and interveners to the original hearing or appli-
cation to the regulatory body. There are occasional
exceptions to this general rule when members of the
public, business associations, MPs, or provincial govern-
ments only become sufficiently interested in a case to
become parties at the late stage of the Cabinet petition.
Sometimes this belated interest is a result of publicity
surrounding the petition stage and at other times a regu-
latory decision may, by its effects, generate a level of
interest not present while the matter was actually before
the regulatory body. The adoption of better procedures
by regulators for publication of public notices of pend-
ing hearings and applications would help to alleviate
this phenomenon. In any matter which was the subject of
extended public hearings before the regulator the tenden-
cy is for all parties actively involved in these hearings
with regard to the particular issue placed before the
Governor in Council also to participate actively in the
exchange of pleadings on the petition. Petitions are
frequently filed by a number of these parties either in
support of a similar position or directed to distinct
matters of public interest to each party.
The costs of the petition process are very much in
the control of the parties themselves. All submissions
are in writing and it is within the discretion of a party
to expend much or little time in preparation of these
materials. A petition can easily be launched with the
investment of three or four hours. However, in a compli-
cated case, involving numerous parties and a lengthy
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exchange of pleadings covering a number of issues, far
more time is clearly required to pursue a petition in an
aggressive fashion. 73
The issues are initially identified by the parties
although Cabinet may well find issues not adverted to by
the parties to be decisive. From time to time submis-
sions become a catalogue of all items of potential rele-
vance and persuasive value regardless of whether, on a
strict test, all of these matters would really fall under
the scope of interpretation of policy, and thus within
the parameters of the statutory review or appeal power
uniquely given to the Governor in Council. Reference is
often made to points of law and jurisdiction, even though
these pertain only on review by the Courts, and to
findings of fact with which a petitioner takes issue.
Appeals from findings of facts are more properly directed
to the regulatory body itself insofar as it has a resid-
ual power to reconsider its own decisions.
Reasons, in the commonly understood sense of the
word, are never given in an Order in Council disposing of
a petition. 74 Privy Council officials explain this
practice by saying that it would be inappropriate for the
Governor in Council to offer justification for his deci-
sion. This argument is grounded solely on traditional
habits of thought now better laid to rest along with
Crown immunity from tort liability. It is more forth-
right to recognize openly that political considerations
may often prevent Privy Council from publishing full
reasons. The argument in favour of the provision of
reasons is analogous to that in favour of the establish-
ment of fair procedures in handling petitions. In both
cases the "unseemliness" of laying down rules for the
conduct of the Governor in Council or limiting the scope
for the use of executive power free from the requirement
of justification is overwhelmingly offset by decisions by
the judiciary that the Crown, insofar as it exercises
statutory as opposed to prerogative powers, must use
those powers in accordance with the purposes for which
they were conferred by Parliament. Procedures fulfilling
the requirements of fairness and reasons for decisions
are necessary to ensure both that decisions taken under
statutory powers are intra vires and that they are seen
to be. Privy Council Office officials would appear to
prefer, however, that Privy Council be stripped of its
statutory powers rather than subjected to procedural
strictures or required to give reasons.
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The impact on the regulatory bodies themselves of
decisions on petitions to the Governor in Council varies
greatly depending on the issues at stake and the degree
of independence typically exercised by the board, commis-
sion or tribunal. The Manitoba cable case is an example
where, because the CRTC did not consider itself legally
bound by the federal-provincial Agreement, Commission
policy on ownership was not directly affected by the
setting aside by the Governor in Council of its decisions
granting cable licences. In the case of a regulator
without control over the policy it applies in its adjudi-
catory function, the policy position taken by Cabinet in
a particular issue brought on petition could have both a
specific effect on the particular case and a general
effect on policy as interpreted and applied in the future
by the regulator. Petitions granted on so-called "equi-
table" grounds will have a very limited general effect on
policy, although similar cases in the future may receive
greater attention from the regulator before policy is
applied to a harsh effect.
The incidence of court actions on matters brought
before the Governor in Council by way of petition is
largely a function of the determination and resources of
the parties, including the Crown. Court actions typi-
cally are, of course, more costly than the petition pro-
cedure and costs always function as a deterrent, in the
pursuit of any legal remedy provided. For this reason
the presence or absence of court actions is not an
accurate indicator of public satisfaction or lack of
satisfaction with any stage of the administrative law
process including petitions to the Governor in Council.
For the simple reasons that in recent years:
(i) the number of petitions to Cabinet has
increased;
(ii) there are more law firms and public and
private groups with interest and expertise in
the administrative law area;
(iii) standing has been liberalized;
(iv) class actions are now more than merely
conceivable; and
(v) the case law has indicated that the courts
will subject the executive acting with statu-
tory decision-making powers to judicial re-
view,
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it is to be anticipated that there will be an increasing
number of matters brought before the courts as well as
the Governor in Council. In some cases this will reflect
an attempt to fully utilize all forums for review of a
given matter, and in other cases court action will be
taken up only where there is perceived to have been a
reviewable flaw in treatment of the matter by the execu-
tive in exercise of its review and appeal function.
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Chapter VI
CASE STUDIES
These cases studies have been provided as a conclu-
sion to the first part of the paper because they give
concrete exemplification of the issues and problems asso-
ciated with the executive review and appeal schemes cur-
rently in use. Familiarity with recent cases will assist
the non-specialist reader in grasping and evaluating both
the significance of the issues and problems discussed in
Chapter VII and the adequacy of the models proposed in
Chapter VIII to deal with them.
A. PETITIONS TO THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL FROM DECISIONS
OF THE CANADIAN TRANSPORT COMMISSION
1. The ABCs Case
As late as 1976, it was not possible to operate a
charter air flight entirely within Canada because the Air
Carrier Regulations required a charter operation to com-
mence within Canada and terminate at a point outside, or
commence at a point outside and terminate at a point in-
side Canada. As a consequence, it was often less expen-
sive to fly to a point outside the country than it was to
fly a similar distance within Canada itself.
The advance booking charter (ABC) arrangement had
been introduced for international charter flights in
1972. At that time the CTC had sent a letter to the
industry and other potentially interested groups request-
ing their views on the possible application of ABC rules
to charter travel within Canada. The 1976 Annual Report
of the CTC reports that there was little interest
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expressed from either the industry or tourist and travel
groups at that time. A similar letter was sent out again
in October of 1976 by the Air Transport Committee in
response to indications that in the intervening years
some interest had developed in domestic ABCs for vacation
and travel. Numerous replies to this letter of inquiry
were received, some supporting and some opposing, and as
a consequence the Air Transport Committee had decided to
consider the matter further in 1977.
A review of domestic fares and of the possibility
of authorizing domestic advance booking charters (ABCs)
commenced in 1976 and was concluded in 1977 with the
holding of a public hearing in Ottawa in September of
1977. An article in the Financial Post (September 3,
1977) attributed the Air Transport Committee 1 s decision
to hold a public hearing to the persistent efforts of the
CAC in attempting to obtain review of domestic air fares
in Canada. In any event a formal public hearing did
occur in September, 1977 with representations by the
major airlines, the travel and tourist industry and CAC.
An aspect of the context within which these hearings were
held is revealed in the following quotation from the CAC
Annual Report for 1977-1978:
An interesting side light to the public hearings
was in the fact that the Minister of Transport,
Otto Lang, had tried to stop the Canadian Transport
Commission from holding the public hearings at all.
Mr. Lang wrote a confidential letter to the Chair-
man of the CTC, Mr. Benson (former Minister of
Finance) , suggesting that the CTC give Transport
Canada officials access to submissions made on the
introduction of domestic ABCs "on a confidential
basis". Mr. Lang explained that he wanted his
Department to be the one to determine the policy
concerning domestic charters.
To his considerable credit, Mr. Benson replied that
since the Minister was so concerned, the hearings
would be advanced, and he attached a copy of the
Notice of Hearing. In answer to the suggestion
made by Mr. Lang, that the Department of Transport
consider the matter privately and on a confidential
basis, Mr. Benson stated:
"The purpose of a hearing is to ensure that any
person interested will be given an opportunity
to make representations. Interested persons
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include the general public, travel agents, tour
operators, government officials, the Consumers 1
Association of Canada and the air carriers."
He concluded by stating that the Department of
Transport could obtain copies of submissions made
to the CTC just like any other party."75
In a decision dated December 16, 1977 the Air
Transport Committee of the Canadian Transport Commission
adopted the report of the hearing panel which had recom-
mended approval both of intra-regional domestic ABCs for
1978. The Air Carrier Regulations were then amended to
provide a means of implementing the Committee's decision.
The restrictions on the introduction of the ABCs were so
severe and the experimental period provided for so short
that CAC believed that no accurate picture of the demand
for domestic charters and their impact on services would
be forthcoming from the experiment. CAC therefore
brought a petition before the Governor in Council under
subsection 64(1) of the National Transportation Act
requesting that the restrictions be lifted and a longer
experimental period provided.
The Order in Council disposing of this petition on
the recommendation of the Minister of Transport, dated
January 19, 1978, varied Canadian Transport Commission
Decision No. 5369 and Part IV-A of the Air Carrier Regu-
lations made by the Canadian Transport Commission General
Order No. 1977-9 Air, dated December 19, 1977, to provide
for: (1) a larger number of regional ABCs to provide
scope for a full and fair test; (2) that other air
carriers holding class 4 licences be allowed to apply for
the right to participate in the additional inter-regional
ABCs to be permitted as provided above, providing however
that the two trunk line air carriers were to have no pri-
mary rights to the operation of these additional inter-
regional flights; and (3) that the Commission undertake
an on-going study to determine whether any other restric-
tions on domestic ABCs contained in Part IV of the Air
Carrier Regulations should be relaxed. In particular the
Commission was directed to consider whether mixing the
ABC and ITC passengers was desirable or the mixing of
originating and returning passengers on the same aircraft
would be desirable, and whether the time requirements in
respect of advance booking should be reduced. As well,
the Commission was directed to amend the Air Carrier
Regulations accordingly to implement its findings above.
The Regulations in fact were amended throughout the year
77
of 1978 and the advanced booking period by the end of
1978 had been reduced from 45 to 30 days.
2. The McCord Helicopters Case
The Air Transport Committee in a Decision dated
June 14, 1974 denied the application of McCord Heli-
copters Ltd., for a charter licence on the grounds that
current demand for service was being met. This decision
was appealed by McCord to the Minister of Transport under
section 25 of the National Transportation Act . The
Minister in his judgment dated February 11, 1976 directed
the Commission to review McCord 1 s application with regard
to existing demands for service in view of the fact that
no helicopter service was, at that time, actually based
in Chetwynd, B.C. On review by the Commission the denial
was confirmed.
Although warned by officials of the Minister 1 s
office that the chances for success were nil, McCord
Helicopters then brought a petition before the Governor
in Council, under section 64(1) of the National Trans-
portation Act to vary Decision No. 3896 and Decision No.
4942 of the Canadian Transport Commission to provide for
acceptance of McCord* s application for authority to
operate a Class 4, Group A-RW Charter Commercial Service
to transport goods and persons between points within
Canada from a base at Chetwynd, B.C. and the issuance of
a licence accordingly. The petition was granted by way
of Order in Council P.C. 1977-1372 dated May 12, 1977.
This is a curious case. The only explanation based
on principle for the petition having been seriously
entertained and granted is that a basic point of fairness
and equity was involved. McCord alleged that it had
discovered the demand for service in Chetwynd but been
unable to meet that demand because it did not possess a
licence. Its application for a licence was subsequently
denied on the grounds that other carriers were now meet-
ing the demand originally identified by McCord. The case
is regarded by some legal counsel with experience in
transportation matters as a good example of the sort of
matter which should never be brought on petition before
the Governor in Council as it does not involve broad
policy issues, or have any serious implications for the
general "public interest". The small businessman, how-
ever, may point to the McCord Case as indicating that
maintenance of a system of petitions to Cabinet from the
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decisions of regulatory boards is essential to protect
individual and small business interests from being
unfairly and arbitrarily dismissed by decision-makers
practiced in regulation of large commercial air carriers
where strict and uniform application of policy is more
appropriate.
Both positions above are probably overstated for,
although the case does, in contrast with other matters
brought before the Governor in Council on petition,
appear somewhat anomalous, it is probably best regarded
simply as a fully legitimate use by a member of the pub-
lic of a forum for review in which success was obtained
by the applicant through the combination of a successful
personal lobby and the absence of any overriding politi-
cal considerations which would have made the Governor in
Council reluctant to grant the requested relief. Not to
be forgotten is the fact that the Minister of Transport,
in his judgment in February of 1976 on the earlier appeal
under section 25, had at least looked somewhat favourably
on the appeal although he did not choose to grant it
directly himself but rather referred the matter back to
the Commission for review. The Memorandum to Cabinet
prepared by MOT supported McCord ! s position. 76 In a case
such as this, not involving issues of general interest to
the public and thus without broad political implications,
support from the Minister of Transport is apt to be
critical for success.
3. The NordAir Affair
On the sixteenth of January, 1978, Air Canada
published notice of its intent to acquire an interest in
NordAir Limited by purchase of all of the outstanding
shares of NordAir. Numerous formal objections, as pro-
vided for under section 27 of the National Transportation
Act , were filed with the Canadian Transport Commission
and a public hearing was held in Montreal in April of
1978.
The staff at the CTC welcomed the opportunity of a
public hearing in the matter as they did not feel them-
selves to be informed about Air Canada's motives in
making the acquisition nor other elements relating to the
case. The matter must be seen against a background in
which the Ministry of Transport appeared to be advocating
a substantial change in the structure of the air indus-
try. The plan originated in a Ministry of Transport
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(MOT) planning group which had had meetings with the Air
Transport Association of Canada (ATAC) in which members
of the CTC were not involved. The product of these dis-
cussions was a paper entitled "Structure of the Domestic
Air Carrier Industry". The CTC, probably in large part
because of their own non-involvement, apparently found it
difficult to take the work of this group very seriously
and anticipated that the whole matter would die after a
period of initial enthusiasm. The staff at CTC also
found it difficult to take the findings and suggestions
contained in the above mentioned paper seriously because
they could not understand how the analysis was being made
or what factors had been considered in giving weight to
each of the components in each of the options. Because
no one either from industry or the MOT was making any
attempt to explain this process to them, the CTC felt
they really had no option except simply to wait and see
what happened. This situation of animosity was apparent-
ly aggravated by the CTC decision regarding advanced
booking charters in late 197 7 which had been embarrassing
to the Minister of Transport because it was treated by
the media as indicating that the CTC, often not clearly
distinguished in the public eye from the Minister, was
more firmly committed to the interests of mainline car-
riers than to the interests of consumers.
The parties of record at the public hearings in
Montreal in April, 1978, included the Government of
Manitoba, the Government of Quebec, the City of Windsor,
the Grand Council of the Crees (Quebec), three M.P.'s,
the Director of Investigation and Research under the
Combines Investigation Act , the Alliance of Canadian
Travel Associations, the Consumers Association of Canada,
the Canadian Swimming Pool Design Associates, the Uni-
versity of Sherbrooke, Air Canada, NordAir, six regional
airlines, and nine private persons. Both at the hearing
and in the press the acquisition was strongly
criticized. Among the arguments presented against the
acquisition were the following:
1. That the takeover of a regional carrier by
Canada's major airline was completely contrary to
the Government's established policy of encouraging
the growth of regional carriers;
2. That the acquisition was anti-competitive
and would result in control by Air Canada over the
Canadian charter market by means of its acquisition
of NordAir' s substantial charter business; and
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3. The expenditure of twenty-five million dol-
lars by a Crown Corporation was unwarranted, as
there was no demonstrated need for Air Canada to
expand into a regional operation and a buyer in the
private sector, Great Lakes, was available.
The following excerpts from a letter sent by Robert
J. Bertrand, Director of Investigation and Research under
the Combines Investigation Act to the Acting Secretary of
the Canadian Transport Commission on February 17, 1978
provides a good expression of concerns expressed by
various parties at the hearing and pre-hearing stage:
I am writing with reference to the notice of the
proposed acquisition noted above. In this regard I
am examining the matter to determine whether fur-
ther action in accordance with my duties and re-
sponsibilities under the Combines Investigation Act
is warranted.
On the basis of the information assembled to
date, I believe that the proposed acquisition may
effect a significant lessening of competition in
the air carrier industry and lead to excessive con-
centration therein. Further it has the potential
to produce far-reaching consequences beyond the
immediate scope of this proceeding with resulting
prejudice to the public interest. Certainly to the
extent that the proposed acquisition extends Air
Canada's operation into unregulated sectors, it
becomes more difficult to effectively regulate that
part of its operation that remains in the regulated
sector.
Accordingly, I object to the proposed acquisi-
tion on the basis that it would be prejudicial to
the public interest and I urge the Commission to
hold public hearings as part of its investigation.
I hope that this letter will serve as notice to the
Commission, Air Canada and NordAir Ltee — NordAir
Ltd. of my intention to make representations to and
to call evidence before the Commission in respect
of the maintenance of competition in relation to
the proposed acquisition pursuant to section 27.1
of the Combines Investigation Act .
I have attached as Appendix I specific questions
which I suggest should be directed to both parties
to the acquisition. I believe the receipt of this
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information is essential both to enable me to prop-
erly fulfill my role as an intervenor under the
Combines Investigation Act as well as to enable the
Commission to adequately evaluate the proposed
acquisition. The Commission may wish to discuss
with the companies the most economical way of
providing such data well in advance of any further
proceedings.
At this point in time, and in support of my
suggested requests for information from Air Canada
and NordAir (Appendix I), I view the following to
be major areas of concern which should be resolved
by further investigation.
1. To what extent will the proposed acquisi-
tion increase Air Canada 1 s control of the domes-
tic scheduled traffic? For instance, will Air
Canada effectively eliminate CP Air as a factor
in competing for traffic originating on Nord-
Air 1 s system and destined for a point outside
NordAir 1 s sytem to which both Air Canada and CP
Air presently compete? (e.g. a Fort George-
Vancouver & D passenger)
2. Will the proposed acquisition be likely
to lead to defensive merger/ acquisition propo-
sals by competing carriers thereby producing a
further reduction in competition and/or exces-
sive concentration in the hands of a few firms?
For example, as a defensive reaction might CP
Air seek to acquire Eastern Provincial Airlines,
or any other air carrier in a move to maintain
its domestic market shares?
3. Is the proposed acquisition consistent
with the Government's regional air carrier
policy? To what extent will services presently
provided by NordAir be curtailed, downgraded (in
terms of quality of service) or eliminated after
the acquisition? If the acquisition should be
approved, what, if any, conditions should be
imposed upon Air Canada to assure a level of
services consistent with the regional air car-
rier policy?
4. Will the proposed acquisition result in a
significant reduction in the aircraft capacity
available to charterers not presently owned or
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controlled by an air carrier, and thereby dis-
criminate amongst competing charterers? Would
such a result thus produce a lessening of compe-
tition in the charter business?
5. Will the proposed acquisition create
inherent conflicts of interest for Air Canada to
the detriment of the travelling public and other
competing enterprises? For instance will Air
Canada reduce the aircraft capacity which is
presently available through NordAir, for char-
ters to Florida and the Caribbean where Air
Canada currently provides scheduled air servi-
ces? Also, will the domestic ABC experiment be
impaired by virtue of Air Canada's competing
C.C.C.F. program?
6. Will the proposed acquisition tend to
increase the barriers to entry by new firms into
the tour wholesaling and tour operating portions
of the air industry?
7. Will the proposed acquisition result in
overall diseconomies of scale, or other cost
increases, such as to require higher average
fares/rates or public subsidy, than would be
required in the absence of said acquisition?
I have sent a copy of this letter and Appendix I
to Air Canada and NordAir Ltee — NordAir Ltd, at
their respective head offices in Montreal, Quebec,
by prepaid registered post and have attached hereto
an affidavit of service in that regard.
The Director participated actively in the public
hearings held in Montreal in April 1978 but did not file
a petition to the Governor in Council in the Fall of 1978
with other principal interveners. Any representations
made to Cabinet in the matter were presented by the
Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs.''
An exchange of correspondence between the CAC and
Otto Lang, the Minister of Transport, prior to the public
hearing make it clear that the NordAir matter is an
example of the problems posed when a particular case must
be decided in a context of evolving policy. Many of the
parties filing formal objections to the application had
noted that the acquisition of NordAir by Air Canada would
be in fact contrary to established Regional Air Carrier
83
policy. Mr. Lang in his response to such a query prior
to the public hearing wrote the following statement:
As you may know, I am already giving consideration
to possible changes in the structure of domestic
air carrier industry. These are described in a
Transport Canada Discussion Paper that was sent to
the Air Transport Association of Canada (ATAC) for
comment in September, 1977. The process of consul-
tation with ATAC has not yet been concluded, and
may well culminate in substantial revision in the
nature and assessment of the options considered.
Subsequently, consultations are planned with the
provinces and all other interested parties, to
ensure that all relevant considerations are given
due weight. I will expect the long-term relation-
ship between Air Canada and NordAir to be consis-
tent with this evolving policy framework.'"
No reference is made here with regard to consultation
with the CTC regarding the future of the Regional Air
Carrier Policy. 7^
The following excerpt from the reasons of Commis-
sioner Guy Roberge indicates some of the problems posed
for the Air Transport Committee by the NordAir Case.
I cannot but have some reservation, because of the
past attitude of Air Canada, one which may be
changing, when it is advanced that NordAir will be
as free after the acquisition as it was before to
carry out its charter business in the fashion
deemed advisable on the basis of its sole interest.
The situation warrants that one exercise caution
and seek to resort to maximum precaution and
guarantee.
Later I shall deal with the special measures
which I trust can prevent the undue restriction to
materialize or can reduce it. I shall give the
reasons why in spite of my finding I have not con-
cluded to disallow on the basis of my analysis of
the charter services involved.
Structures of commercial aviation in Canada
On behalf of the Attorney-General for Quebec our
attention has been directed to the increasing share
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of government ownership of the air carrier indus-
try. To the acquisition of P.W.A. , by the Govern-
ment of Alberta and to that of Transair by P.W.A.
,
will now be added, if the proposal is not disal-
lowed, the acquisition of NordAir by Air Canada
which is the property of the Government of Canada.
The extent or degree of Government ownership as
opposed to private ownership is not in itself a
matter for the Commission to pass judgment upon.
That matter involves a political decision. It
involves what a proper allocation of resources on
the part of one government or another may be, it
involves other factors in respect of which it is
also the prerogative of the State to make deci-
sions. (For instance, one may point to the recent
amendment contained in subsection 15(1) of the
Aeronautics Act .) While it is far-reaching the
language of section 27 (The Commission may disallow
any such acquisition if in its opinion it will ...
otherwise be prejudicial to the public interest)
cannot be .extended to cover the ground examined by
Counsel for the Province of Quebec. Therefore, the
argument raised escapes our jurisdiction.
Regarding the development of commercial aviation
in Canada ... the changes in question are struc-
tural changes which go to the substance of the air
policy. These features do not belong to ... the
determination which we must make under section 27
of the National Transportation Act . They pertain
to the realm of policy and are among the elements
which may be considered in due course by the Minis-
ter.
* * *
Regarding the prejudice to the public interest
... a negative finding . . . would have been linked
to my own views of what the structure of commercial
aviation in Canada should be and of the policies
which should form its basis. It is recognized that
policy formation may spin from adjudicative deci-
sions. However, I do not see my way clear to use
the adjudicative decision process to equate, in
this particular instance, the public interest with
my own views and preferences. ... Finally, I should
say that section 27 imposes on an adjudicator the
duty of exercising his discretion not to disallow
if, in this considered opinion, such a solution can
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lead to a better result, all told, than would dis-
allowance.
My colleagues, Thomson, Carver and Laffery, have
accepted the statement of the President of Air
Canada "that it was Air Canada's intention that if
the acquisition were completed NordAir would con-
tinue to operate as a separate subsidiary and as a
regional air carrier within the guidelines of the
Regional Air Carrier Policy", Some testimonies or
parts thereof ... seem to have struck me in a dif-
ferent way than it is the case with my colleagues.
While I share their confidence and trust in the
management of Air Canada, it has become apparent to
me that their vision of the economic reality and
their evaluation of the temptation which may be
felt by Air Canada, do not correspond entirely to
mine. To what extent will the demands of the
economic reality, as perceived by the management of
Air Canada, lead to pressures being exercised on a
"separate" NordAir? Efficacious resistance to that
temptation depends much on the degree of that
separateness and on the mechanism which is set in
place when the acquisition is completed. It is in
that light that I have examined the precautions
that could be taken in order to prevent, or to
minimize at least, certain of the results which
were outlined by the participants in the hearing or
which have come to the fore in the course of our
investigation and which, in the charter area, I
consider as being conducive to an undue restriction
of competition.
The present instance is not one of consolidation
of regional carriers nor of common ownership of
regional carriers within a larger region (for
instance through the purchase of the shares of
Transair by P.W.A. ) but it is an instance of owner-
ship of a regional carrier by a trunk carrier. The
policy enunciated on behalf of the Government over
the years has foreseen neither one nor the other
situation. That policy has been directed to the
assignment of spheres of influence and activities.
It is silent in respect of ownership. Over the
years the Commission has not disallowed the acqui-
sition of local carriers by regional carriers pre-
sumably because what we must be concerned with is
not ownership per se , but what happens as regards
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the spheres of activities assigned to each category
of carriers. What we must determine is whether the
activities will be allowed to continue unimpaired
after the acquisition within the parameters of the
governing policy.
* * *
However, if a real separateness is maintained,
in spite of the ownership situation, I am confident
that, although constrained, the competition which
is peculiar to commercial aviation in this country,
the integrity of the services to be performed on
all fronts and the public interest as well can be
safeguarded.
Where does the power lie to achieve those safe-
guards? With the Commission in some measure, as I
have indicated earlier. Tc a greater degree and in
another context the means of establishing and main-
taining real separateness between Air Canada and
NordAir rest with the Minister of Transport. ^
Decision No. 5539 of the Air Transport Committee
was issued on July 28th, 1978. The Committee decided not
to disallow the acquisition of NordAir Ltd. by Air Canada
stating that they feared that to disallow the acquisition
would result in instability in the air industry in
Ontario and Quebec.
Petitions to the Governor in Council under sub-
section 64(1) of the National Transportation Act against
the ATC decision were filed on August 25, 1978, by the
Province of Ontario and on August 28, 1978, by the Alli-
ance of Canadian Travel Association, the Consumers Asso-
ciation of Canada, Sun Tours, and Great Lakes. Ontario
argued that if a restructuring of the air industry was to
occur that it must come about deliberately as the result
of carefully considered policy directions and not as the
result of the ad hoc decisions of an administrative
tribunal. Ontario also insisted on the need for greater
consideration of provincial concerns in the construction
of federal policy.
In its petition, Great Lakes argued that the signi-
ficant policy issues at stake — private versus public
interest, competition versus monopoly and federal policy
as opposed to strongly expressed local needs — should
not be dealt with lightly. Great Lakes found strong
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support for its petition focusing on government policy in
the remarks of Guy Roberge quoted above and in the
remarks of Commissioner L. R. Talbot in his dissenting
judgment. Although Roberge had indicated that the Air
Transport Committee lacked jurisdiction to consider the
question of government ownership under the heading of
"public interest", Commissioner L. R. Talbot had stated
that:
The degree of ownership of the aviation industry in
Canada by the public sector (either by federally-
owned or provincially-owned corporations) versus
the degree of ownership by the private sector is a
matter of public interest and is a matter that
should not be accelerated by the non-disallowance
ft 1
of this intended acquisition. 1
There is no doubt that significant policy issues were and
still are at stake in the NordAir case. The theme of
concentration of corporate control and ownership and its
impact on the public interest has arisen in a number of
other cases before regulatory boards in the last two
years. The weight given this consideration by individual
regulators appears to depend heavily on their particular
ideologies. It would therefore be appropriate for
Parliament to review the policy content and effectiveness
of present legislation designed to foster competition and
perhaps to etch more clearly lines of statutory provi-
sions on the subject.
Air Canada submitted its reply to the petitions on
September 15, 1978 and replies by petitioners to the
reply of Air Canada were submitted in late September.
Meanwhile Quebecair had applied to the Review Com-
mittee of the Canadian Transport Commission for review of
the Air Transport Committee Decision. Their application,
filed on August 29, 1978, emphasized the policy set forth
in section 27 of the National Transportation Act . All
interveners of record before the Air Transport Committee
were informed by telex of Quebecair 1 s application but
unanimously chose not to participate in that review, many
of them having just filed petitions to the Governor in
Council. The Governor in Council disposed of the peti-
tions against Decision 5539 by way of Order in Council
P.C. 1978-3389, dated November 6, 1978, in which the
Governor in Council declined to vary or rescind the deci-
sion. The Review Committee of the Transport Commission
subsequently disposed of Quebecair 1 s application for
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review of the same decision by reference to the above-
mentioned Order in Council. The matter was temporarily
concluded by the following press release by Mr. Lang, the
Minister of Transport, on November 7, 1978.
AIR CANADA/NORDAIR
OTTAWA — Actions which will preserve the indepen-
dent operations of NordAir from Air Canada were
announced today by the federal government.
Transport Minister Otto Lang said the Cabinet,
while technically approving the purchase by Air
Canada of shares in NordAir — as permitted by the
Canadian Transport Commission — had agreed that
Air Canada should transfer such shares to the
government directly. The operation of NordAir,
which the CTC had insisted be kept independent of
Air Canada, would therefore be clearly independent.
"It is our intention to give NordAir the oppor-
tunity to continue to develop as a regional carrier
and at the same time the government will pursue
discussions with the other principal non-mainline
carriers in the eastern half of Canada towards the
development of a smaller number of strong regional
lines than are operating now", said Mr. Lang.
He said this could occur through mergers or
other forms of joint action which would result in
the eastern half of Canada being served by a car-
rier or carriers with a stronger economic base
better able to offer efficient service at the most
reasonable fares.
Mr. Lang acknowledged that the reorganization of
the eastern regional carriers would be a complex
undertaking involving many practical difficulties.
He was confident, however, that such a change could
create a much more rational pattern of services and
operations that would benefit the public and car-
riers alike.
"The government's involvement is appropriate
because of the large role which will be played by
overall policy considerations in the route changes
which may result. We will want good and efficient
services at reasonable rates", said Mr. Lang.
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"The government intends that NordAir will be
restored to the private sector", said Mr. Lang.
"It is my objective to accomplish this within 12
months."
The minister also stated that the government is
considering the manner in which current restric-
tions on CP Air Limited should be eased and how CP
Air and Air Canada along with the regional airlines
and Wardair, a major charter operator, may continue
to be strengthened as our major airline operators
in Canada and abroad.
Mr. Lang announced that the government has no
objection to CP Air applying to the Canadian Trans-
port Commission to operate into the Atlantic Pro-
vinces in conformity with the CTC's regulatory
requirements.
Information from sources within the Ministry of
Transport indicates that the recommendations to the
Governor in Council presented in Memorandum form by the
Minister on this petition were prepared on the specific
direction of the Minister overriding all objections by
MOT staff involved in consideration of the merits of the
petition. The future ownership of NordAir is undecided
though in many circles it is doubted that the Minister of
Transport actually planned to see it sold back to the
private sector. Taken as a whole the case serves as a
good argument both for advance planning in the policy
area as a means to avoid situations such as this where
major policy changes are effected only through decisions
in particular cases and for a restructuring of control
over policy in transportation to clarify the respective
functions of the CTC and the Ministry of Transport.
B. PETITIONS TO THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL FROM
DECISIONS OF THE CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION
AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
1. The Manitoba Cable Case
The outlines of this case are well set out in the
CRTC Annual Report 1976-77.
The Commission published a public notice on 4
October 1976, "Request for applications for cable
television service to certain areas of Manitoba".
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The notice reviewed a previous Commission Decision
74-201 (5 July 1974) approving a head-end at
Tolstoi, Man,, setting out criteria for applica-
tions including ownership of headend, amplifiers,
and drops. Applications were to be submitted by 20
December 1976, for a public hearing to be held at a
later date.
However, on 30 December, the Commission issued a
public notice saying that additional time had been
requested by applicants, and the deadline accord-
ingly was put forward to 31 March 1977. The notice
then went on to summarize developments in the Mani-
toba cable television situation since the 4 October
notice. The Governor General- in-Council, on the
recommendation of the Minister of Communications as
authorized by the Broadcasting Act , section 23, had
issued an Orders in Council setting aside decisions
authorizing the cable television licences issued
for Selkirk and Portage la Prairie. (In Decision
76-650 and 76-651, 16 September 1976, the Commis-
sion issued Winnipeg Videon's licences at Selkirk
and Portage la Prairie and Grand Valley Cable-
vision's licence at Brandon. Both decision said
that "any contractual agreement entered by the
licensees with the Manitoba Telephone System is
subject to Commission approval." In renewing
Winnipeg Videon 1 s licence at Winnipeg in Decision
76-544, 18 August 1976, the Commission stipulated
that the licensee was to own the local head-end,
drops, and amplifiers, and any contractual arrange-
ments with MTS were subject to CRTC approval.)
Therefore the Commission said it was again prepared
to receive applications for these areas. The
notice included the Commission's original public
announcement for these areas, issued 1 August 1975.
The 30 December announcement went on to say that
one point in the August 1975 notice called for
further comment: the Commission's policy had
always been to require that a cable licensee own,
as a minimum, the local head-end, amplifiers, and
drops which form part of the cable television
distribution system. But on 10 November 1976, an
Agreement was concluded between the Governments of
Canada and Manitoba on the regulation of certain
communications services in the Province of
Manitoba. This Agreement ... embodies an approach
to the ownership of cable facilities which differs
from Commission policy.
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While the Commission was not a party to the Agree-
ment and is not legally bound by it, the Commission
would find it helpful, in its deliberations on
future applications for cable television licences
in Manitoba, to receive comments on the terras and
scope of the Agreement from applicants and other
interested parties, including the parties to the
Agreement, In particular, the Commission would
appreciate a fuller understanding of the Agreement
as it relates to the Commission's concern the
licensee exercise effective control over their
cable television undertakings in order:
a. to comply with the requirements of federal stat-
utes and regulations relating to broadcasting
undertakings
b. to respond fully to Commission policies and to
be accountable directly to the Commission for
the manner in which the cable television under-
taking is carried on
c. to supply to subscribers all services authorized
by the Commission
d. to be in a position to extend service areas as
required
e. to be able to negotiate and conclude cost shar-
ing arrangements with other licensees, if desir-
able or necessary, for the extension of services
f. to be directly accountable to the Commission for
rates charged to subscribers and to be able to
satisfy the Commission that the rates are at-
tributable solely to the provision of the li-
censed cable television service
g. to be in position to identify and separate costs
of the distribution facilities from those of the
microwave facilities
h. to respond to and solve service complaints by
subscribers and for this purpose to maintain
primary contact with subscribers
i. to contribute to the design of the distribution
system in order to ensure compliance with
federal technical standards
j. to ensure that the cable television distribution
facilities will not be used in a manner preju-
dicial to broadcasting services in Manitoba.
All proposals for cable television licences in
Manitoba should deal with the above concerns which
underlie the Commission's ownership policy.
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The agreement between the Department of Communica-
tions ("Canada") and Manitoba was attached as
Appendix B to the notice. The parts of the agree-
ment concerning hardware ownership are (from the
preamble)
:
The Province has responsibility for regulating
and supervising common carrier services provided
through its agency, the Manitoba Telephone Sys-
tem, or other agencies of a similar character
subject to the regulatory and supervisory
authority of the Province (any such agency here-
inafter referred to as the Agency): facilities
and apparatus owned or under the control of the
Agency that are or may also be used by broad-
casting receiving undertakings in Manitoba.
Article V, "Cable-carrier hardware arrangements",
reads as follows:
For the purpose of providing authorized program-
ming services to the public, a broadcasting
receiving undertaking may lease from the Agency
all necessary facilities and apparatus excluding
signal modification and studio equipment, chan-
nel modulators, and the antenna and head-end of
a broadcasting receiving undertaking, the terras
and conditions under which the Agency provides
such facilities and apparatus being agreed be-
tween the Agency and the undertaking in accord-
ance with applicable statutory provisions. 82
Since the above-described events in 1976, the CRTC,
while continuing to affirm the general value of its own
cable ownership policy, has approved cable licences for
Manitoba with terms and conditions which take into
account the cable ownership policy of the Manitoba
government. Prior to 1976, the actual cable, represent-
ing one third of the capital investment in cable hard-
ware, was already owned by the government owned phone
company. The terms of licences approved in 1977 allow an
additional one third of the capital investment to be
owned by phone companies and leased to cable operators.
This one third represents the amplifier component. CRTC
policy still requires that cable licensees own the head-
ends and drops. The phone company in Saskatchewan is also
government-owned and therefore the provincial government
in Saskatchewan wanted cable ownership policy to be
applied in Saskatchewan with a result similar to that
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obtained in Manitoba. The provincial government in
Saskatchewan was perceived by CRTC to be in a position to
seriously impede implementation of CRTC cable ownership
policy, and accordingly the CRTC adjusted the terms and
conditions of Saskatchewan cable licences to take into
account the provincial government position. Throughout
the rest of Canada, where provincial governments have
wanted quite different results than those obtained in
Manitoba and Saskatchewan, CRTC cable ownership policy
has been applied without qualification. The outcome of
the case is indicative of the ability of CRTC to respond
realistically to the particular needs and preferences of
individual provinces.
2. The Telesat Agreement
Following public hearings held during the period
from April 25 to June 2, 1977, the CRTC decided that the
Telesat Canada Proposed Agreement with Trans-Canada Tele-
phone System (TCTS) would not be in the public inter-
est. ^3 The Commission considered that its basic juris-
diction under subsection 320(11) of the Railway Act was
limited to that of approving or withholding approval of
agreements submitted under that section, and that the
criteria for approval is the public interest viewed in
the broad sense. The Commission divided "public inter-
est" into two broad categories, the first encompassing
such basic regulatory issues as the effect of the Agree-
ment on the requirement for effective regulation of rates
and the prohibition against unjust discrimination or
undue preference and the second including a number of
questions of general public policy.
The Commission concluded with regard to the first
category that approval of the Agreement would render it
more difficult to identify the costs and economies of
satellite services offered to the public, would create
problems for effective intervention in Telesat rate
cases, and would have the effect of significantly reduc-
ing incentives to efficiency which arise in rate proceed-
ings. The Commission also found that approval of the
Agreement would increase the likelihood of undue prefer-
ence to TCTS and thus prejudice the ability of the Com-
mission in the future to adjudicate on complaints of
unjust discrimination under the Railway Act . Under the
second head of issues raised, those of public policy, the
Commission found that the effect of the Agreement on the
power and autonomy of Telesat, on the availability and
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expansion of satellite services in Canada, and on compe-
tition in the telecommunications service would be dele-
terious. In short, in Telecom Decision CRTC 77-10, dated
August 24, 1977, the CRTC did not approve the Agreement.
Prior to the hearing the Commission had ordered
that Bell Canada and B.C. Tel, both federally regulated
parties to the Agreement, be added as applicants in addi-
tion to Telesat. Thirty-four submissions were received
by way of intervention. The following interveners ap-
peared at the public hearing: CN/CP, the Director of
Investigation and Research, the CAC, the Minister of
Transport and Communications for the Province of Ontario,
the Minister of Communications for the Province of
Quebec, the Canadian Arctic Gas Study Ltd., the Canadian
Cable Television Association, Cablesat Ltd., the Attorney
of British Columbia, the Inuit Tapirasat, the Canadian
Association of Broadcasters, Saskatchewan Telecommunica-
tions, the Canadian Federation of Communications Workers
and H. Edmunds.
Petitions against the decision of the CRTC were
filed by Telesat Canada on September 15, 1977, by Bell
Canada on September 23, 1977 and by B.C. Telephone Co.
sometime prior to September 29, 1977. In its Reply,
filed with the Governor in Council on October 31, 1977,
the CAC adopted two positions in the alternative. The
first was to suggest that the Governor in Council must
decline jurisdiction in the matter because the Governor
in Council had considered the very matter before it by
way of petition prior to the application for approval to
the CRTC by Telesat Canada. Attached to the CAC Reply as
Appendix A, was a copy of the Memorandum to Cabinet
entitled "Proposed Telesat Canada Membership in the
Trans-Canada Telephone System". CAC argued that because
it could be seen that the issues presented on petition
were identical to or encompassed by the issues raised in
the Memorandum to Cabinet, the Governor in Council was in
effect being asked to entertain an appeal from its own
previous decision in which it hadapproved the Telesat-
TCTS Agreement in principle subject to the jurisdiction
of the CRTC. In further support of this submission, the
CAC appended as Appendix B, a letter dated December 14,
1976 and marked "confidential" from the Minister of Com-
munications Jeanne Sauve, to the Chairman of the CRTC,
Harry Boyle, in which it was communicated that the
government had "agreed that the Association of Telesat
Canada with the Trans-Canada Telephone System as a member
of TCTS was acceptable" subject to some conditions.
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In the alternative the CAC submitted that the
Governor in Council should undertake review of the deci-
sion of the CRTG only if it was shown that new evidence
was available, new facts had arisen, or the decision of
the CRTC contained a basic error of fact or law. Prior
to filing ^the Reply counsel for CAC had engaged in a cor-
respondence with Prime Minister Trudeau, in which the CAC
objected to procedure used on petitions to the Governor
in Council in the following terms:
It must be emphasized that in any court, whether it
be the lowest court in the land or the Supreme
Court of Canada, the ability of a party to bring a
matter before that particular court, without notice
to any other party of record, is an extraordinary
procedure which must be granted only in the most
extreme circumstances.
Consequently, we find it difficult if not impos-
sible to understand the basis upon which the Gover-
nor in Council accepted the petition from Telesat
Canada without being satisfied that all other
parties of record in the proceedings before the
Commission had been notified, served with the peti-
tion and given notice of a period in which to
respond.
To characterize the petition, as has been done
by the Privy Council office, as a private matter
between the petitioner and the Governor in Council
is totally unacceptable, inconsistent with the
notion of a statutory appeal and a fundamental
violation of the notion of fairness or natural
justice.^
At the same time CAC had argued that the petitioner
Telesat Canada by filing a petition against the Decision
by CRTC had placed the Governor in Council in the "embar-
rassing position" of sitting in an appellate capacity on
a decision in a matter on which it itself had previously
taken a position and made a recommendation to the CRTC.
The CAC therefore requested that the Governor in Council
decline to exercise jurisdiction. The Prime Minister in
his response maintained that these petitions to the
Governor in Council under subsection 64(1) were not
strictly speaking requests for judicial appeal, but only
requests for consideration of the matter on the grounds
of public policy. In view of this distinction the
government did not agree that the Governor in Council
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should decline to entertain the petition by Telesat
Canada. Whether this distinction is one with a differ-
ence is a matter of opinion.
On November 3, 1977 the Governor in Council issued
his decision on the petitions from the CRTC Decision
77-10 by Orders in Council P.C. 1977-3152 in which the
Governor in Council concluded that "the public interest
will be better served if the Telesat Canada Proposed
Agreement is approved". The Governor in Council, acting
on his own motion, therefore varied Telecom Decision CRTC
77-10 dated August 24, 1977, so as to provide for the
approval of the Agreement between Telesat Canada and the
TCTS. A press release from the Minister of Communica-
tions, Jeanne Sauve, also released November 3, 1977,
explained that the government had "decided to vary this
decision in such a way as to approve the proposed agree-
ment" (i.e. reverse the decision), with due regard to
broad issues of public policy which "lie beyond the rea-
sonable purview of the CRTC". Madame Sauve continued
... the range of factors affecting the policy
issues is far wider than that which the CRTC could
reasonably be expected to consider. Many of these
issues lie well beyond the purview of the Commis-
sion. Because adequate statutory mechanisms
through which the government could have provided
clear policy guidance to the CRTC are not yet
available, the Commission was unable to accord
these policy matters due consideration. The
government's conclusions have accordingly reflected
its view of these broader issues while taking full
account of the views of the CRTC and all interested
parties who either participated in the hearing or
have since made representations to the Governor in
Council.
In view of the fact that the Minister of Communica-
tions had fully communicated her views in detail to the
Chairman of the Commission in the letter referred to
above and appended to the Reply of CAC to the petition of
Telesat Canada, one can only assume that what she means
here by "adequate statutory mechanisms" would be a power
to issue binding directives to the Commission which would
have rendered it impossible for the Commission to con-
clude that the Agreement in question was not in the pub-
lic interest.
The CAC subsequently applied to the Federal Court
Trial Division, under Section 18 of the Federal Court
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Act
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for a declaration that the Governor in Council had
exceeded his jurisdiction by using the power to vary a
decision bestowed on him under subsection 64(1) of the
National Transportation Act to reverse a decision. The
matter was heard by Gibson J. and judgment rendered on
April 6, ,1978, dismissing the action with costs. Gibson
J. held that the word "vary" has a very wide connotation,
and that he was, therefore, of the view that the Governor
in Council in this case, "in reversing the decision of
the CRTC by substituting his decision for that of the
CRTC and thereby causing an entirely different result to
obtain, was lawfully exercising his power to vary pre-
scribed in subsection 64(1) of the National Transporta-
tion Act ; and as a consequence, the Order in Council,
P.C. 1977-3152, dated November 3rd, 1977, has no juris-
dictional defects and is intra vires the powers of the
Governor in Council." 85 The case was heard on appeal to
the Federal Court of Appeal on January 25, 1979 by
Jackett C.J.C., Le Dain and Pratte JJ. and dismissed
without reasons.
3. The Bell-Saudi Arabia Contract
This case, now before the Governor in Council by
way of a petition by Bell Canada from Telecom Decision
CRTC 78-7 and Telecom Decision CRTC 79-1, like the Tele-
sat case is an instance where Commission considerations
with regard to rate regulation and the political and
policy concerns of the Cabinet may not coincide. The
matter in question arose as an aspect of Bell Canada's
application for an increase in certain rates entertained
in two months of public hearings in May and June of 1978.
In consequence of these hearings, the CRTC released Tele-
com Decision CRTC 78-7 concluding among other things
that:
(a) "... the Commission considers the Saudi Arabia
operations to be integrally related to Bell
Canada's telephone business." (Decision 78-7 at
page 65);
(b) "As regards investor and managerial incentive,
the Commission believes that in a regulated company
like Bell Canada, it is normal, fair and appro-
priate for subscribers' rates to reflect the bene-
fits arising from a project such as the present
one, inasmuch as it is through the efforts to meet
their telecommunications requirements that the
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Company has been able to develop the expertise to
compete successfully on an international basis to
perform the project." (Decision 78-7 at page 66);
(c) "At this time, however, the Commission finds
that there is no reasonable conclusion on the evi-
dence in this case but that all the revenues from
the Saudi Arabian contract be treated as part of
the Company's ordinary revenues for regulatory pur-
poses." (Decision 78-7 at page 66)
(d) "It is therefore ordered that the Company's
estimated revenues for regulatory purposes be
adjusted, for each of the years 1978 and 1979, to
include the pre-tax revenues to be realized in each
year under the agreement with the Government of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." (Decision 78-7 at pages
66 and 67).
On October 6th, 1978 Bell Canada applied to the CRTC
requesting a review of the above excerpted portions of
Telecom Decision CRTC 78-7. The Commission issued Tele-
com public notice 1978-27 on October 23, 1978, inviting
submissions as to the criteria which it should use in
deciding whether or not to exercise its discretion to
review under section 63 of the National Transportation
Act and, in effect, how those criteria should be applied
in the present case. Numerous submissions were received.
The Commission appointed a committee consisting of three
members of the Executive Committee who did not partici-
pate in the original decision to constitute a Review Com-
mittee. The unanimous decision of the Review Committee
was that the application for review should be denied.
The criteria applied required the applicant to demon-
strate on a prima facie basis that one or more of the
following existed:
(1) an error in law or fact;
(2) a fundamental change in circumstances or fact
since the decision;
(3) a failure to consider a basic principle which
had been raised in the original proceeding; or
(4) a new principle which has arisen as the result
of the decision.
In the case in question, none of these criteria were
found to be met. The Decision of the Review Committee
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was released February 2nd, 1979 as Telecom Decision CRTC
79-1.
Bell Canada in their petition under subsection
64(1) of the National Transportation Act dated March 2nd,
1979, asked the Governor in Council to vary or rescind
the two Telecom decisions above-mentioned on the follow-
ing grounds inter alia that:
(1) the Commission was in error in finding the Saudi
Arabia project to be as a matter of fact integrally
related to Bell Canada's telephone business; Bell
neither admitted nor placed in dispute the under-
lying principle;
(2) its activities in Saudi Arabia are beyond the Com-
mission's regulatory jurisdiction;
(3) the maintenance of separate accounts prevents the
occurrence of any cross-subsidization;
(4) the "profit centre" concept is commonly used in
Canadian regulation, for example, in the separation
of CP Telecommunications from CP Rail;
(5) contributions by way of expertise and materials
from Bell Canada would be fully compensated under
service agreements included in the rate base for
regulatory purposes;
(6) the Commission by virtue of its inclusion of the
net profits of the Saudi Arabia contract for the
purposes of regulation had unfairly deprived Bell
Canada share holders of 132.3 million dollars (es-
timated) net income after tax over the five-year
period from 1978 to 1982.
(7) the long-term effect of the CRTC Decision would be
to "crush Bell Canada initiatives" to pursue and
engage in international contracts and the absence
of such initiatives would be detrimental to the
Canadian economy.
As of early June, 1979, the petition apparently had
not been disposed of. If it is granted it will be per-
ceived by its principal opponents as an example of the
use of executive review, in which political rather than
regulatory considerations weigh heavily, to disrupt the
orderly development of the policy of a regulatory board
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attempting to deal with the intricate problems of cross-
subsidization as these arise within its particular area
of expertise. In other circles, among Bell Canada share-
holders for example, it may be seen as an instance in
which executive review has prevented harm to the "public
interest" that might result from a uniform application of
regulatory policy. It is my hope that the present dis-
cussion of executive review powers may be of some assist-
ance in weighing the merits of such conflicting allega-
tions.
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Chapter VII
EVALUATION OF CURRENT PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES IN THE
EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE REVIEW POWERS
This chapter consists of four parts, the first
three establishing the criteria with reference to which
the evaluation of current practices and procedures in the
exercise of executive review powers is performed in the
fourth part and on which the recommendations in Chapter
VIII are based. Use of such an explicit evaluation
procedure is rare in a study paper. It is employed here
in an experimental attempt to avoid the common flaw of
intermingling conclusions, facts, opinions and silent
premises to the point where the belaboured reader is
either persuaded or repulsed but may not be able to pin-
point where he/she was won or lost. Constructive debate
is more apt to occur when the parties are clear about the
nature and extent of their disagreement. First, the
"values" with reference to which the assessment is to be
performed are identified. Second, the governmental func-
tion commonly ascribed to executive review and appeal
powers is examined and the extent to which it is desir-
able to have regulatory policies subject to control by
the executive is itself placed in question. Thirdly,
recent judicial decisions in the area of administrative
law concerning directives, fettering of the discretion of
statutory decision-makers, delegation of ministerial
powers, bias on the part of the administrators and ad-
ministrative boards and review tribunals, the concept of
ultra vires , and the duty of fairness, are examined for
the purpose of extracting an indication of current tend-
encies in Canadian administrative law with a view to
applying emergent legal principles in the following
assessment of current powers and practices in the area of
executive review.
Only when the standards or measures to be relied on
have been clearly identified is the assessment itself
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made. The use of different standards than those relied
on here might result in the identification of other prob-
lems with executive review than those I perceive to exist
or the proposal of a distinct set of recommendations. I
have merely argued that insofar as priority is placed as
it is in, this paper on the enhancement of specific and
clearly identified values and principles in government,
current executive review and appeal powers and practices
are, on examination, revealed to be problematic and in
need of change. The recommendations I put forward to
resolve the problems identified are grounded on this same
set of values and principles.
A. VALUES USED IN THE ASSESSMENT
Any values chosen for use in conducting any assess-
ment of anything, whether it be the topic under discus-
sion here, the performance of a classical dance, the
organization of a desk drawer, or the allocation of the
resources available to a person or group of persons, can
be justified either by reference to their alleged intrin-
sic worth or their instrumental role in achieving a goal
where the intrinsic or instrumental value of this goal in
turn is, rightly or wrongly, either assumed or in turn
justified. Any choice of values thus has a context, a
frame of reference. Particulars under assessment can be
made the subject of meaningful value judgment as to their
instrumentality in relation only to this frame of refer-
ence whose value is presumed or in turn justified. The
process of rational justification always grounds itself
ultimately on an assumption of value or the presumed
truth of a value judgment which itself is not subject to
justification save by way perhaps of circular argumenta-
tion. Conflicting judgments of value can easily arise
even within a single frame of reference as a result of
diverse projections of the instrumental value of particu-
lars or distinct conceptions of the essential charac-
teristics of the frame of reference.
The frame of reference used here as a goal whose
inherent value is presumed for these purposes, is the
actual and apparent exercise of statutory executive
review and appeal powers according to law, that being as
defined by positive law in Canada seen within the common
law tradition and the Parliamentary system of representa-
tive government. Any changes in the positive law proposed
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here are thus justified by an argument to the effect that
they will serve to realize or to reassert principles
traditionally regarded as essential to a parliamentary
system of representative government with due reference to
the expanded responsibilities of government and other new
factors of contemporary relevance. "
The characteristics essential to this frame of
reference, that is, those without which it would be some-
thing "other than" that which it is, are regarded as
being of "value" and, for simplicity's sake, may be
called "values" (although usually referring to something
as a "value" in this fashion means — "this is a quality
in our frame of reference that we value") as may charac-
teristics that are instrumental to the achievement or
maintenance, as the case may be, of the frame of refer-
ence itself. Other discussions might use frameworks that
were broader yet and evaluate the value of particular
systems of government as instruments for the achievement
of broader goals. This study paper merely presumes the
Parliamentary system of representative government as
given and asks how the values inherent in that system and
its principles can be applied to meet new demands.
The values to be used in this assessment of execu-
tive review powers are very straightforward and were
chosen as being those qualities essential to government
in accordance with the law under a Parliamentary system
of representative government. They are: (1) openness,
(2) opportunity for informed public and Parliamentary
debate regarding policy and legislation, (3) consistency
in interpretation of law, including its policy content,
(4) uniformity in application and enforcement, and (5)
speed with accuracy. In addition, if the parliamentary
system of representative government itself is to be
strengthened, mechanisms must be designed to achieve the
following goals: (1) legislation by representatives of
the people, (2) parliamentary review of legislation made
by delegated authority, (3) ministerial accountability to
Parliament, (4) protections against conflict of interest
and abuse of power, (5) judicial independence, and (6)
judicial review.
B. THE FUNCTION OF EXECUTIVE REVIEW AND APPEAL
The function attributed to executive review and
appeal powers is highly dependent on the view adopted of
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the role of the executive within a parliamentary system.
At one extreme it is possible to identify the government
of Canada with the government of the day. If this view
is adopted it is possible to regard the executive review
and appeal function, like control by the executive over
the machinery of legislation and over the content of
delegated legislation where the regulation-making power
is vested in the minister or the Governor in Council, as
yet another fully legitimate means to ensure that the
policy views of the government of the day are indeed
given expression and proper interpretation in the deci-
sions of statutory decision-makers as well as in primary
and secondary legislation. It is within this view of the
role of the executive that the bestowal of a general
directive power in the hands of ministers in my opinion
most naturally finds its place.
Supporters of increased ministerial directive
powers in the regulatory area have argued that the net
result will be increased accountability to Parliament,
while the extension of ministerial power will be merely
an instrumentality to that end. The idealism of this
point of view is to be admired. A variety of pragmatic
considerations make it preferable, however, to use other
instruments to guarantee direct accountability to Parlia-
ment with regard to policy in those instances where
Parliament has deemed independent regulation desirable.
Allocation of control over policy interpretation and
implementation to the executive, by contrast, would place
complete reliance on the principle of ministerial
responsibility to provide accountability to Parliament.
If on the other hand the principle of parliamentary
supremacy is emphasized, then one could argue for a
diminution of the scope for uncontrolled legislation by
delegated authority or the creation of effective Parlia-
mentary controls over the use of that authority, effec-
tive control or direction by Standing Committees of
Parliament over at least aspects of the machinery of
legislation and a redefinition of the role of the execu-
tive outside Parliament into that of head of state and
chief administrator. Within this view the primary role
of executive review and appeal powers, if any, would be
to provide for extraordinary relief in instances where
strict application of policy contained in primary or
secondary legislation would have unduly harsh effects or
to correct the most obvious errors of departmental or
independent statutory decision-makers with regard to in-
terpretation of policy as set out in primary or secondary
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legislation, where these errors were not such as to
render the administrative decisions subject to review in
the courts on the grounds of error of law. This limited
appellate role could be filled by the regulatory review
committee in appeals from independent decision-makers
without the hazard of executive political interference
and, on appeals with leave, by the courts. The sugges-
tion that the courts become involved with occasional
appeals from regulatory decisions based on policy inter-
pretation anticipates the development of articulate regu-
latory policy. The executive would have a central role
in shaping policy but not uncontrolled powers of dicta-
tion.
Somewhere between these two extremes lies a view of
the role of the executive within the parliamentary system
which is most appropriate for each matter under federal
jurisdiction given the priority placed on the qualities
and goals listed above and the heavy demands placed on
modern government by its multiple responsibilities. It is
clear that appropriate models can be formulated for
control over policy for each area of administrative law
having to do with regulation only by asking by what
mechanism political responsiveness is to be best achieved
at each of the stages in the regulatory process, that is,
those of policy generation, policy interpretation, policy
implementation, policy enforcement and policy review and
appeal. Each of the alternative models proposed in Sec-
tion A of Chapter VIII, both designed to enhance the
values and goals listed above, allocates control over
policy quite differently. The first assigns the major
role in policy development and interpretation to the
executive, thus ensuring control by the government of the
day. The second, designed for sectors in which indepen-
dent regulation is desired, places responsibility for
policy squarely in the hands of the regulatory body free
from executive interference and subject in its use of
delegated legislative power only to control by Parliament
and the courts.
C. RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND EMERGENT LEGAL
PRINCIPLES
Recent judicial decisions dealing either with the
role of the executive or the function of and parameters
to be placed on executive review and appeal powers are of
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value in identifying emerging legal principles relevant
to this assessment. These decisions clarify the law with
regard to six key issues: the legal status of direc-
tives, fettering of discretionary decision-making power,
delegation of ministerial powers, bias, ultra vires , and
the duty ^f "fairness".
1. Directives
Recent case law with regard to "directives" has
often been primarily concerned with the legal status of
particular directives for the purpose of determining
whether they were properly reviewable under sections 18
or 28 of the Federal Court Act . In the process, however,
some clarity has been achieved. Most importantly it has
become clear that the courts are prepared to make refer-
ence to the overall purpose of a statute and the nature
of the rights it governs or creates in order to decide
what procedural rights are implied and thus, in turn,
when it is appropriate for the courts to intervene to
protect these rights.
In a series of cases87 dealing with inmate disci-
pline the courts have come to the conclusion that, al-
though directives issued pursuant to the regulations
under the Penitentiary Act confer no "legal rights" on
inmates, the nature of the potential impact on the inmate
of a disciplinary decision in any given case may dictate
that the procedures used in arriving at the decision must
be "fair". The issues surrounding "directives", "guide-
lines", and "rules", i.e., documents issued either infor-
mally in the course of fulfilling administrative duties
or pursuant to a provision in regulations, are thus as
closely tied to the issue of vires as is the matter of
delegation of statutory decision-making authority.
Rules, directives, and guidelines, as well as decisions
taken with delegated decision-making power, may be ultra
vires the enabling act even if made and exercised pur-
suant to a statutory authority. The exercise of adminis-
trative discretionary powers are, as a consequence, all
subject to review under section 18 of the Federal Court
Act with regard to the issue of vires whether or not they
are purportedly exercised pursuant to "law".
The legislative scheme used in any given statute
will influence the court in its decision as to whether or
not any particular directive is intra vires the statute.
Where the legislation confers sweeping powers of "control
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and direction" on a Minister over an agent of the Crown,
it is difficult to argue that any particular "directive"
is ultra vires the act or was established in the absence
of an appropriate information gathering and decision-
making process. The comments of Le Dain J, in Re
A.G.I.P. S.P.A. and the Atomic Energy Control Board , May
24, 1978, bear this out. Le Dain stated:
The decisions of the Atomic Energy Control Board in
the exercise of its licensing functions are made
subject to direct ministerial control by means of
directions expressive of governmental policy. This
shows the very special position of the board in
this field: it is not exercising a truly indepen-
dent adjudicative function on issues that viewed as
a whole lend themselves to a judicial or quasi-
judicial process. The reservation of the minis-
terial power to make directions upon the basis of
recommendations of a review panel composed of
representatives of the departments concerned as
well as the board, indicates that the issues in the
final analysis are seen to be complex ones of
national policy, involving in some cases questions
of security over which the government acting in its
executive capacity must retain ultimate control. 88
These comments may be usefully contrasted with
those of Chief Justice Laskin in the reasons of the
majority of the court in Capital Cities Communications
Incorporated v. CRTC8 9 with regard to the role of fair
procedures in the adjudicative process in justifying the
application of CRTC policy set out in the form of guide-
lines in a policy statement, rather than in regulations
promulgated pursuant to statute. It is clear from com-
paring these cases, and those referred to above concern-
ing inmate discipline, that each case or class of cases
in which the legality of administrative guidelines,
rules, or directives comes into question must be decided
anew. The general scope and nature of the powers confer-
red by the statute on the administrator making the rule
in question, the nature of the rights dealt with in the
statute and the extent to which, in the light of these
powers and rights, the court deems it appropriate that
executive or administrative power to decide and establish
policy be subject to procedural requirements must all be
assessed.
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2. Fettering of Discretionary Power
Fettering of discretionary decision-making power is
an old issue of extreme relevance to problems central to
the practices and procedures of independent regulatory
bodies. JLn that context the issue is inextricably linked
with the problem of defining "policy", for, odd as it may
seem, there appears to be considerable uncertainty as to
just what "policy" is. Policies establish goals and
priorities to guide the allocation of resources in
achieving those goals. Proclamation of a "policy" im-
plies that there is some scope for choice and the power,
or possibility of power, to implement those choices. In
the absence of probable power or of choice theories may
be constructed but policies are not.
The policy content of statutes tends to be cast in
broad terras and power to implement this policy through
regulations, rules and adjudication is delegated. The
regulatory process, like the departmental administrative
process, then uses a combination of regulation, rule-
making and adjudication to give precise content to the
often ambiguous policy goals of the statute. The statute
may fail to clearly indicate a priority among multiple
goals. The regulator may thus be left to balance goals
which conflict in a particular fact situation. Policy
only crystallizes in the face of the facts; in a vacuum
it remains theoretical. Policy guidelines if they are
articulate can be of real use, however, as an adjudica-
tive and business planning guide rather than merely a
device with which to demonstrate one's skills in sophis-
try. The techniques of policy development presently used
by the CRTC, involving the use of issue and rule-making
hearings and the issuance of general policy statements
appear to be effective in providing the Commission with
exposure to diverse views of the "public interest" and
how it may best be enhanced.
There is no greater unanimity as to what "govern-
ment policy" is. Is it to be found in ministerial press
releases, the policy guidelines issued by regulatory
bodies, or only in the policy statements contained in
validly enacted statutory instruments? If the latter
view is accepted, how are conflicts between the interpre-
tations drawn from that legislative policy by ministers
and regulatory bodies to be resolved? As is clear from
the preceding chapters this is not a merely academic
question.
110
The issue of fettering enters no matter which way
one turns in the attempt to find firm ground for inter-
pretations of broad policy statements contained in legis-
lation. For example, when the CRTC indicated in 1976 in
connection with its hearings on Procedures and Practices
in Telecommunications Regulation that it would be "con-
scious of developing national telecommunications policy
objectives", 90 both Bell Canada and the Canadian Telecom-
munications Carriers 1 Association objected strenuously,
for in their view the CRTC, like all other statutory
regulators, was required to look to the policy content of
the legislation and not to the policy preferences of the
executive. In the 1978 CRTC Telecom Decision 78-4 on
practices and procedures^! the Commission restated its
position with regard to the weight to be given "govern-
ment policy" to explain in effect that to "be conscious
of" was "to take into consideration". And indeed this is
the only position that the CRTC can take if it is to
escape the allegation that it has fettered its discretion
by either government policy or by its own policy guide-
lines.
The recent case law dealing with fettering and
regulatory policy implies that the position of the CRTC
in this regard is sound. CRTC development and use of its
own policy guidelines was said to be "eminently proper"
by Chief Justice Laskin, speaking for the majority, in
the 1977 Supreme Court of Canada judgment in Capital
Cities Communications Inc. v. CRTC . 92 ^r# Justice
Laskin* s opinion of the propriety of the practice of
reference to policy guidelines on an individual applica-
tion took into account the breadth of the statutory
policy mandate, the hearing process which gave interested
parties an opportunity to make submissions with regard to
possible policy guidelines as such, the desirability of
having overall regulatory policy guidelines known in
advance (rather than only as a result of case by case
adjudication), and the fact that parties to be affected
by the implications of the policy guidelines in the par-
ticular case had the opportunity to argue that they
should not apply.
Fettering had also been alleged in an earlier
case, 93 where the CTC had referred to the general policy
content of a regulation previously struck down as ultra
vires the Commission. The Federal Court of Appeal held
that, although the policy had been applied without excep-
tion in 400 cases, there was no fettering of Commission
discretion, for in each case the Commission had been
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willing to hear and consider reasons why the general
policy should not apply. In summary, it is clear that
regulatory bodies are free to develop policy guidelines
and rules to cover issues not dealt with, or not dealt
with in full detail in the primary legislation or regula-
tions enacted pursuant thereto, as long as they do not
then automatically apply these guidelines in a particular
case. The holding of policy issue and rule-making hear-
ings by regulatory bodies can be seen as a valuable tac-
tic in defending the legitimacy of any resultant policy
guidelines as well as an effective means to ensure some
public participation in the development of such guide-
lines.
The implications of the principle that discretion-
ary decision-making power is not to be fettered for
references in adjudication by regulatory bodies to
"government policy" have not been discussed in recent
cases which are as obviously in point as were those dis-
cussed above concerning reference to policy guidelines
generated by the regulatory body itself. Cases discuss-
ing the implications of giving weight to "extraneous
considerations" are not of great assistance insofar as to
apply them to this issue on either side of the argument
is to beg the question of the status of "government
policy". And to beg that question is to avoid the kernel
of the problem underlying much of the recent discussion
of ministerial directive powers as a mechanism for com-
municating the policy views of the government of the day
to independent regulators. Conversely, as is shown in
Chapter VIII, consideration of the implications of the
principle of fettering goes a long way towards unravel-
ling that same problem.
In this context the term "dictation" can be used
almost interchangeably with the term "fettering". To
"dictate" is to "fetter" successfully. To permit oneself
to be "fettered" by the policy statements of another is
to acquiesce in "dictation". The landmark Canadian case
on the point is still Roncarelli v. Duplessis ,94 in which
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Premier's
advice to the licence commissioner was equivalent to an
order to revoke Roncarelli 1 s liquor licence. Rand J., in
the conclusion of his reasons for judgment, stated with
reference to the issue of whether the Premier had acted
in the matter within the scope of his official function
that:
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It would be only through an assumption of a general
overriding power of executive direction in statu-
tory administrative matters that any colour of pro-
priety in the act could be found. But such an
assumption would be in direct conflict with funda-
mental postulates of our Provincial as well as
Dominion Government; and in the actual circumstan-
ces there is not a shadow of justification for it
in the statutory language.
Among Justice Abbott's very brief comments in his reasons
for judgment in the case was the statement that "The
Commission here was not a department of government in the
ordinary sense and the defendant had no statutory power
to interfere in its administration".
With this perspective, on-going policy conflicts
between the minister and the regulatory bodies in trans-
port and communications take on new nuances. The problem
is not simply one of finding effective means of ensuring
that independent regulators give due effect to "govern-
ment" policy as that is expressed by the executive, but
of finding legal means of doing so, and that would
require legislative action by Parliament. Powers of
direction or dictation provided by regulation and made by
the Governor in Council purportedly pursuant to statute
would be subject to the vires test according to the same
broad criteria discussed with regard to directives above,
and delegation, below.
Informal ministerial interference, as arguably
occurred in the ATC decision not to disallow the acquisi-
tion of NordAir by Air Canada, would appear to be open to
the same analysis as that of Duplessis 1 in the Roncarelli
case were it not for the apparently sincere, however
dubious, belief perpetuated in MOT and other sectors of
the executive branch of government that policy statements
by the Minister of Transport have a legal status and bind
the discretion of the CTC. Unlike the CRTC, however, the
CTC appears to regard itself as legally bound to abide by
ministerial policy and thus should perhaps be described
as acquiescing in dictation. In the NordAir matter,
because the Regional Airlines Policy was recognized to be
in a state of evolution by MOT and the industry without
consultation with CTC itself, reliance by ATC on that
policy was tantamount to abdicating, or permanently dele-
gating, CTC decision-making power in the case to the
Minister. The policy itself was in flux, the Minister
had indicated he expected treatment of NordAir to be in
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accord with evolving policy, but no immediate consulta-
tion with CTC was contemplated. In the circumstances one
way the CTC could have dealt more adequately with the
case would have been to declare themselves free of any
obligation to be bound by or give undue consideration to
ministerial policy statements and then to hold two hear-
ings, the first a general policy hearing, the second the
actual acquisition hearing. Given the combination of the
views of the Minister and the existing appeal provisions
in section 64 of the National Transportation Act it is
not really surprising that the majority of the ATC chose
to ignore all broad policy issues. Even Roberge averted
to critical ones only to indicate that they were not, in
his opinion, within the jurisdiction of the Commission
under section 2 7 and would require the attention of the
Minister or Parliament.
It must be asked whether statutory ministerial
directive powers over independent regulators would be in
such basic conflict with the principle that discretionary
decision-making powers are not to be fettered as to
create as anoraolous a situation as presently exists with
the provision for statutory appeals from "independent"
regulatory decisions to Cabinet. The latter, despite
LeDain f s comments affirming their statutory nature, are
in effect highly "political" or "politicized" appeals
because of the nature of the forum and its procedure.
Only if directive powers were quite narrowly circum-
scribed would the possibility that the regulators will be
overridden on fundamental regulatory issues, going to the
core of the regulatory mandate, be avoided; yet if direc-
tive powers were limited to that extent they would be
powerless to achieve the purposes for which they have
been proposed — the articulation of coherent regulatory
policy which gives a central place to the priorities of
the government of the day and is subject to control by
Parliament through the mechanism of ministerial responsi-
bility.
3. Delegation
Themes similar to those discussed with regard to
directives and fettering run through the cases on delega-
tion of powers. The comments of Pratte J., in Ramawad v.
Minister of Manpower and Immigration , confirm that the
essential points of reference used by the courts are the
nature of the rights in question, the nature and scope of
the powers conferred, and the overall legislative scheme
employed.
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In the Immigration Act , Parliament has recognized
the existence of different levels of authority,
namely, the Governor in Council, the Minister, the
Director, immigration officer in charge, the Spe-
cial Inquiry Officer and the immigration officer.
The authority granted by Parliament to each of such
levels is clearly specified in the Act, In some
cases, the Act allows for a sharing of authority as
between some of these levels. For instance, under
s, 12, a peace officer is obligated to carry out
any warrant issued under the Act for the arrest,
detention or deportation of any person if "so
directed by the Minister, Director, Special Inquiry
Officer or an immigration officer". Also, s. 36(2)
authorizes "the Minister, Director, a Special
Inquiry Officer or an immigration officer" to give
certain instructions with respect to the deporta-
tion of a person against whom a deportation order
has been made.
Similarly, the Regulations issued under the Act
make a clear distinction between the authority con-
ferred on the Minister on the one hand and on his
officials on the other hand.
Indeed, in the Act and in the Regulations, the
most important functions have been reserved for the
Minister's discretion while authority in other
areas have been delegated directly to specified
officials.
The general framework of the Act and of the
Regulations is clear evidence of the intent of
Parliament and of the Governor in Council that the
discretionary power entrusted to the Minister be
exercised by him rather than by his officials act-
ing under the authority of an implied delegation,
subject of course to any statutory provision to the
contrary. To put it differently, the legislation
here in question, because of the way it is framed
and also possibly because of its subject-matter,
makes it impossible to say, as was the situation in
Harrison (R. v. Harrison (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 660
28 C.C.C. (2d) 279, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 238), that the
power of the Minister to delegate is implicit;
quite the contrary.
I am reinforced in my opinion on this point by
s. 67 of the Act which reads as follows:
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• The Minister may authorize the Deputy-
Minister or the Director to perform and exercise
any of the duties powers and functions that may
be or are required to be performed or exercised
by the Minister under this Act or the regula-
tions and any such duty, power or function per-
formed or exercised by the Deputy-Minister or
the Director under the authority of the Minister
shall be deemed to have been performed or exer-
cised by the Minister."
The effect of this section is, by necessary
implication, to deny the Minister the right to
delegate powers vested in him to persons not men-
tioned therein.
I therefore come to the conclusion that the dis-
cretion entrusted to the Minister under para. 3G(d)
of the Regulations must be exercised by him, or if
properly authorized to do so under s. 67, by one of
the persons therein mentioned which do not include
the Special Inquiry Officer who issued the deporta-
tion order here in question.
It follows that the decision made by the Special
Inquiry Officer in this case to the effect that
"there are no special circumstances in existence at
the present time in order to apply Paragraph 3G(d)
of the Immigration Regulations as requested by
Counsel", is not and cannot be considered as a
decision of the Minister; it is therefore in-
valid. 95
The reasons of Pratte J. in Ramawad were followed
by Decary J. , in Re Laneau and Minister of Immigration9 6
a case in which it was held that the Immigration Act does
not authorize a minister to delegate his powers under
section 8 to a Special Inquiry Officer.
A narrower approach to the problem of delegation
was taken by the Ontario High Court in Re Clark et al v.
A.G. of Canada in which the court held:
The power to make Regulations given to the Atomic
Energy Control Board by s. 9 of the Atomic Energy
Control Act , R.S.C. 1970, c. A-19, is wide enough
to authorize the Uranium Information Security Regu-
lations, SOR/76-644, which provide for the secrecy
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of information relating to certain uranium trans-
actions. However, s. 2(a) (ii) of the Regulations,
which prohibits a person from releasing information
concerning uranium except if "he does so with the
consent of the Minister of Energy, Mines and Re-
sources", is ultra vires the Atomic Energy Control
Board. It offends the maxim delegatus non potest
delegare . The real effect of the exemption is to
vest the Regulation-making power of the Board in
the Minister. The Minister could give exemptions
to everyone and could effectively nullify the
application of the Regulations. There is nothing
in the Atomic Energy Control Act which justifies
the conclusion that the Board is entitled to dele-
gate the powers granted to it by the Act. The fact
that s. 2(a) (ii) is ultra vires does not invalidate
the entire Regulations. The appropriate approach
is simply to strike out s. 2(a) (ii). Therefore,
apart from s. 2(a) (ii), the Regulations are intra
vires the Atomic Energy Control Board.
A very different result might have followed had the
court adopted the broader approach of considering the
legislative scheme as a whole, for it is arguably the
case that a board which is by statute subject to the
"control and direction" of the Minister can "delegate"
all its powers to the Minister without violating the
principle of vires .
Cases dealing with the standards of procedure to be
required in the conduct of inquiries on the basis of
which a report or recommendation is prepared for a minis-
ter or the Governor in Council are relevant to the issue
of delegation. The view that principles of natural jus-
tice will not apply to an administrative officer or board
whose only function is the collection of information and
preparation of a report, applied in Guay v. LaFleur98 by
the Supreme Court of Canada in 1964, has now been gener-
ally replaced by the less certain but more satisfactory
view that procedures used in inquiries (like those used
in the generation of any "administrative" decision) must
be appropriate to the matter ultimately at stake and the
legislative scheme. Thus it was observed in Andre
Desjardins v. The A.G. of Canada , National Parole Board
et al. :
Here, the Board* s decision was not a final determi-
nation, but it can be argued that its recommenda-
tion would undoubtedly be accepted by the Governor
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in Council, and it is perhaps sophistry to suggest
that since the Board was merely investigating, and
not deciding, it was not obliged to act judicially
or quasi- judicially. ^9
Partial delegation of executive powers thus no longer
clearly forestalls imposition of the same standards of
fairness on the delegatee as would be required of the
Minister. With regard to this point Lord Denning in 1976
in his reasons for judgment in Selvarajan v. Race Rela-
tions Board , stated:
The fundamental rule is that, if a person may be
subjected to pains or penalties, or be exposed to
prosecution or proceedings, or deprived of remedies
or redress, or in some way adversely affected by
the investigation and report, then he should be
told the case made against him and be afforded a
fair opportunity of answering it. 100
4. Bias
The decisionslOl with regard to allegations of bias
against boards with investigatory or decision-making
powers must be read in the light of one very real protr-
lera; would it be possible to find persons with sufficient
expertise to perform the regulatory task required who
could not be alleged to be biased, or reasonably appre-
hended as biased, by some of the parties concerned. This
is not a new problem. Judge-shopping is an old pastime.
Moreover, it is probably ill-founded to argue, for exam-
ple, that an environmental group is at a greater disad-
vantage when appearing before the NEB than a labour union
in an appearance before the average judge of some 50
years ago. The influence of socio-economic and political
ties on judicial decision-making is inevitable and will
continue to be so even in the absence of what might
amount to technical "conflict of interest". The tradi-
tional protections against the impact of these factors on
decision-making: judicial independence, public hearings,
full reasons, rights of appeal, and freedom of expression
and of the press, must be fully implemented with regard
to any decision for which a measure of insulation from
political and personal bias is required.
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5. Ultra Vires
Executive acts not authorized by the statutory
instruments relied on, and decisions based on considera-
tions irrelevant to the legislative scheme conferring the
power to decide, will be declared ultra vires by the
courts#102 As above, the legislative scheme, the nature
of the power conferred, the matter at stake, and explicit
or implied procedural requirements are decisive.
6. Fairness
The "duty of fairness" doctrine, frequently touched
on above, is the keystone around which judicial treatment
of administrative law appears to be being rebuilt. The
old division into "administrative" as opposed to "quasi-
judicial" or "judicial" is now generally recognized to be
non-essential and, as a consequence, the appropriateness
of procedure used in decision-making by all statutory
decision-makers must be defended and attacked with refer-
ence to what would be "fair" in the whole circumstances.
This phenomenon is but another reflection or aspect of
the more global, less technical approach to administra-
tive law already seen above.
The "fairness" doctrine has been emerging for some
time in Canada and recently received clear confirmation
from the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Nicholson and
Haldimand-Norf oik Regional Board of Commissioners of
Police , October 3, 1978, in a 5-4 decision. 103 Martland,
Pigeon, Beetz, and Pratte, in a dissenting judgment held
that the decision of the Board to dismiss a constable
during an 18 month probationary period was "purely
administrative" and therefore the Board was subject to
constraints of courtesy but not law in the procedures
adopted to obtain his dismissal. The majority opinion,
delivered by Laskin C.J.C., held that though the Board
acting with executive or administrative powers was not
required to act in accordance with the rules of natural
justice, it was under a general duty of fairness which
would have been fulfilled had the constable been informed
of the reasons for his dismissal and given an opportunity
to reply.
In Inuit Tapirisat of Canada et al v. His Excellen-
cy The Right Honourable Jules Leger, et al. (on appeal to
the Federal Court of Appeal from the dismissal by the
Federal Court Trial Division of the Inuit Tapirisat
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application for a declaration under section 18 of the
Federal Court Act that they were denied a fair hearing on
their petition to the Governor in Council under sub-
section 64(1) of the National Transportation Act), the
court held, in reasons by Le Dain J., as follows:
While the authority conferred by s. 64(1) cannot
for the reason indicated, be characterized as judi-
cial or quasi- judicial, I cannot see why the duty
to act fairly which was affirmed in the Nicholson
case should not in principle be applicable to the
Governor in Council when dealing with an interested
party who exercises the right of petition or
appeal. The authority is not the general political
power of the Cabinet but a specific statutory
authority, which, because it contemplates a right
of petition or appeal, is clearly conferred at
least in part for the benefit of persons whose
interests may be affected by a decision of the Com-
mission. It is reasonable I think, to ascribe to
Parliament an intention that such persons should
within certain limits be dealt with fairly from a
procedural point of view. The question is what
those limits must be, having regard to the nature
of the Governor in Council or the formal Executive,
and the manner in which it acts by long-established
constitutional convention and practice.
The court went on to state that, although allega-
tions with regard to non-disclosure of intra-governmental
submissions did not give rise to grounds for relief be-
cause there was no clear intention in Parliament to qual-
ify traditional Privy Council secrecy:
[T]he question whether the appellants were denied a
fair opportunity to reply to the submissions of
Bell Canada raises in my opinion an issue of a dif-
ferent order. Here Bell Canada, as one of the par-
ties to the dispute, had been given an opportunity
to answer the petition of the appellants. Was the
nature of this answer and the issues raised by it
such that fairness required that the appellants be
given a reasonable opportunity to reply? If so, was
the delay of some two weeks before the decision of
the Governor in Council was released a reasonable
one in the circumstances? These are obviously
questions of fact. Natural justice has not recog-
nized a right of reply as a general principle. It
has been treated as depending on what fairness
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required in the particular circumstances of each
case, having regard to the necessary right of an
administrative authority to determine when it has
heard sufficiently from interested parties to give
it a basis for decision. See Forest Industrial
Relations Limited and International Woodworkers of
America and the Labour Relations Board of the Prov-
ince of British Columbia v. International Union of
Operating Engineers Local 882
,
[1962] S.C.R. 80;
Komo Construction Inc. et al v. Commission des
Relations de Travail du Quebec et al , 1968 S.C.R.
172; Wiseman v. Borneman
,
[1971] A.C. 297; Re
Cypress Disposal Ltd. and Service Employees Inter-
national Union, Local 244
,
50 D.L.R. 150. The same
approach would appear to be appropriate in the case
of the duty to act fairly. Since the question is
essentially one of fact, one cannot say before the
issue has been tried that the Statement of Claim
does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. 104
Here, as was seen with respect to delegation and vires , a
broad approach is being taken by the courts whereby the
legislative intent and the nature of the issues in ques-
tion must be weighed to determine procedural requirements
and the consequential validity or invalidity of acts pur-
portedly performed by the exercise of statutory decision-
making powers.
D. IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH CURRENT
EXECUTIVE REVIEW AND APPEAL SCHEMES
This section applies the criteria established in
the earlier parts of the chapter to assess current per-
formance in the exercise of statutory executive review
and appeal powers and their impact on the administrative
law process. The assessment reveals a number of critical
problems.
In 1971 J. R. Mallory observed that:
The major problem in modern constitutional govern-
ment is to retain an effective control, by public
opinion and by legal restraints, of the apparatus
of the state which constantly expands with the
increased public demand for more social welfare
services and with the growing burden of national
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defence in a world of increasing peril. Liberty in
such a world can be nourished only by the full and
effective functioning of the political and legal
restraints on abuse of power. ^^
The same- basic considerations apply with regard to the
parameters to be placed around executive control over the
generation, interpretation, implementation, review and
enforcement of policy by "independent" regulatory bodies
and departmental administrators. To avoid undue repeti-
tion, problems with regard to executive control over
policy that have been discussed at some length in the
previous chapters will not be dwelt on here. Certain
additional areas not yet discussed will be highlighted.
This section has been designed to be read only in con-
junction with the preceding chapters, not in isolation,
as familiarity with the material presented there is pre-
sumed here.
1. Political Insulation v. Political Control
Much confusion in the regulatory/ administrative law
areas will be eliminated if statutory mechanisms are
chosen with a conscious view to the degree to which they
will achieve a desired measure of either independence
from the executive or political control by the executive.
Once this basic choice with regard to allocation of power
over policy in the key economic sectors has been made,
the practical mechanisms adopted to provide for interpre-
tation and implementation of policy must be ones whose
effects are consistent with rather than in conflict with
that basic choice.
2. Advisory/Regulatory Function
A regulatory body such as the NEB, which performs a
dual function as both government advisor with regard to
the formation of policy and regulator of the oil and gas
industry, is arguably strongly prejudiced in its perfor-
mance of the regulatory function by its involvement in
the formulation of government policy in the energy area.
Use of the NEB regulatory model is not appropriate where
any degree of insulation from executive influence is
desired, any residual independence that the NEB might
retain in performance of its adjudicatory function as
regulator being, of course, destroyed by the subjugation
of many of its major decisions to approval by Cabinet.
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3, Rule-Making/Adjudication
An increased use of rule-making or issue hearings
by the major regulatory bodies as a function independent
from adjudication on particular cases would be desirable.
Such policy hearings would provide a forum for advanced
planning at which it would be possible for diverse and
conflicting viewpoints from the public, industry, and
various sectors within government to be presented, chal-
lenged, and weighed. It would not be inappropriate for
Standing Committees in the House to present a brief to
such an issue or rule-making hearing. Similarly if old
habits, such as ministerial distaste for departing from a
consensus position, could be overcome, one can conceive
of conflicting positions being advocated by the represen-
tatives of several interested government departments all
of whose spheres of activity pertain to the matters at
issue but give them diverse perspectives on the "public
interest"
•
4. Insufficient Insulation of the Regulatory Process
from Political Interference
This problem, touched on numerous times before,
arises primarily from the very real gulf that exists
between the theory and practice in the administrative law
area. One view of regulation in Canada is well expressed
by quoting from the comments of John Turner in the House
at the time the Federal Court Bill was introduced in
March of 1970. He said:
Parliament sets up these statutory tribunals such
as the Canadian Transport Commission, the Canadian
Radio-Television Commission, the National Energy
Board and other Boards. We deliberately delegate
to all those boards and commissions a certain range
of policy decisions that have to be made falling
within a general area of competence. We do this
because we want a certain independence in those
decisions, because we want to withdraw the
decision-making power to a certain degree from the
political arena, and because ministers and depart-
ments do not have the necessary opportunity and
time in certain cases to deal with and address
their minds to those problems. *06
And somewhat further down he continued:
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Where an administrative tribunal — I am now talk-
ing within the federal sphere — exercises a judi-
cial function, or that grey area between the judi-
cial function and the administrative function which
is known as quasi- judicial, where there is a dis-
pute or contest between parties by way of an appli-
cation for a licence or the determination of a rate
structure, or where two or more parties have to be
heard and a decision rendered by the administrative
tribunal, that judicial or qua si-judicial function
should be exercised according to certain prin-
ciples, principles of natural justice. The members
of the board should have no conflict of interest.
Every party should have an opportunity for a hear-
ing. Each party should have the opportunity to
hear the other party's case, cross-examine, obtain
production of documents and have before him the
evidence upon which the board or tribunal makes its
decision. 107
This sets out an ideal of regulation in Canada to which
the realities do not correspond any more than they did in
1970. This gulf between theory and practice is enhanced
by the lack of protections against conflict of interest,
the lack of protections against ministerial interference
with the regulatory process both in policy formation and
adjudication, the general absence of formal procedures in
the performance of executive review functions both by
ministers and on petitions to Cabinet, and the lack of
written reasons in disposing of petitions to Cabinet.
Each of these four problems renders the regulatory pro-
cess in Canada subject to potential abusive use of execu-
tive power. A reasonable apprehension of scope for abuse
of power by the executive in the regulatory area may be
as deleterious to the credibility and integrity of the
regulatory process as actual abuse of that power.
5. Lack of Informed Representation of Diverse
Interests
Regulation in Canada cannot occur with due regard
to diverse aspects of the "public interest" until there
is fuller access by the public to relevant information
and greater monetary support for independent groups
engaging in research, debate, and advocacy of alternative
positions.
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6. Ministerial Interference
Interference, here taken to imply informality and a
high degree of confidentiality, must be distinguished
from open public forms of political activity. Where a
regulatory model is consciously chosen which favours
insulation of the regulatory process from political
interference, mechanisms must be established for prevent-
ing a minister from engaging in private discussions with
members and staff of regulatory boards with regard to
either policy generation or particular matters before the
regulator in its adjudicatory capacity. Overt attempts
by a minister or his department to influence the outlines
of developing policy would, by contrast, be desirable as,
for example, where they took the form of presentation of
a brief or argument in the context of an issue or rule-
making hearing.
It is inappropriate where true insulation from
political interference is desired to make a regulatory
decision subject to appeal to the executive. The estab-
lishment of procedures for executive appeals will not
alter their highly political nature but only encourage
the real reasons for certain sensitive decisions to be
veiled. As hypocrisy in government should not be encour-
aged there is no better solution than the abolition of
Cabinet appeals. One should, of course, distinguish
strongly between an "appeal" provision, such as is seen
in subsection 64(1) of the National Transportation Act
,
whereby the executive is empowered to substitute a
completely new and perhaps opposing decision for that of
the regulatory body (on the grounds of a different view
of the "public interest" or any other such term which is
subject to diverse definitions on the grounds of broad
executive policy) , and a review provision drafted along
the lines of section 23 of the Broadcasting Act allowing
the Cabinet to return a matter to the Commission for
reconsideration in the light of certain submissions by
Cabinet. There should be added, however, a proviso that
the decision of the Commission on reconsideration is to
be final. This type of review provision could be used to
fulfill both the function of providing so-called "equi-
table" relief in policy matters, where strict application
of existing policy would have unconscionably harsh conse-
quences, and the other type of "political" review in
which the Cabinet, cognizant of broader policy issues
than are strictly the responsibility of the regulatory
body, finds that these broader matters must be taken into
consideration.
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7. Conflict of Interest
The problems of conflict of interest in the regula-
tory area are somewhat more complex than the traditional
one of personal financial interest in a venture over
which one^ has some control by virtue of public office.
At least three other types of conflict of interest can be
identified. The second arises in the situation where the
government by virtue of its relation to Crown Corpora-
tions must appear as a client before federal regulatory
bodies. The third, touched on before, arises through the
perhaps inevitable and necessary use of experts in a
field, who have a personal commitment to certain methods
of doing business and to a long-term plan of development
within an industry, as regulators. The fourth, also
touched on before, arises insofar as government desires
to encourage business investment as one means to promote
a healthy economy, and indirectly continue to finance the
government. Conflict may arise between broad social and
political goals and the goals pursued by business. uo
To take a very current example of the fourth type
of conflict one can point to the problems of conflict of
interest in the regulation of nuclear energy with a view
to both safety and production. An alliance with business
interests and the consensus model of executive decision-
making in government make it quite difficult for govern-
ment departments to actively pursue the "public interest"
in its global sense. Either government Ministers must
overcome their general reluctance to adopt publicly con-
flicting points of view or more effective means of sup-
porting independent groups to engage in research, debate,
and advocacy of positions alternative to those of vested
economic pressure groups must be found.
There has been discussion with respect to conflict
of interest in the House of Commons at various times over
the last six years, usually surrounding the introduction
of guidelines or a bill designed to address the problem
of conflict of interest couched in its traditional form.
On December 18, 1973 Guidelines were issued by way of
Order in Council to govern the conduct of public servants
and appointees of the Governor in Council with regard to
potential conflict of interest situations. These were
discussed on the same day in the House and subjected to
criticism on two principal grounds, first that the Guide-
lines failed to take account of potential conflicts of
interest with family or corporate interests not strictly
personal to the individual public servant and second that
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the Guidelines relied on the judgment and integrity of
the individual public servant to both interpret and en-
force the Guidelines in his own case.
In July of 1973 the President of the Privy Council,
Allan MacEachen had tabled a "Green Paper" entitled
"Members of Parliament and Conflict of Interest". The
paper was referred to the Standing Committee on Privi-
leges and Elections which completed its study of the
paper in 1975. The report of the Senate Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs chaired by Senator Carl
Goldenberg presented its report on the Green Paper on the
29th of June, 1976. At this time there was speculation
that perhaps an Act to govern conflict of interest with
regard to members of Parliament might be in effect by
mid-1977.
On June 26, 1978 the government introduced Bill
C-62, a proposed Independence of Parliament Act . Criti-
cism in the House focused on the fact that the Bill would
not have any application to members of regulatory bodies
such as the NEB. Not surprisingly, the dual function
performed by the NEB as advisor and regulator was relied
on by the Prime Minister and the leader of the N.D.P. to
different effects, the former arguing that the guidelines
in the Bill did not cover judges or quasi-judges because
it was inappropriate for the federal government to inter-
fere in this manner with the independence of the judici-
ary, and the latter arguing that the National Energy
Board because of its role in framing major policy deci-
sions, often resulting in substantial government expendi-
tures, certainly should be included under conflict of
interest guidelines.
The new Independence of Parliament Bill, C-6, was
tabled October 16, 1978. It merely passed first reading.
The net effect is that despite six years of study and
debate there is still no legislation as such governing
conflict of interest in the federal government, and such
Guidelines as do exist are wholly inadequate to meet the
problem.
The second aspect of conflict of interest, arising
from the dual role of government as client and regulator,
was raised in the oral question period in the House on
November 22, 1978. The questions directed themselves to
whether any guidelines existed in relation to the role of
Deputy Ministers serving on Crown Corporations and ex-
pressed concern that their presence might confer some
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special advantage on Crown Corporations not available to
their competitors. Although this line of questioning was
apparently motivated by a certain discomfort within the
Conservative party over the acquisition by Petro Canada
of Pacific Petroleums, the concerns may well have valid-
ity and must be taken into account in any consideration
of the appropriateness of significant Cabinet influence
over the generation and implementation of policy in regu-
latory areas directly affecting Crown Corporations.
The Petro Canada matter is a good example to focus
on precisely because the legislative mechanism used in
the case of the NEB, unlike that of the CTC and the CRTC,
clearly provides a channel for political influence over
each and every stage of the regulatory process from
policy generation to approval of the adjudicatory deci-
sion in a particular case. It is understandable that
competitors of Petro Canada are apprehensive about the
long-term consequences of being subject to indirect regu-
lation by Cabinet, which is also the indirect owner and
regulator of Petro Canada. Clearly the issue here is not
at all the "nationalization" of Petro Canada as such or
the value of the use of Crown enterprises to pursue
federal policy goals and ensure Canadian participation in
key sectors of the economy, but rather one of how the
regulatory mechanisms used in the energy area and other
related sectors can be overhauled to insure insulation
from executive interference and the generation and appli-
cation of energy policy in a forum whose members are
independent of vested ownership interests presently per-
ceived to exist in Cabinet as a result of Crown Corpora-
tions. If the regulatory process remains as it is at
present regulators will inevitably find themselves under
pressure, however subtle, to overlook warnings that pro-
jects contemplated by Crown enterprises are economically
unsound, technologically risky or potentially damaging to
the environment. Should subtlety be wasted, Cabinet
appeals are a most effective means of ensuring executive
control.
8. Lack of Parliamentary Control Over the Exercise of
Delegated Legislative Powers
This is a long-standing problem recognized ten
years ago by the Special Committee of the House of Com-
mons on Statutory Instruments (The MacGuigan Committee).
In its Third Report the Committee recommended that Par-
liament be empowered to review questionable regulations
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by way of resolutions referring them to the government or
appropriate minister for reconsideration. 109 The Special
Committee also recommended that Standing Orders be estab-
lished whereby a group of ten members of the House would
have the right to initiate debate on particular regula-
tions. It was also suggested that where regulations
concern matters of major significance to the public, a
provision for a negative or positive resolution would be
appropriate.
As yet none of these measures have been adopted.
Moreover it is arguably the case that the measures pro-
posed by the Special Committee are insufficient. If
negative or positive resolutions are used they should be
used for all regulations, rather than only those of
"major consequence", to avoid the problem of line-
drawing. Directives, rules and guidelines issued pur-
suant to statutes or regulation should also be tabled
even if they are not subject to ratification, HO and a
mechanism should be established whereby the House can
disallow them even if occasional regulatory delays and
inconvenience result. At present once Parliament has
delegated its legislative power, it has no means of
exercising control over use of that power save by the
passage of further legislation. Meanwhile, control of
the legislative machinery is in the hands of the govern-
ment of the day, as are most of the regulation making
powers, and it surely would be rather naive to expect the
government of the day voluntarily to subject its own
regulations, fresh from the office of a Cabinet Minister,
to defeat in the House of Commons by a special Act. It
is arguably the case that responsible parliamentary
government cannot be said to exist in any meaningful
sense if Parliament does not retain some real control
over the use of power it has delegated.
9. Myth of Ministerial Accountability
Similar issues arise around the problem of minis-
terial accountability. Ministerial accountability has
been used recently as an argument in favour of the be-
stowal on Ministers of a power to give policy directions
to regulatory bodies. It is argued that Ministers will be
accountable for these directions to Parliament, the
representatives of the people, as the regulatory bodies
themselves are not. Widespread assertions that the
Minister is accountable for his actions and those of his
subordinates do not become true simply through repeti-
tion. To the contrary, reliance on the principle to show
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the existence of accountability to Parliament for the
performance of a myriad of government functions only
underscores its mythical qualities by overburdening the
principle beyond all credibility. The fact that Parlia-
ment has no effective sanction to use in the case of a
Minister -whose own, or whose department's, overall inter-
pretation of the policy content of legislation differs
from their own is not mentioned. In practice it is
unrealistic to expect a non-confidence motion to be even
seriously contemplated to deal with such a situation
unless the government of the day is already in trouble
with the opposition. Nor is the fact mentioned that the
government of the day has sufficient control over the
legislative machinery to gain legislative foundation for
any particular policy, unless it fails to muster suffi-
cient support for that policy in Parliament, and thus
have no legitimate need for a directive power. Periodic
amendment of the key policy sections of principal stat-
utes would not be an onerous burden on the government of
the day or on Parliament. With Ministerial directive
powers, actual accountability would be assured only if
the exercise of these powers were subject to ratification
by Parliament. A power of ratification, in turn, can
only be responsibly exercised by a Parliament with access
to relevant information as is, of course, not the case at
present.
In Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers , HI a
recent case before the English Court of Appeal, the court
failed to be persuaded by an argument based on account-
ability to Parliament. The case, involving a mail boy-
cott, turned on the question of whether the plaintiff, a
private individual, had standing to bring an action with-
out the consent of the Attorney General. The Attorney
General argued that the decision as to whether to request
an injunction against the boycott should be his alone.
The Court of Appeal decided that the plaintiff could
request an injunction even though the Attorney General
failed to join in this request. The Attorney General had
supported his position by arguing that if he were in-
correct in failing to seek an injunction against the boy-
cott the matter could be raised in Parliament and his
position criticized. Lord Denning found this justifica-
tion to border on the fictional because he thought it
highly probable that the Attorney General would be sup-
ported by his own government party regardless of his
position or his reasons for this position.
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Only in a Parliament where the government of the
day is a minority government does the theory of minis-
terial accountability have much relevance for the day-to-
day adjustment of government policy. Surely it is time
for legislative schemes, such as increased Ministerial
powers of direction, proposed in Canada for the purported
purpose of making government more responsive both to the
practical requirements of government and to the elected
representatives of the people, to be grounded on some-
thing more substantial than fantasy. Genuine pluralism
can only be created by a conscious reallocation of poli-
tical power which recognizes the existence of fundamental
conflict between various interests and provides multiple
protections against abusive use of power. Representative
government can be strengthened to provide for greater
"political accountability" but reliance must be placed on
public participation in policy generation, open exchange
of views, public access to information, institutional
protections to assure impartiality in decision-making,
control by Parliament over primary and secondary legisla-
tion, as well as on the principle of ministerial account-
ability.
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Chapter VIII
RECOMMENDATIONS: MODELS FOR THE GENERATION,
IMPLEMENTATION, REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATORY
POLICY
These recommendations, set out in the form of two
alternative models, have been generated with reference to
the criteria set out in Chapter VII. The over-all aim is
to design legislative schemes for use in the regula-
tory/administrative law area incorporating the values and
principles identified above and avoiding the flaws iden-
tified in current review and appeal provisions.
A. MODEL A: GUIDELINES FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE
In the future, regulatory and administrative law
schemes in general must be carefully and consciously
chosen with a view to how political control is to be
allocated over each stage of the regulatory process; as
was indicated in the preceding chapters this has often
not been done in the past. The result has been a great
gulf between theory and practice in regulation and the
perpetuation, as a consequence, of many illusions about
how, by whom, and on what grounds, regulatory decisions
are taken. As noted by the Lambert Commission Report * *-*
the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) is a good
example of a body commonly and mistakenly thought to have
independent decision-making powers whereas in fact it is
a solely advisory body. Confusions of this sort can and
should be eliminated by the adoption of regulatory
mechanisms and terminology accurately reflecting the
allocation of political control.
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FIRA is a relatively innocent example of the illu-
sions created by the current approach to regulation.
Innocent, because once it is realized that Cabinet is the
decision-maker there is no question of where political
control and thus political responsibility lie. Whether
as a citizen or a member in the House one is satisfied to
allow decisions over foreign investment to remain with
the Cabinet where they are vulnerable to interference by
vested economic interests is another matter and separate
issue. More serious are the illusions created by the
establishment of allegedly "independent" regulatory
bodies whose decisions may be subject both to ministerial
interference and variation, rescission or reversal by
Cabinet. Insofar as independent regulation is genuinely
desired the present statutory schemes are a failure. The
illusion of independence some of them perpetuate combined
with the difficulty of pin-pointing the locus of politi-
cal control for any given decision makes such schemes, at
least in a few instances, a cruel joke on principle of
representative government according to law.
To eliminate these problems in the regulatory and
administrative law areas clear choices as to where poli-
tical control is to lie must be accompanied by institu-
tional mechanisms designed to unambiguously implement
those choices. To use the most obvious example, if
variation and reversal of regulatory decisions on broad
political grounds by the executive is not desired then
petitions to the Governor in Council, as we now know
them, must be abolished. Similar decisions must be made
about each aspect of the administrative law and regula-
tory process with regard to each subject-matter under
federal jurisdiction.
In some instances a high degree of executive con-
trol may be desired. This effect can be achieved without
violating the basic principles and values identified in
Chapter VII by means of the following scheme:
1. Scheme giving a high degree of control to the
executive.
a. Secondary legislation (of all types including
rules, guidelines, and directions) should, inso-
far as this is feasible, be circulated by the
department for public comment in draft form.
General issue hearings may be appropriate from
time to time to increase the level of public
participation in debate over policy development.
134
Rules, guidelines and directions should be
subject to approval by the responsible Minister
and to ratification or negative resolution by
Parliament and to publication.
This approach to the creation of secondary legislation
will broaden the range of viewpoints available to be
taken into account in formulating policy, retain the
principle of ministerial responsibility for policy en-
acted with delegated authority, ensure control by Parlia-
ment over the content of all secondary legislation, and
prevent the promulgation of "secret law". Primary
responsibility for the formulation of secondary legisla-
tion would lie with the body — in this case a government
department — which has the expertise with the subject
matter garnered through the adjudicative process in its
role as original decision-maker. Approval of secondary
legislation by the Minister, subject to ratification or
negative resolution by Parliament, would affirm the prin-
ciple of ministerial responsibility and yet provide
Parliament with a concrete means of exercising control
over the use of legislative power delegated to the de-
partment.
No doubt the requirement for ratification or the
use of a negative resolution by Parliament where either
of these powers had been deemed appropriate and provided
for in the primary legislation would from time to time
result in some inconvenience and delay. Professor
Janisch appears to regard the potential for delay that
would be created by any such provision as serious enough
that he does not recommend it and relies instead solely
on consultation with strengthened Parliamentary commit-
tees.! 13 My view, by contrast, is that if the consulta-
tion process is properly conducted and the department (or
regulatory body, as the case may be, see 2(b) below),
responsible for formulation of secondary legislation
makes appropriate use of various techniques of soliciting
a broad range of views, any veto or approval power in
Parliament will rarely be used to oppose secondary legis-
lation recommended to it. Clearly I assume that Parlia-
ment will use its powers responsibly and I would regard
responsible use to include occasional obstruction of
secondary legislation to allow for further public and
Parliamentary debate over fundamental issues. Without
such a residue of control in Parliament there is no
practical restraint on the use of delegated legislative
power. The mere existence of residual Parliamentary
control in the concrete form of a veto or approval power,
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rather than merely the general principles of Parlia-
mentary supremacy and ministerial responsibility to
Parliament should at the same time motivate the depart-
ment or other body formulating the secondary legislation
to regard Parliament as at least a silent partner in the
project of policy development whose concerns and inter-
ests cannot be simply ignored.
b. Original adjudicatory decision-making should be
performed within the government department under
the "direction and control" of the Minister. If
there is a Ministerial appeal it should be the
appeal of first resort only.
This arrangement gives clear expression to the principle
of Ministerial responsibility for policy interpretation
and yet by specifying that ministerial appeals, if any,
are the appeal of first resort, prevents executive inter-
ference with the policy interpretations of appeal tribu-
nals. As became clear in the preceding chapters this
prohibition is necessary to avoid selective and sometimes
arbitrary executive intervention in the over-all approach
to policy interpretation taken by independent appellate
tribunals which defeats the purposes for which they are
allegedly created.
c. The burden of conducting appeals, if any, from
original adjudicative decisions and, insofar as
they exist, Ministerial appeals, may be given to
an independent tribunal whose decisions should
be either final or subject only to an appeal to
the courts on a point of law or jurisdiction.
It is clear that a point of "policy" interpretation is
more easily construed as a point of law rather than a
matter of "expert opinion" where policy has been given a
detailed articulation in secondary legislation. More-
over, if as provided in (a.) above, all secondary legis-
lation is promulgated in the manner proposed there, the
distinction between secondary legislation as such and
mere rules issued for administrative convenience, dis-
cussed in Chapter VII with regard to the legal status of
"directives", should vanish. The courts would then be
able to decide whether or not they had jurisdiction to
entertain any given appeal insofar as it was grounded on
statutory interpretation with reference to whether the
point to be interpreted had in fact been given a clear
legal meaning or whether instead its interpretation had
either been left to the discretion of the original
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adjudicator or was otherwise subject to being displaced
in its significance for the regulatory decision by
"expert opinion".
It is clear that a decision by Parliament to allow
no appeals to an independent tribunal or to the courts
would leave ultimate responsibility for policy interpre-
tation in the hands of the minister. Accountability for
policy interpretation in the general course of the adju-
dicatory process, as opposed to the use of delegated
legislative power, under any Act not making provision for
appeals to a tribunal or to the courts would thus rest
wholly on the principle of ministerial responsibility.
d. Periodic review of recent cases, including any
before the Minister or the tribunal where the
Act provides for either or both forms of review,
should be routinely performed by departmental
officials in charge of formulation of secondary
legislation with a view to its improvement by
revision.
This suggestion merely reaffirms the point, under-
lying (a.) above, that primary legislative responsibility
for the drafting of secondary legislation is best given
to the body with that familarity with the subject matter
which is gained through the adjudicative process.
e. Consultation with the public, provincial govern-
ments, other government departments and appro-
priate Committees of the House of Commons is to
occur by way of hearings, where appropriate, and
in other cases at least by way of public solici-
tation of views with regard to proposed second-
ary legislation made available to the public in
published form.
This suggestion also amplifies on (a.) above,
emphasizing that departmental and ministerial control
over the formulation of secondary legislation is not to
be taken to preclude taking into account a broad range of
views in the process of formulating and revising regula-
tions, rules and directives.
f
.
Procedures used in adjudication are to be formal
and themselves subject to periodic review and
revision to protect the interests of the parties
as these are apprehended.
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Procedures need not be complex but they are of
little value to the parties when they are subject to
change without notice. Appropriate procedures will be
those attuned to the nature and complexity of the subject
matter and the skills and resources of the parties.
Achieving -procedural fairness must be recognized to be an
on-going process.
g. Written reasons are to be provided on each deci-
sion by any decision-maker.
Written reasons are essential for the purposes of
appeal and encourage the development of consistent and
principled decision-making. They are also of significant
value to the draftsman charged with periodic revision of
primary and secondary legislation insofar as they reveal
points of ambiguity and apprehended unfairness in exist-
ing legislation.
h. The policy provisions of primary legislation
should be subject to periodic review and amend-
ment by Parliament.
In order to enable Parliament to participate in a
meaningful way in this review process Standing Committees
of the House of Commons must be reduced in number to
allow members to specialize and thus focus their time and
attention on policy in only one or two areas. Standing
Committees must also be assured full access to relevant
information from government departments, provided with
more adequate research staff, and come to be perceived as
bearing significant on-going responsibility for policy
review and development. House committees can, as is
remarked on in the Lambert Commission Final Report, ^
function very effectively when charged with responsibil-
ity for program review. This has been demonstrated by
the performance of the sub-committee of the House Commit-
tee on Justice and Legal Affairs which in 1976-77 studied
the penitentiary system.
i. Control over the legislative machinery of Par-
liament must be shared by the government of the
day with those Standing Committees of the House
which have been charged with responsibility for
policy review and development.
This reallocation of control is necessary to pre-
vent the government of the day from simply refusing to
place draft legislation implementing policy reforms
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proposed by Committees before Parliament even though
those reforms are the result of extensive public hearings
and careful study. Such refusals have been a problem
recently. The fate of many of the recommendations of the
Sub-committee studying the penitentiary system, mentioned
above, demonstrates this. A similar problem has been
experienced in the failure of the Liberal government to
introduce legislation implementing the recommendations of
the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Statu-
tory Instruments. H5 Placing some control over the
legislative machinery in the hands of Parliament is
required to strengthen the principle of representative
government.
In those areas where maximum independence in all
aspects of the regulatory/administrative law process from
control by the executive is desired it can be achieved
with adherence to the basic principles and values identi-
fied in Chapter VII by means of the following scheme:
2. Scheme providing maximum independence from execu-
tive control.
a. A regulatory body independent from the executive
government and government departments should be
created by statute and given all the powers and
duties necessary to administer the statute(s) in
question.
The body created in this manner with full powers
would be responsible to Parliament directly. Its inde-
pendence could not be curtailed by the executive for it
would be in no way dependent on the executive. Parlia-
ment might reserve to itself, the executive or the
courts, specific powers of oversight and review.
b. The regulatory body would formulate and approve
all secondary legislation, subject to ratifica-
tion or negative resolution by Parliament and to
publication.
A premium would be placed on advanced planning and
broad consultation in the policy area, qualified by the
realization that on-going modification of policy is also
essential. Public issue and rule-making hearings would
be held in the policy planning stage at which all those
members of the public, representatives of interested
government departments, provincial governments, clients,
and even Standing Committees of Parliament, if they so
139
desired, who presented evidence would have standing to
cross-examine other witnesses. All proposed secondary
legislation, that is, rules, directives and regulations,
would be published in draft form for the purpose of seek-
ing further public criticism and comment before it was
put in final form and laid before Parliament for ratifi-
cation. This approach to the enactment of secondary
legislation is the same as that proposed under scheme (1)
above. In both schemes primary responsibility for formu-
lation of secondary legislation is placed in the body
with original adjudicatory responsibility. Dissatisfac-
tion in Parliament with the use made of delegated legis-
lative power by the regulator may be expressed through
the negative resolution and the enactment of amendments
to the key policy sections of the appropriate statutes.
This differs from the Lambert Commission proposal,
made with reference to independent regulation-making
powers of the CRTC and CTC, that all regulations be
approved by the Governor in Council in accordance with
"the principle that the Governor in Council is the prin-
cipal regulation-making authority" . 1 16 In my opinion
there is no such principle though it is the case that
most regulation-making powers are at present in the
Governor in Council save in those two instances where
Parliament has conferred them, by statute, on a regula-
tory body. If, as the Lambert Commission Report sug-
gests, the real reason for placing this power in the
Governor in Council is to ensure responsibility to
Parliament then it should be done directly by provision
in the primary legislation that secondary legislation be
subject to either approval or veto as is deemed appro-
priate in view of the subject matter of the Act in ques-
tion.
The Governor in Council is patently dependent on
departmental recommendations in exercise of the reg-
ulation-making function. This fact can be recognized by
requiring ministerial approval rather than approval by
the Governor in Council for secondary legislation formu-
lated by a government department. This was suggested in
section 1(a), above. Where a regulatory body bears
primary responsibility for formulation of secondary
legislation a different treatment is appropriate for the
Minister is dependent on the advice of public servants.
In my opinion, it is inappropriate to rely on public
servants rather than members of Parliament to approve
regulations formulated by an "independent" regulator if
the goal is enhancement of responsibility to Parliament.
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If control by the government of the day rather than, or
without, direct accountability to Parliament is desired
then, of course, the Lambert Commission recommendation is
to be preferred.
Conflict between a minister and a regulatory body
over policy interpretation can be resolved along the
lines preferred by the minister by passage of appropriate
clarifying legislation, unless, of course, Parliament
does not support the amendments proposed by the Minister.
This approach would render ministerial directive powers
proposed by H. N. Janischll7 and by the Lambert Commis-
sion superfluous and avoid the very real hazard of these
directive powers being used, even when combined with the
broad consultation and publication proposed by the
Lambert Commission and Janisch, to engage in political
interference with the interpretation and implementation
of policy by independent regulators. H8 Throughout the
present study it has been observed that failure to adopt
concrete mechanisms specifically designed to achieve a
given allocation of power often results in a great gulf
between theory and practice, or between the ideal and the
actual result. Ministers, placed as they are under poli-
tical pressures, would necessarily be tempted to use
directive powers to, in effect, intervene in specific
cases under the guise of clarifying broad policy matters.
To create broad ministerial directive powers would
also be in basic conflict with the principle that the
discretion of decision-makers is not to be fettered. Yet
if directions given under such powers were not said to
impose obligations per se on the regulator, thus avoiding
fettering, the problems for which directive powers are
regarded by Janisch and the Lambert Commission as being
an answer would remain unresolved. In those instances
where Parliament decides provision for ministerial direc-
tive powers is mandatory, in response to pressing practi-
cal considerations overriding the concerns expressed
above with regard to ministerial interference, they may
be specifically authorized in the statute itself provided
that their scope is precisely defined. Exercise of such
directive ^powers may or may not, as is deemed appro-
priate, be specified to be subject to negative resolution
by Parliament.
c. Original adjudicatory decision-making should be
performed by the regulatory body.
141
If the regulatory body performed its policy-making func-
tion well it would not be placed in the position of hav-
ing to direct its attention to general policy decisions
for the very first time in the course of adjudication on
an individual case. Moreover, the adjudicator should
have the option, subject to veto by the client, of wait-
ing to hear and consider any particular application until
relevant policy guidelines are clarified and up-dated.
Where the client wished to proceed instead of waiting,
the new policy should clarify how that particular client
is to be dealt with in the future (whether or not the
same treatment will be given the same client in the
future when a new policy is generally in effect, and for
what period of time). The periodic issuance of general
policy guidelines reflecting the tentative lines along
which the regulator anticipated its policy would develop
in the future would enable parties to the adjudicatory
process to include in their applications representations
on aspects of evolving policy with special relevance to
their particular case.
d. In order to involve diverse segments of the
public in the policy planning and adjudicatory
process, the following measures must be taken by
the regulatory body:
i. Maximum disclosure to the public of the
information pertinent to regulatory deci-
sions.
ii. Full disclosure of ex parte consultations.
iii. Costs to actively participating interveners
on a solicitor-client basis plus disburse-
ments for expert witnesses, save for in-
stances where the intervention was frivo-
lous.
e. Adjudicatory decisions should be subject to
review if at all only by a review committee of
the regulatory body itself and in the courts on
the grounds of error of law and excess of juris-
diction.
No executive review or appeal should be available from
the decisions of an independent regulatory body. It is
by now clear that I regard abolition of "appeals" to
Cabinet as essential to protect the integrity of the
regulatory process. In any event, with the implementation
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of the numerous proposals above with regard to policy
development there should no longer be a need for execu-
tive review of general board policy, a key function in
effect presently served by Cabinet appeals from indi-
vidual decisions.
f. Enforcement mechanisms, generally inadequate
under present regulatory schemes, must be cre-
ated to deal with non-adherence to terms and
conditions placed on licences, certificates,
etc.
It is inappropriate for an independent regulatory body to
be dependent on the Attorney General to prosecute en-
forcement matters. The large number of Crown enterprises
in existence and the recognition, discussed earlier, that
vested economic interests have significant informal
influence at the executive level could create a serious
loss of public trust in the exercise by the Federal Crown
of prosecutorial discretion. Current examples of public
distrust abound with regard to enforcement of health,
safety and pollution guidelines in industry and the ener-
gy field.
Proposals l(e-i) above should also be fully imple-
mented here under scheme 2, for they are of equal value
whether the primary responsibility for policy development
lies in a department or with a regulatory body.
3. In addition to the two models outlined above, the
one maximizing executive control and the other
maximizing the independence of the regulatory body,
a variety of hybrid models clearly could be de-
signed. This should be done with care, however, or
lines of political control will become as blurred
as they often are now. Executive review, though it
probably would not be apprehended as needed even by
the executive where secondary legislation was cur-
rent and detailed, should be prohibited in all
cases other than as provided for in scheme 1 above.
A request for extraordinary relief could be put to
a review committee established within the adjudica-
tory body as well as it could to a Minister's
office, and request for review on the ground of
misinterpretation of policy would place the Minis-
ter in a position to disrupt orderly development of
jurisprudence in the regulatory or administrative
area in question and is therefore not desirable.
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B. MODEL B: GUIDELINES TO AMELIORATE PRESENT PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE
If no fundamental changes are made in the regula-
tory/administrative law areas, the following modifica-
tions would still be useful to strengthen representative
government within the framework of the parliamentary
system.
1. Eliminate all power in the Governor in Coun-
cil to vary, rescind or reverse decisions of inde-
pendent statutory decision-makers. The Governor in
Council on review should be limited to a power to
remit the decision back to the regulatory board or
administrator for reconsideration and final deter-
mination. There should be public notice of matters
made the subject of requests for review. Time
limits should be established within which requests
for review must be made and decisions rendered by
the Governor in Council. Time limits and procedures
to ensure an orderly exchange of pleadings on
review by the Governor in Council will not preju-
dice Privy Council control over the decision-making
process or intra-governmental consultation process
and should be established. Urgent matters could be
decided more quickly on notice to the parties of
intent to decide by a given day. All referrals
back to the regulatory board should be accompanied
by written reasons, copies of which are sent to the
parties. Extraordinary provision could be made for
the provision of confidential written reasons to
the regulatory body. Exercise of the provision for
confidential reasons could in turn be subject to
review and confirmation or rejection by a Federal
Court judge.
2. Explicitly authorize or prohibit by statute
the delegation of existing Ministerial review,
appeal and approval powers, and provide formal pro-
cedures to govern their exercise.
3. Require the publication of all secondary
legislation, including rules, directives, and
guidelines, to prevent the effective promulgation
of "secret" law and provide an opportunity for rou-
tine scrutiny of all secondary legislation to en-
sure that it is intra vires the enabling legisla-
tion in its substance as well as its form.
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4. Implement the measures in A(2)(d) above which
are designed to foster effective public participa-
tion in the regulatory process and eliminate lobby-
ing tactics and executive interference, both
characterized by confidentiality, with independent
regulatory bodies.
5. Subject the problem of conflict of interest
in its various forms, discussed above in Chapter
VII, Section D, to further study to determine how
protections against its effects can be best estab-
lished in the regulatory area. Special attention
must be given to the scope for conflict of interest
arising from the dual involvement of the federal
government as regulator and regulatee.
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Chapter IX
PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL REGULATION
In recent years there have been a series of serious
confrontations between federal and provincial authorities
with regard to regulation. Some conflict has arisen from
overlapping regulatory responsibilities as, for example,
in the regulation of energy production and distribution
where the National Energy Board is responsible for inter-
Provincial pipelines and the provincial regulator is
responsible for intra-Provincial distribution. In the
transportation field similar problems potentially exist
in the area of motor vehicle licences, where federal
regulatory responsibility by statute (not implemented)
covers inter-provincial carriers while provincial regu-
lators are responsible for the issuance of licences for
carriers within the province. Jurisdictional disputes
with roots in the division of powers in the BNA Act where
an obvious geographical test is not available are another
inexhaustible source of confrontation, the recent cable
and pay-T.V. disputes being good examples. In addition,
the decisions of a federal regulatory body may have im-
portant practical impact on the production, availability,
rates or tariffs, nature of services, and distribution,
of an energy, communications, or transportation product
or service within an individual province. Where federal
and provincial policy finds itself at logger-heads, the
carrier or producer who is subject to regulation by both
bodies finds it difficult to engage in coherent business
planning.
Existing mechanisms for federal-provincial consul-
tation in the policy planning area have proved somewhat
less than fully satisfactory. Provincial governments do
represent regional interests and can provide a perspec-
tive on energy, transportation and communications policy
that is unique and a valuable contribution to the policy
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planning area. Because of their special status as
elected representatives, provincial governments have from
time to time expressed considerable discomfort in appear-
ing on a merely equal basis with other interveners at
federal regulatory hearings. Examples of federal-
provincial conflict of the types discussed above were
seen in the case-studies in Chapter VI, especially the
NordAir Affair and the Manitoba Cable case.
There have been diverse proposals to alleviate some
of the sources of federal-provincial conflict in the
regulatory area. One standard solution proposed and in
use to some extent is legislation providing for an inter-
delegation of authority between the federal and provin-
cial spheres. The policy planning area is thorny,
however, and it is often difficult to achieve federal-
provincial agreement.
The federal executive has perceived itself as being
placed at a disadvantage in negotiation with the provin-
ces by the independent regulation-making powers of the
CTC and the CRTC. The solution which appeared to be most
favoured by some members of the Liberal cabinet was to
provide the federal Minister with power to issue "direc-
tives" to the federal regulatory agency to ensure the
implementation on the federal level of relevant federal-
provincial agreements. This idea has been debated for
the areas of transport and communications since at least
the summer of 1975. As of March of 1979 it remained the
favoured solution, not only as an aid to resolving many
federal-provincial disputes of the types mentioned above,
but also as a means for the federal cabinet to exercise a
general ongoing control over policy generated or imple-
mented by the independent federal regulatory bodies.
Members of the Liberal cabinet justified pulling in-
creased power to the centre in this fashion by arguing
that it was necessary if the Cabinet was to have the
tools required for resolution of federal-provincial con-
flict.
The proposal was explained by the Minister of Com-
munications in April of 1975 in the following manner:
The purpose of this provision would be to ensure
that the development of policy would be, and would
be clearly seen to be, under the control of elected
representatives of the people. It would also af-
ford opportunity, from time to time, for the views
of the governments of the provinces to be made
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applicable to the decisions of the Federal Commis-
sion. 1^
The expectation was that policy planning could be con-
ducted by way of federal-provincial conferences culminat-
ing in agreements which then would be implemented on the
federal side by the issuance of policy directives to the
federal regulatory bodies in question. The closely
related idea which has been proposed is to place the
regulation making power of all independent agencies under
Cabinet control and restrict the regulatory bodies them-
selves to the simple enforcement of the regulations and
the policy contained in the regulations. 120
Proponents of ministerial directive powers are
certainly correct in anticipating that the most efficient
way to deal with both sets of problems, that is, genera-
tion and implementation of policy in the federal regula-
tory area as such, and generation and implementation of
policy insofar as it requires cooperation between provin-
cial and federal governments, will be best achieved by a
mechanism of common design. I do not believe it is wise,
however, for the reasons outlined in the preceding chap-
ters, to use broad directive powers as they have been
envisioned for this purpose. Other better solutions are
available. All the negative aspects seen above to be
associated with creation of broad directive powers need
not be reiterated here. The principal objection, in my
view, is the excessively heavy dependence on the princi-
ple of ministerial responsibility for the purposes of
political accountability they require. However viable
reliance on ministerial responsibility to assure that
ultimate political control resides in Parliament may or
may not be, both in general and in particular circum-
stances, there is really no need to place undue burdens
on the principle.
One problem in particular, however, that of con-
flict of interest, should perhaps be underlined at this
point. The federal government is not only responsible
for regulation in the federal jurisdiction but also has
occasion through its agents, the Crown corporations, to
appear as clients before federal regulatory bodies. The
scope for conflict of interest here is clear and while it
may well be that the federal cabinet has no active mali-
cious intent to issue directives of a type which would be
equivalent to the dictation to the regulators of policy
placing federal Crown corporations in a favoured posi-
tion, it nevertheless remains true that the perspective
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brought to bear by Cabinet on problems of broad public
policy must inevitably be influenced by considerations
arising from the increasing direct involvement of the
federal government in business by way of the Crown cor-
poration as well as by the well-established pressures on
Cabinet to placate major business interests.
The interests both of the provinces and of non-
state operated enterprises as well as of the public in
general would be rather better protected if federal-
provincial agreements — assuming that such agreements
can in fact be achieved — were subject to ratification
or negative resolution by Parliament and the provincial
legislatures concerned. Reference could then be made to
the agreements themselves by the regulatory agencies
concerned and it would be unnecessary to interpose the
mechanism of the directive, to be issued or not as was
seen to be desirable by the federal Cabinet and worded in
the form that was deemed most appropriate by the federal
Cabinet or minister involved. The onus would thus be
placed on the federal and provincial governments to
engage in any negotiations required to arrive at clear
agreements and to obtain legislative approval for these
agreements. Agreements of this type might as well be
achieved by federal-provincial committees of regulators;
regulators in theory should be more efficient in perform-
ing this task as they have a familiarity with the subject
matter rarely possessed by ministers. The capacity to
focus on technical issues when these are relevant would
make it possible to blend consideration of technical and
political questions. At once, four objectives would be
achieved: (1) federal and provincial regulators would be
provided with a clear mandate to implement a precise
policy as set forth in the agreement, (2) the new policy
would be clearly intra vires
, (3) the federal-provincial
dispute would presumably have been resolved, and (4)
federal and provincial regulators would interpret a
common agreement, a single document, rendering the inter-
position of federal and provincial executive interpreta-
tions, issued to them in the form of regulations or "di-
rectives", superfluous.
The aftermath of the Manitoba cable case, moreover,
indicates that a federal regulatory body can respond
realistically to special circumstances created by
federal-provincial agreements and is willing to take
provincial policy into account when applying its own
policy for the purposes of issuing broadcasting licences
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within an individual province. This experience may indi-
cate that the ratification scheme proposed above, involv-
ing a high degree of formality, is quite unnecessary.
Success of the informal approach, however, requires a
strong-minded and persuasive federal commission if a de-
gree or type of fragmentation in federal regulatory pol-
icy that would defeat its very purpose is to be avoided.
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APPENDIX A
Statutory Powers of Direction, Review and Appeal
in the Minister and the Governor in Council over
Decisions of Federal Boards, Tribunals and Commissions
The statutory provisions classified were selected
from the November 1, 1978, Office Consolidation of the
Revised Statutes of Canada prepared by the Department of
Justice. The method of selection used was the following.
First, computer searches were conducted using two key
word combinations: (1) Governor Minister Minister's
Ministerial and Appeal* Directive Directives Rescind*
Reverse Reversed Revoke* Review Reviewed Reviews Varied
Varies Vary, and (2) Governor Minister Minister's Minis-
terial and Direct Directed Directing Direction Directions
Directs but not Appeal* Directive Directives Rescind*
Reverse Reversed Revoke* Review Reviewed Reviews Varied
Varies Vary. The sections included in that sampling were
then screened by hand to eliminate those where no prior
exercise of statutory decision-making power was under
review or appeal.
Subsection 2(j>) of the Federal Court Act defines
the terms "federal board, Commission or other tribunal"
to mean • •
.
"any body or any person or persons having, exercis-
ing or purporting to exercise jurisdiction or
powers conferred by or under an Act of the Parlia-
ment of Canada, other than any such body consti-
tuted or established by or under a law of the
province or any such person or persons appointed
under or in accordance with a law of the province
or under section 96 of the British North America
Act , 1867;"
The breadth of this definition implies that virtually all
federal statutory decision-making powers, not merely
those exercised by a federal "board, commission or tribu-
nal" so-called and subject by statute to executive re-
view, are technically within the purview of this study
insofar as all departmental administrators report to a
Minister and their decisions may thus be subject to
review. Further criteria clearly had to be imposed to
select the sections to be studied. Explicit provisions
for executive review or appeal of the decisions of
federal boards, tribunals and commissions so-called have
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all been included. Decisions by single persons exercis-
ing statutory decision-making powers specified as belong-
ing to the holder of a particular office such as "Direc-
tor" or "Administrator" or "Superintendent" have only
been included insofar as the legislation appears to have
been cast in an attempt to give the original decision
—
maker so-named a functional independence, rather like
that of a board or tribunal, from the Minister. Provi-
sions for appeals to an adjudicator or appeal board
rather than to the Minister or from a decision by the
Minister have been partially included in this classifica-
tion to obtain a more balanced and adequate view of the
scope and significance of ministerial review powers with-
in the legislative scheme as a whole.
The statutory provisions included in the final list
cannot be regarded as totally exhaustive of all provi-
sions in the Revised Statutes of Canada for review or
appeal by the Minister or the Governor in Council of the
decisions of federal boards, commissions and tribunals.
The Revised Statutes of Canada do not use a uniform ter-
minology and as a result, in all probability, there are a
few statutory provisions in the Revised Statutes of
Canada that provide for the effective equivalent of a
review or appeal power and yet would not be selected by
the key word combinations used. In addition, certain
Acts give effect to review and appeal powers under other
Acts or sections of the same Act by the use of a phrase
such as "the provisions of section 64 of the National
Transportation Act apply mutatis mutandis to all deci-
sions of the board made pursuant to this section". No
section worded in this manner would have been included in
the basic group from which this classification has been
prepared. Such provisions have been included in the
material classified insofar as they have come to my
attention but the list does not purport to include each
and everyone of these provisions. At the same time it is
fair to say that the material classified is sufficiently
complete to give a fully representative view of the
various legislative schemes in use at the present time to
provide for executive review and appeal powers over
federal administrative decisions.
Directive powers have been included in this table
to indicate the extent to which the executive holds a
discretionary or mandatory power to define the parameters
within which the independent statutory decision-maker
exercises original discretion. If the aim is to ascer-
tain the extent of executive control over the substance
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of decisions of federal boards, tribunals and commis-
sions, then clearly directive powers are as significant
as review and appeal powers. Regulations have, in this
regard, a role and significance similar to directives.
For simplicity's sake the distribution of regulation-
making powers has not been included in this table.
However it is to be noted that most regulations are made
either by the Governor in Council with or without the
recommendation of the appropriate Minister, by the Minis-
ter with the approval of the Governor in Council, or, on
occasion, by a regulatory body with or without the appro-
val of the Minister. Effective control over the content
of regulations, by which legislation is implemented and
in which the policy aims of legislation are interpreted
and given substance, is thus in the hands of the execu-
tive, not Parliament nor, save rarely, independent regu-
latory bodies. In examining the table below the signifi-
cance of those regulation-making powers must not be
forgotten.
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KEY
The following abbreviations are used in the follow-
ing table:
a — directive power (unspecified) in Minister
b — general directive power in Minister
c — specific directive power in Minister
d — jurisdictional directive power in Minister
e — board or company under management and control
of Minister
f — directive power (unspecified) in Governor in
Council
g — general directive power in Governor in Coun-
cil
h — specific directive power in Governor in Coun-
cil
i — jurisdictional directive power in Governor in
Council
j — board or company agent of federal Crown
k — agency or board of review with solely inquiry
and advisory or reporting function
1 — Minister to review recommendation and decide
m — appeal to Minister
n — Minister to review recommendation and advise
Governor in Council
o — Governor in Council to decide
p — Governor in Council to approve
q — appeal to Governor in Council
r — appeal to board or adjudicator from decision
of Minister
s — appeal to adjudicator rather than to Minister
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APPENDIX B
Orders in Council from January 1968 to February 1979
disposing of petitions to the Governor in Council
pursuant to Statute from the Decisions of Statutory
Regulators
1. Between August 27, 1976, and August 24, 1978, 15
petitions or groups of petitions against Orders of the
Administrator were submitted to the Governor in Council
pursuant to section 24 of the Anti-Inflation Act * All of
these petitions were dismissed.
Petition submitted July 29, 1976, by Aircraft Operations
Group. No Order in Council issued.
Petitions submitted in August, 1976, re Atlantic Sugar.
No Order in Council issued.
Petitions submitted September 3, 7, and 8, 1976 re City
Motors and Hickman Motors. No Order in Council issued.
P.C. 1976-2418, September 29, 1976, on the petition of
the Manitoba Liquor Control Commission
P.C. 1976-3278, December 23, 1976, on the petition of
the Essex County Board of Education
P.C. 1978-725, March 9, 1978, on the petition of the
Niagara South Board of Education
P.C. 1978-726, March 9, 1978, on the petition of East-
ern Provincial Airways (1963) Limited
P.C. 1978-808, March 16, 1978, on the petition of the
City of Winnipeg
P.C. 1978-809, March 16, 1978, on the petition of the
Treasury Board of Canada re the Air-
craft Operations Group
P.C. 1978-810, March 16, 1978, on the petition of the
City of Winnipeg
P.C. 1978-811, March 16, 1978, on the petition of St.
Boniface School Division No. 4
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P.C. 1978-1626, May 11, 1978, on the petition of Essex
Group Inc.
P.C. 1978-2271, July 13, 1978, on the petition of Abex
Industries Limited
P.C. 1978-2612, August 16, 1978, on the petition of
International Union of Operating En-
gineers Local #955
P.C. 1978-3226, October 19, 1978, on the petition of
Communications Union Canada
2. Transport: Canadian Transport Commission and peti-
tions pursuant to section 64 of the National Transporta-
tion Act . As was explained above the non-issuance of any
Orders in Council disposing of petitions or on his own
motion merely indicates that the Governor in Council has
not exercised his powers under section 64 but not neces-
sarily that no petitions were submitted.
1968 No Orders in Council.
1969 No Orders in Council.
1970 No Orders in Council.
1971 P.C. 1971-2167, October 14, 1971, denying the peti-
tion of NordAir Ltd. to vary or rescind Decision
No. 2968 in which the C.T.C. authorized A. Fecteau
Transport Aerien Ltee. to provide a Class 3 speci-
fic point commercial air service to the additional
point Fort George under Licence No. ATB
1712/67(NS).
1972 No Orders in Council.
1973 P.C. 1973-822, March 29, 1973, denying the petition
of Quebecair to vary or rescind Decision No. 3075
in which the C.T.C. denied an application for a
licence to operate a Class 8 International Schedule
Commercial air service serving Montreal and points
in the eastern United States.
1973 P.C. 1973-823, March 29, 1973, denying the peti-
tions of A. Fecteau Transport Aerien Ltee. to vary
or rescind Decision No. 3433 in which the C.T.C.
authorized NordAir Ltee. to serve certain points
from Montreal, and Nos. Decisions 3426, 3434 and
168
3438 in which the C.T.C. imposed certain weight
limitations on aircraft to be used under licences
held by the petitioner.
1974 P.C. 1974-715, March 26, 1974, denying the petition
of Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd. to vary or re-
scind Decision No. 3566 in which the C.T.C. found
that the proposed acquisition by Air Canada of an
interest in Wardair Canada Ltd. by the purchase of
1/3 of the issued shares of Wardair Canada Ltd. and
later certain non-voting preferred shares (to be
issued) would not unduly restrict competition or
otherwise be prejudicial to the public interest.
1974 P.C. 1974-1605, July 16, 1974, denying the peti-
tions of the provinces of Manitoba and Saskatche-
wan, the City of Yorkton and the Yorkton Chamber of
Commerce to rescind or vary Decision No. 3729 of
the Air Transport Committee of the Canadian Trans-
port Commission approving an application by Mid-
West Airlines Ltd. to suspend the commercial air
services operating between Winnipeg and Brandon
under licence No. ATC 1949/70 (NS) and between
Winnipeg, Dauphin and Yorkton under licence No.
1950/70 (NS).
1975 No Orders in Council issued. No disposition of
group of three petitions by the CAC and the Prov-
inces of Manitoba and Saskatchewan against the CTC
decision rendered May 26, 1975 in the 1975 air rate
case.
1976 P.C. 1976-894, April 13, 1976, on the recommenda-
tion of the Minister of Transport varying the
following orders and decisions of the Canadian
Transport Commission:
(a) Order No. R-16824 dated June 27, 1973;
(b) Order No. R-17016 dated August 2, 1973; and
(c) any other order or decision of the Canadian
Transport Commission that is inconsistent with
paragraph (d) below;
(d) that the following rates or portions of rates
for domestic and export movement of rapeseed meal
and rapeseed oil from the four rapeseed crushing
plants at Altona, Nipawin, Saskatoon and Leth-
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bridge, be established annually at minimum compen-
satory levels:
(i) rates for rape seed meal and rape seed oil
moving west;
(ii) rates for rapeseed oil moving east; and
(iii) the portions of rates pertaining to the
movement of rapeseed meal east of
Thunderbay or Armstrong, Ontario.
1976 P.C. 1976-2066, August 5, 1976, on the recommenda-
tion of the Minister of Transport varying Decision
No. 4886 of the Canadian Transport Commission on
the application by the Attorney General of British
Columbia for an order to restrain or enjoin Pacific
Western Airlines Ltd. from moving its executive
head-office, headquarters or administration staff
and/or repair and maintenance facilities and staff
from British Columbia.
1976 P.C. 1976-3320, December 23, 1976, denying the
petition of Canadian Pacific Ltd., opposed by the
Government of the Province of British Columbia and
a number of local businesses and associations,
municipal councils and members of the British
Columbia Legislature, to vary or rescind Order No.
R-23304 of the Canadian Transport Commission re-
quiring Canadian Pacific to reconstruct two bridges
at French Creek and Tsable River within twelve
months. (Canadian Pacific Ltd. had suspended all
railway operations between Parksville and Courtenay
on the Esquiraalt and Nanaimo Railway in the Prov-
ince of British Columbia on July 1, 1975, on the
grounds that the two bridges in question were un-
safe.) Order No. R-23304 of the Canadian Transport
Commission is hereby varied to provide that Cana-
dian Pacific Ltd. shall proceed forthwith with
action to reconstruct the bridges at mileage 98.6
and 125.5 of its Victoria subdivision and that such
reconstruction be completed and ready for train
traffic within twelve months of the date of this
Order in Council.
1977 P.C. 1977-362, February 18, 1977, on the recom-
mendation of the Minister of Transport varying the
following Orders and Decisions of the Canadian
Transport Commission: a) Order No. R-16824 dated
June 27, 1973, as varied by Order in Council P.C.
1976-894; and b) Order No. R-17016 dated August 2,
1973, as varied by Order in Council P.C. 1976-894,
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only insofar as necessary to provide that Canadian
Transport Commission Orders No. R-23976 dated
November 26, 1976, and No, R-24045 dated December
16, 1976, purporting to be in conformity with the
above-mentioned Order in Council, P.C. 1976-894,
express the intention of the Governor in Council
and are binding upon the Canadian Transport Commis-
sion and upon all parties.
1977 P.C. 1977-717, March 17, 1977, denying the petition
of the Attorney General of British Columbia to vary
Decision No. 4886 of the Canadian Transport Commis-
sion on the application by the Attorney General of
British Columbia for an order to restrain or enjoin
Pacific Western Airlines Ltd. from moving its
executive head-office, headquarters or administra-
tive staff and/or repair and maintenance facilities
and staff from British Columbia as varied by Order
in Council P.C. 1976-2066 of August 5, 1976.
1977 P.C. 1977-1372, May 12, 1977, granting the petition
of McCord Helicopters Ltd. to vary Decision No.
3896 and Decision No. 4942 of the Canadian Trans-
port Commission to provide for the acceptance of
the application by McCord Helicopters Ltd. for
authority to operate a Class 4, Group A-RW charter
commercial service to transport goods and persons
between points within Canada from a base at
Chetwynd, B.C. and the issuance of a licence ac-
cordingly.
1977 P.C. 1977-2353, August 16, 1977, denying the peti-
tion of Mr. Ian Watson, M.P., to vary or rescind
the Decision of the Canadian Transport Commission
dated February 24, 1976, rejecting an application
for the re-establishment of passenger train service
between Valleyfield and Montreal in the Province of
Quebec.
1978 P.C. 1978-168, January 19, 1978, on the recommenda-
tion of the Minister of Transport varying Canadian
Transport Commission Decision No. 5369 and Part
IV-A of the Air Carrier Reguations made by the
Canadian Transport Commission General Order No.
1977-9 Air dated December 19, 1977, only insofar as
necessary to provide: a) that a larger number of
inter-regional ABCs (domestic) be permitted in 1978
to give sufficient scope for the initiation of a
full and fair test and determination of the demand
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for low-priced domestic air travel and of the im-
pact of inter-regional ABCs (domestic) on schedule
services; b) that other air carriers holding
Class-4 licences be allowed to apply for the right
to participate in the additional inter-regional
ABCs
-
(domestic) to be permitted pursuant to (a)
above, without giving the two trunkline air car-
riers any primary right to the operation of such
additional inter-regional ABCs (domestic); and c)
that the Commission consider and determine whether
any other restrictions on the performance of ABCs
(domestic) contained in Part IV-A of the Air Car-
rier Regulations may appropriately be eased, and in
particular, whether it would be practical and
desirable to permit the mixing of ABCs (domestic)
and ITC passengers, and of originating and return-
ing passengers, on the same aircraft, and to reduce
the time requirements in respect of advance booking
and if so, the Commission shall amend the Air Car-
rier Regulations accordingly.
1978 P.C. 1978-1993, June 15, 1978, denying the peti-
tions of the Government of Saskatchewan and Mr. Don
Mazankowski, M.P., to rescind or vary Order No.
R-24504 of the Railway Transport Committee of the
Canadian Transport Commission.
1978 P.C. 1978-2351, July 20, 1978, denying the petition
of Mr. Don Mazankowski, M.P., seeking rescission of
Order No. R-24502 of the Railway Transport Commit-
tee of the Canadian Transport Commission.
1978 P.C. 1978-3091, October 5, 1978, denying the peti-
tions of the Government of Ontario, Great Lakes
Airlines Ltd., SunTours Ltd. and the Government of
Manitoba to vary or rescind one or both of Deci-
sions Nos. 5537 and 5538 in which the Canadian
Transport Commission altered the licences of Trans-
air Ltd. and NordAir Ltd.
1978 P.C. 1978-3389, November 6, 1978, denying the peti-
tions of the Government of Ontario, the Government
of Quebec, the Consumer's Association of Canada,
the Alliance of Canadian Travel Associations, the
Honourable Herb Gray, M.P. , Great Lakes Airlines
Ltd., Suntours Ltd., the Chamber of Commerce of
Thunderbay and the Government of Manitoba, to vary
or rescind Decision No. 5539 in which the Air
Transport Committee of the Canadian Transport
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Commission decided not to disallow the acquisition
by Air Canada of NordAir.
1979 Pending. Petition submitted on January 18, 1979 by
Canadian National Railway Company requesting that
the Governor in Council vary Order No. R-26840 of
the Railway Transport Committee and rescind Order
No. R-28128 and the Decision of the Review Commit-
tee of the Canadian Transport Commission dated
January 5, 1979, in the matter of the abandonment
of certain operations in the Neepawa and Canberry
subdivisions.
3. Broadcasting and Telecommunications: Canadian
Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (or
its predecessor Canadian Transport Commission) and Orders
in Council disposing of petitions pursuant to section 64
of the National Transportation Act and section 23 of the
Broadcasting Act . Non- issuance of an Order in Council
does not necessarily imply that no petitions were submit-
ted.
1968 No Orders in Council.
1969 No Orders in Council.
1970 No Orders in Council.
1971 No Orders in Council.
1972 No Orders in Council.
1973 P.C. 1973-871, April 9, 1973, on the recommendation
of the Minister of Communications, pursuant to sub-
section 64(1) of the National Transportation Act
,
varying the Decision of the Canadian Transport Com-
mission on application "A" of Bell Canada filed
with the Commission on November 10, 1972, by post-
poning the date on which the new tariffs are to
become effective for approximately three months or
until the third day of July 1973 to allow suffi-
cient time for a review of the decision.
1973 P.C. 1973-1765, June 21, 1973, on the recommenda-
tion of the Minister of Communications pursuant to
subsection 64(1) of the National Transportation Act
varying the Decision of the Canadian Transport Com-
mission dated March 30, 1973 on application "A" of
Bell Canada filed with the Commission on November
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10, 1972 in which the C.T.C. approved certain rate
increases requested, by revoking the 50% increase
in service charges (tariff items 100 and 110) set
out on pages 18 to 20 of schedule 1 of said appli-
cation "A" and authorized by the Commission, the
said revocation not to affect the introduction of a
minimum visit service charge as set out on page 19
of the said schedule 1.
1973 P.C. 1973-1827, June 29, 1973, on the recommenda-
tion of the Minister of Communications pursuant to
subsection 64(1) of the National Transportation
Act
,
varying the Decision of the Canadian Transport
Commission dated March 30, 1973, on application "A"
of Bell Canada filed with the Commission on Novem-
ber 10, 1972 in which the C.T.C. approved certain
rate increases requested in the application, by
revoking the 50% increase in service charges
authorized by the Commission, other than the in-
creases already revoked by Order in Council P.C.
1973-1765 of June 21, 1973, the said revocation not
to affect the introduction of a minimum visit ser-
vice charge.
1974 No Orders in Council.
1975 No Orders in Council.
1976 P.C. 1976-2761, November 10, 1976, on the recom-
mendation of the Minister of Communications pur-
suant to section 23 of the Broadcasting Act
,
setting aside the issue by the C.R.T.C. of the
following broadcasting licences: a) the licences
to service Selkirk and Portage La Prairie, Mani-
toba, which were issued to Winnipeg Videon Ltd. by
C.R.T.C. Decision 76-650 of September 16, 1976; and
b) the licence to serve Brandon, Manitoba which was
issued by Grand Valley Cablevision Ltd. by C.R.T.C.
Decision 76-651 of September 16, 1976.
1977 P.C. 1977-1508, May 26, 1977, denying the petition
of Capital Cable Cooperative dated May 3, 1977,
pursuant to section 23 of the Broadcasting Act to
set aside Decision No. 77-193 of the Canadian
Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission
or to refer it back to the Commission for recon-
sideration and hearing.
1977 P.C. 1977-2026, July 14, 1977, dismissing the peti-
tion submitted on June 1, 1977, by Mr. A. J. Roman
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on behalf of the National Anti-poverty Organization
pursuant to subsection 64(1) of the National Trans-
portation Act to vary or rescind Telecom Decision
No. 77-7 of the Canadian Radio-Television and Tele-
communications Commission dated June 1, 1977, con-
cerning the application of Bell Canada for certain
rate increases.
1977 P.C. 1977-2027, July 14, 1977, dismissing the peti-
tion submitted June 9, 1977 by Mr. A. J. Roman on
behalf of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, pursuant
to subsection 64(1) of the National Transportation
Act , to vary or rescind the Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission Tele-
com Decision C.R.T.C. 77-7 dated June 1, 1977, con-
cerning the application of Bell Canada for certain
rate increases.
1977 P.C. 1977-2028, July 14, 1977, dismissing the peti-
tion submitted May 12, 1977 by Canadian National
Railway Co., pursuant to subsection 64(1) of the
National Transportation Act , to vary or rescind
Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications
Commission Telecom Decision C.R.T.C. 77-3 dated
April 7, 1977, concerning the application of the
Canadian National Railway Company for certain rate
increases.
1977 P.C. 1977-3152, November 3, 1977, the Governor in
Council pursuant to subsection 64(1) of the Nation-
al Transportation Act , having given due considera-
tion to petitions and views of interested parties
and to the views of the Canadian Radio-Television
and Telecommunications Commission as expressed in
Telecom Decision C.R.T.C. 77-10 in which the Com-
mission did not approve the Telesat Canada Proposed
Agreement, made as of December 31, 1976, with the
Trans-Canada Telephone System, by his own motion,
varying the Telecom Decision C.R.T.C. 77-10 dated
August 24, 1977, so as to provide for the approval
of the Agreement between Telesat Canada and Trans
—
Canada Telephone System; that is to say, the deci-
sion is to be read as follows: "The Agreement
between Telesat Canada and the Trans-Canada Tele-
phone System, made as of December 31, 1976, is in
the public interest and is hereby approved."
1978 P.C. 1978-3577, November 23, 1978, dismissing the
petitions of C. K. Nelson and D. J. W. Robinson
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dated October 3, 1978, the petition and supple-
mentary petition of K. M. Greentree dated October
16, 1978 and November 21, 1978, and the petition of
J. W. Gillespie, dated October 25, 1978, all pur-
suant to section 23 of the Broadcasting Act , to set
aside or refer back to the Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission for
reconsideration and hearing Decisions C.R.T.C.
78-623/24, 78-629/30, 78-631/32 and 78-635/36 of
the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunica-
tions Commission.
1979 P.C. 1979-191, January 25, 1979, on the recommenda-
tion of the Minister of Communications, pursuant to
section 23 of the Broadcasting Act , not to set
aside Decision 78-724 of the Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission.
1979 Pending. Petition by Bell Canada submitted to the
Governor in Council on March 2, 1978 pursuant to
section 64(1) of the National Transportation Act
for an order varying or rescinding two decisions of
the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunica-
tions Commission dated August 10, 1978 (Telecom
Decision C.R.T.C. 78-7) and February 2, 1979 (Tele-
com Decision C.R.T.C. 79-1) with respect to inclu-
sion for the purpose of regulation of telephone
rates in Ontario and Quebec of the income from a
contract dated January 25, 1978 between Bell Canada
and the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia providing for the
extension, modernization, operation, and main-
tenance of the Saudi Arabian Telephone system for a
period of five years.
4. Summary of Orders in Council Disposing of Petitions
to the Governor in Council from Decisions of the Canadian
Transport Commission and the Canadian Radio-Television
and Telecommunications Commission, January 1968 to March
1979.
a. Transportation:
1968 No Orders in Council.
1969 No Orders in Council.
1970 No Orders in Council.
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1971 Petitions Denied — 1.
1972 No Orders in Council.
1973 Petitions Denied — 2.
1974 Petitions Denied — 2.
1975 No Orders in Council issued. No dis-
position on group of three petitions
against CTC decision.
1976 Petitions Denied — 1; Petitions Al-
lowed — 1; Order varied on the recom-
mendation of the Minister — 1.
1977 Petitions Denied — 2; Petitions Al-
lowed — 1; Order varied on the recom-
mendation of the Minister — 1.
1978 Petitions Denied — 4; Petitions Al-
lowed — 1.
1979 January to March: Pending — 1.
b. Broadcasting and Telecommunications.*
1968 No Orders in Council.
1969 No Orders in Council.
1970 No Orders in Council.
1971 No Orders in Council.
1972 No Orders in Council.
1973 Order varied on the recommendation of
the Minister — 3.
1974 No Orders in Council.
1975 No Orders in Council.
1976 Order varied on the recommendation of
the Minister — 1.
* Jurisdiction over regulation of telecommunications
was transferred from C.T.C. to C.R.T.C. on April 1, 1976.
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1977 Petitions Denied — 4; Petitions Al-
lowed — 1.
1978 Petitions Denied — 1.
1979 January to March: Petitions Denied —
1; Petitions Pending — 1.
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APPENDIX C
Appeals from Decisions of th« Ciaidlto Transport Commission,
1972-1981 1
Applications Co the Revii
Committee under
•action 63 of the
National Transpor-
tation Act
withdrawn
no grounds for revls
decision affirmed
decision varied
TOTAL
2 5 1 — 1 2
8 3 18 36 35 41
15 10 14 7 14 21
_£ 5 7_ 25
_2J- 20
1± 23 40 68 81 84
Appeals to the Minister
under section 25 of the
National Transportation
Act re air, water
(See Appendix D(2))
decision modified
decision afflraed
Commission directed
to review decision
TOTAL
7
1
6
3
5
7
3
2
12
4
16
9
7
3 2 3 2 4 1 3
_1Q_ 9
_
11 12 18 21 19
Variation of Orders by
the Covernor In Council
on the recommendation
of the Minister under
section 64 of the
Nstlonal Transportation
Act2 I (rail) l(rall) l(alr)
Petitions to the Governor
In Council under section
64 of the Nstlonal
Transportation Act
denied
allowed
2 (air) 2 (air) Krall)
Kalr)
,(1 air) .(2 air)
*(1 rail) (2 rail)
Kalr)
Aa reported In the Annual Reports, Canadian Transport Commission, 1972-1978.
These Orders In Council make no reference to a specific petitioner although In some
esses petitions regerdlng the matter had been submitted to the Covernor In Council.
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